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ABSTRACT

Wurtz, Jonathan. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2020. Childhood as a
Philosophical Means to a Political End: Liberalism, Stability, and the Deficiency Model of
Childhood.
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls tells us that an important element of any political
theory of justice is its capacity to generate its own support. That is to say that the principles of
justice theorized by political philosophers, when adopted by a society, ought to inspire
individuals to act in accordance with them. A theory of justice whose principles does not
generate its own support would be, in this sense, unstable and as a result, rejected by rational
liberal standards. In this dissertation, I criticize the stability of Rawlsian liberal theory by first
showing its reliance on the deficiency conception of childhood, and second, rejecting this view
of childhood as empirically ungrounded and epistemologically narrow in scope. By the end, this
dissertation concludes that liberal philosophy is either unstable and therefore illegitimate by its
own standards, or needs to rethink the political status of children—a task which seems
impossible given liberalism’s own commitment to mature rationality.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is concerned with the deployment and function of a particular concept of
childhood in the liberal tradition specifically, and western political philosophy more broadly
speaking. The concept of childhood I am particularly interested in dissecting has been referred to
as “the deficiency conceptualization of childhood”— which I also refer to as the not yet model of
childhood (Matthews, 2009).2 According to this view, childhood represents a predicament of
becoming, of not yet having achieved adulthood. It is, in other words, defined by two
complementary elements: first, childhood is not adulthood, and second, it is a process of
becoming towards adulthood. On the one hand, childhood’s ontology is described in the
negative; it is, first and foremost, not adulthood. To understand what a child is, one must begin
with the adult, and strip them of certain essential qualities— such as abstract reasoning, selfcontrol, moral responsibility etc…. On the other hand, childhood is also a process of becoming
already pointing towards adulthood. That is, its being doesn’t only lack adulthood, it is also
defined by a particular directionality. Childhood, if understood correctly, should imply the
realization of adulthood.
How adulthood is defined will depend on a thinker’s metaphysical, epistemological, and
normative commitments. It may represent the essential rational capacity for human moral
autonomy, as in Kant, or a more fundamental dialectical relationship between transcendence and
facticity, as we see in the French existentialist tradition. We can in fact find a wide variety in
philosopher’s conception of adulthood throughout the history of western philosophy. This is
because the adult is the primary subject and object (at least since the rise of humanism) of
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While “deficient model” is an already established term in the philosophy of childhood and philosophy of
education, it fails to illustrate the dual nature of childhood as being (not an adult) and becoming (an adult). To be
deficient specifically entails a lack but does not necessarily entail the potential for resolving that lack. Hence, I also
use the name “not yet” model of childhood to specifically highlight this duality.
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philosophical thinking. Not only is the philosopher an adult, but they discuss adult matters in
adult ways. Childhood, on the other hand, does not lend itself to such diversity. In most of the
history of western philosophy, it has described human beings who are not yet adults (Matthews
and Mullin, 2018). As a result, philosopher’s interrogation of childhood’s ontology typically
emerges out of a deeper and more fundamental philosophical question about the nature of its
primary subject— i.e. the adult. In the same way that Beauvoir concluded in 1949 that “humanity
is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him”, the deficiency model of
childhood operates on the dogmatic assumption that humanity is equivalent to adulthood, and
defines childhood not on its own terms, but relative to a more primary ontological adulthood
(Beauvoir, 2011, 5). Thus, despite its temporal priority, the not yet model depicts childhood as
metaphysically, epistemologically, and normatively secondary.
This dissertation is, however, only narrowly interested in the deficiency model. While the
ultimate aim is to reject the epistemological legitimacy of this conception of childhood, the
majority of this work is concerned with detailing its function as a strategic concept in liberal
philosophy. That is, I want to inquire as to what exactly constitutes the philosophical role of the
not yet model in theorizing the liberal terms of political justice. My reason for focusing on
liberalism is twofold. First, there is an interesting historical connection between the emergence
of liberal philosophy and a particular change of attitude with regards to children’s moral and
political status in the west. John Locke, the father of western liberalism, was in fact also one of
the first philosophers to popularize the idea that children required a special form of care and
education (Locke, 2013b). Breaking with lingering scholastic ideas of the great chain of being,
he begins his treatise Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) by claiming that “of all the
men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their
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education” (Ibid., 25). In doing so, he not only sets the direction of his project, but its urgency as
well. First and foremost, Some Thoughts represents Locke’s attempt at creating a systematic
pedagogy that can ensure the proper development of at least nine out of ten people. But this is
ultimately because improper pedagogy comes with its own dangerous consequence— i.e. the
production of unvirtuous individuals. Being born as tabula rasas, infants have as much potential
for becoming productive members of a society as they do for becoming corrupting threats to the
larger social whole. Lockean liberal philosophy and its modern successors, in other words, (re)evaluate childhood as a unique site of moral and political struggle, not just for the child, but the
entire society involved.
Secondly, I turn to liberal philosophy because of its status as one of the most dominant
ideological forces of western political thought, at least since its emergence during the
enlightenment. From the 17th century on, the history of western philosophy has had a continuous
string of liberal political thought; from, just to name a few, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant,
Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, to more modern figures like Friedrich
Hayek, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen.
Because of the vastness of this philosophical tradition, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation
to give a full account of liberalism by discussing each and every one of its expressions. For the
sake of efficiency, it therefore focuses on the deployment of childhood in Rawls’ liberal theory.
This is because Rawls, I believe, gives us one of the most systematic and influential accounts of
liberal justice. That being said, it will sometimes be necessary to go beyond Rawls so as to
highlight particular themes, resolves certain gaps, and address possible inconsistencies. Thus, the
first chapter focuses on both Rawls and Locke for the sake of demonstrating their similar
understanding of childhood despite their differing normative commitments; the second chapter
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will make use of the liberal feminist literature as a way to give a better systemic account of the
family; and the third chapter will look at the contemporary literature on parental rights so as to
give a more consistent liberal justification of parental power.
While this dissertation is concerned with the status of children and childhood within the
theoretical bounds of liberalism, it should not be confused for a work of political philosophy.
Whereas, if done correctly, my conclusion will have some implications for the larger whole of
western political theory and practice, this dissertation is principally interested in providing an
epistemological analysis of the concept of childhood in liberal political thought. I am not
interested in arguing for a particular idea of children’s rights or political agency but, as stated
above, in highlighting the particular theoretical function of the not yet model of childhood. In
other words, I approach childhood not as a concrete empirical reality (not at least until the fourth
chapter), but as a transcendental “status concept” playing a particular function in securing the
epistemological rigidity of liberal thinking (Schapiro, 1999). The reason for approaching
childhood as a transcendental concept is, as chapter 4 will argue, simply the fact that western
philosophy’s deficiency model is itself a transcendental concept with very little empirical
foundations. And it is because of this lack of empirical support that I question the
epistemological legitimacy of the deficiency model, as a concept which is supposed to reflect
children’s actual reality. Hence, the question which started this project: if the deficiency model
of childhood is not a true reflection of its concrete reality, how do we explain its uniform
prevalence in the history of western political philosophy? This is surely not a question which can
be given full attention in this dissertation. But I hope to exemplify part of the answer through the
first three chapters. That is that, the not yet model of childhood is a useful concept for smuggling
in one’s own normative commitments into the natural development of children. After all, if
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childhood only represents the ontology of humans who are not yet adults, our definition of
adulthood will have resounding effects on the way in which we define the conceptual scope of
childhood. And this conceptual function, I further argue, is ultimately necessary for Rawlsian
political liberalism to theorize the stability of its own political system. Hence the reason for
titling this dissertation Childhood as a Philosophical Means to a Political End: Liberalism,
Stability, and the Deficiency Model of Childhood.
To achieve this end, this dissertation is divided into four different chapters. Chapter 1
begins by laying out the groundwork necessary to support my ultimate conclusion about the
functionality of the deficit model in liberal theory. The first section begins by drawing out two
key tenets necessary for a political philosophy to be labeled liberal. By specifically drawing on
the work of Locke and Rawls, I define liberal philosophy as a political ideology which
emphasizes 1) the private rational self-interest of individuals and 2) a distinction between the
public and private spheres of society. In the second and third section, I then compare liberalism
against the political philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes so as to clearly outline the
political nature (or lack thereof) of childhood in the former. I specifically argue that, unlike
Aristotelean political naturalism and Hobbesian social contract theory, liberal philosophy treats
children as a-political beings, not because they have differing notions of childhood, but rather
because they have different political commitments. As we shall see through both Hobbes and
Aristotle, the deficient status of children does not necessarily strip them of political agency. For
Aristotle the child is essentially a political agent by virtue of its nature as a human being. As for
Hobbes, while he rejected Aristotelian political naturalism, he also understands children to have
the same capacity for contracting a legitimate sovereign into existence. Liberal theory, on the
other hand, completely bars the child from the contracting act, and thus from the reflective scope
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of liberal justice. Unlike Hobbes’ social contract and Aristotle’s political naturalism, the liberal
philosophy of Locke and Rawls entirely denies the possibility of children’s political agency.
Thus, the fourth section concludes the chapter and starts off the project, by specifically pointing
to what Rawls calls “the problem of stability” as a possible explanation for this depoliticization
of childhood (Rawls, 2009, 230). More specifically, the problem of stability asks about the
motivation of private individuals for taking up public responsibilities and duties that sometime
may require them to go against their own immediate self-interest. Rawls’ answer to this problem
is the development of a moral sense of justice; that is the development of “an effective desire to
act in accordance with [a society’s] rules for reasons of justice” (Rawls, 2009, 230). According
to him, if a liberal society can promote the development of this sense of justice, then the problem
of stability becomes moot by virtue of the system’s capacity to “generate its own support” (ibid).
And for this reason, Rawls dedicates chapter VII of A Theory of Justice to describing the
psychological principles that drive children’s moral development in a liberal society. In other
words, and as this chapter concludes, by demonstrating how the sense of justice naturally
develops in children who live in just societies, Rawls is then able to mitigate the problem of
stability.
The second chapter then turns its attention to the family institution and its role in assuring
the “orderly reproduction of society over time” (Rawls, 1997, 779). This is because, as chapter 3
will argue, the deficiency model is specifically able to mitigate the problem of stability through
its aptitude to legitimize parental paternal power. It is therefore the role of this chapter to first
outline the way in which the family institution operates as a stabilizing mechanism of liberal
societies. It specifically argues that because of the theoretical commitments outline in chapter 1,
liberal philosophy necessitates the family institution as the primary force of stability which
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ensures the development of a sense of justice in children. To support my position, this chapter is
divided into five sections. The first two specifically address the family’s stabilizing role in A
Theory of Justice. I begin in the first section by outlining Rawls’ two formulations of the
problem of stability – i.e. the problem of isolation and the problem of assurance— and their
respective solutions – the development of a sense of justice and the intervention of the penal
system. The second section then proceeds with a discussion of chapter VII to specifically
emphasize the importance of the family in the child’s moral development. As I will show, Rawls
takes the parent-child relationship, or more specifically, the love that it entails, to be the first and
primary source of moral value in the child. Thus, while the family is complemented by a penal
system and educational institutions, it is an irreplaceable force for ensuring that children develop
the necessary moral disposition for participating in just democratic societies. The next two
sections then turn to Rawls’ more recent publication, Political Liberalism, in which he aims to
reassert his original answer to the problem of stability. The third section will begin by outlining
why Rawls felt unsatisfied with his original attempt at answering the problem of stability. As I
will discuss, he specifically takes issue with A Theory’s use of the penal system as a means for
stability. Rather, the development of a sense of justice is now complemented with what Rawls
calls an “overlapping consensus.” This shift in turn, as section four will argue, expands the role
of the family as a stabilizing institution quite dramatically. The fifth section then ends by
prompting the question that will be the main driver of chapter 3: why does the family, as a basic
structure of society, have this special power to condition and constrain the principles of justice to
an extent that no other single institution can?
The third chapter then begins by highlighting the importance of this question through the
feminist work of Susan Okin. As she argues, giving the family so much power over the
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production and reproduction of the terms of justice will inevitably end up reproducing the
currently existing oppressive gender norms that define it. Children raised in families that uphold
sexist and illiberal moral values will in turn become adults who uphold those values and have the
political voice to promote them. As such, she concludes that the original position must include
particular knowledge about the sexual oppression that women have faced, so as to ensure that
families stay within the bounds of justice and do not end up reproducing these norms. But while
Rawls agrees with her criticism, he cannot accept her solution. He rather responds to Okin’s
criticism by affirming that women are first and foremost free and equal citizens and that justice
can always intervene into families that undermine this status. Following this, the second section
then proceeds to look at the work of Deborah Kearns and raises a similar concern but with
regards to the liberal justification of parent’s rights over their children. While it is clear that the
state can intervene in cases where citizens devalue the free and equal status of another, the
question of when liberal justice is allowed to intervene in the parent-child relationship is much
less so. After all, while adult-adult relationships are grounded on equal and mutual respect for
each other’s autonomy, the moral development of children requires that they be treated
unequally. As such it isn’t clear when or why justice is ever allowed to intervene into parentchild relationships, given that it cannot claim to do so in defense of children status as free and
equal individuals. That being said, if it cannot intervene, then Okin’s concern about ensuring the
development of a sense of justice is even more urgent, since parents would ultimately have
absolute control over their children’s development. What is needed, the section concludes, is a
justification of parental power that can both ensure parents’ parental rights over their children, all
the while making sure that justice can intervene when they fail to reproduce the needed sense of
justice.
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The chapter then proceeds with the next four sections detailing three potential
justifications of parental power that are consistent with liberal values: 1) subsequent consent, 2)
hypothetical consent, and 3) children’s well-being. As we shall see, both subsequent and
hypothetical consent fall short of providing liberal philosophy with a justification that is
consistent with its commitments. While the first leaves us open to Okin’s and Kearn’s criticism
of the family as too private and influential to be a basic structure of a just society, the second
puts too much emphasis on the role of justice in determining the scope of parenting— something
which Rawls explicitly rejects in Political Liberalism. The well-being justification, on the other
hand, is able to find a point of congruence between the private nature of the family and its public
function. By specifically arguing that children’s well-being aligns with the development of a
sense of justice, liberal societies can both ensure that parents retain their rights qua parents (i.e.
that children are not treated as free and equal citizens), all the while ensuring that justice can
intervene when they are not fulfilling their social role (i.e. ensure that the family function as a
reproducer of society is not corrupted). The chapter then proceeds to argue that the deficiency or
not yet model of childhood is a necessary condition of the well-being justification. This is
because, as it will be discussed in chapter 1, the deficiency model of childhood is ultimately what
allows liberal thinkers to naturalize liberal values into children’s developments. By defining
adulthood in terms of the liberal subject—i.e. as a rational and reasonable individual—the
deficiency model lets Rawls define the child as not yet a liberal citizen or, in his own terms, a
future citizen. To attend to the child’s well-being is therefore to make sure that its potential as a
liberal citizen is realized. And this, as chapter 2 will have argued, requires the parent’s parental
power. As such, chapter 3 concludes that the parental power necessary to stabilize and reproduce
a just society over time, can only be defensible when combined with the normative parameters
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allotted by the well-being justification; which itself gains justificatory power from its use of the
deficiency model of childhood. And as a result, this dissertation concludes that the deficiency
model of childhood is necessary for liberal philosophy to theorize the stability of its own system.
Finally, the dissertation ends with chapter 4 rejecting the not yet model and briefly addressing
the future of political philosophy’s relationship to childhood. It specifically argues that western
political and moral philosophy has widely operated under a transcendental notion of childhood
without consideration for its immanent empirical realities. This is mainly due to what I call in the
first section, the two faces of childhood in philosophy. Philosophers, I argue, have mainly
understood childhood as a concept which either represents the negation of their philosophy or its
pre-philosophical origins. Because of the child’s status as either a- or pre-philosophical,
philosophers have had to turn to the source of philosophical truth and value – the adult – as a
way to theorize the normative status of children. This essentially meant that children and
childhood, as described at the beginning of this introduction, were seen as secondary
philosophical subject whose nature could be derived from the more fundamental concept of
adulthood. In other words, the secondary ontological nature of childhood meant that it did not
have to be grounded in the immanent reality of children. This transcendental notion of childhood
is then exemplified in the second section through the work of Tamar Schapiro. Schapiro’s essay
“What is a Child?” –an essay widely influenced by both Kant and Rawls – analogizes childhood
with the state of nature in order to justify paternalistic attitude towards children. Without ever
mentioning actual children or supporting her claim with empirical studies, Schapiro concludes
that just like the state of nature, childhood represents a predicament without the moral necessities
and obligations of civilized and moral adulthood. But this move can only be confidently stated in
so far as we accept the transcendental and uncontroversial truth that children are essentially not

10

yet adults. If childhood is reduced to its status as not yet adulthood, then it makes sense to
analogize it with something else which is also representative of not yet adulthood – which in this
case is the state of nature.
To remedy this failure of western philosophers, the third section then proceeds beyond
the bounds of philosophy and into a new tradition of childhood studies that has been growing
since the 90’s. This relatively new tradition of childhood thinkers is united in their attempt to
accentuate children’s moral, social, and political agency. But aside from this common
commitment, they can also be divided into three different lines of research. The first and most
common forms focuses on children’s active participation in political matters, from court
appearances to being elected as a representative in one of the multiple youth parliaments across
the world. However, as others will argue, this only covers a minute number of children. As such,
a second line of research has emerged which focuses more primarily on children’s everyday
mundane political and social agency in both the local micro-politics of the region, and the more
global macro-political world. This includes for example, the work of Samantha Punch which
showed how children in a Bolivian rural village went to school and participated in the broader
economic structure of the community as workers. Or the work of Tatek Abebe which highlights
the role that Ethopian children play as both financial and emotional caretakers in their HIV/AIDS
stricken community also dealing with the economic pressures of a neo-liberal capitalist world. It
is important to note in advance that the point of this work is to recognize the children’s agency as
children. One of the main themes that is continually reaffirmed is that children take on these
responsibilities not as mature children or little adults, but as part of their childhood. Punch’s
work for example, emphasizes how children are able to play and enjoy their childhood all the
while having to be workers and students. What is specifically being emphasized is not the
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abnormality or deviant nature of their childhood, but their capacity to navigate the socio-political
spaces they inhabit as children. Finally, there is a third line of study which, rather than
emphasizing children’s agency relative to an adult’s world, stresses the need to discuss childhood
politics on its own terms. These researchers, in other words, specifically focus on portraying the
particular “political” nature of childhood (Kallio and Hakli, 2011).
Following this summary of some the most recent empirical research on children, the final
section of this closing chapter concludes by addressing the future of the deficiency model,
Rawlsian liberal philosophy, and western political philosophy more broadly. First, it argues that
philosophers should actively reject the deficiency or not yet model of childhood by virtue of its
lack of empirical support. Second, if the deficiency model is an inadequate concept, it also
follows that the stability of Rawls’ political liberalism stands on what is at best, a shaky and
incomplete understanding of the child. While this may not be enough to outright reject the
legitimacy of liberalism as a political ideology, it does suggest that liberal thinkers have a
herculean task ahead of them. For, as this section will explain in more details, without the
deficiency model, the child’s well-being may very well need to prescribe the rejection of liberal
values. This is not to say that this should be the case, but that without an adequate justification of
parental power, a liberal society will inevitably have to come up against this possibility. Finally,
this dissertation ends by arguing that political philosophers ought not only to interact with and
listen to children, but ought also to enter their world so as to begin to learn to recognize the rich
and insightful “underlife” of childhood (Gallacher, 2006).
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CHAPTER 1: LIBERALISM AND THE DEFICIENCY MODEL OF CHILDHOOD
There is an interesting relationship between the western conception of childhood and the
liberal tradition of political philosophy. While the connection itself may not be apparent, we can
highlight the relationship between the two through the work of John Locke. Locke is mostly
recognized for his work in political philosophy and epistemology. But an element of his thinking
that not many philosophers have engaged with was his work on childhood and education. He
may have not released any treatise on the topic of childhood specifically, but his Some Thoughts
on Education (1693) was, and still is, considered one of the most influential pedagogical texts of
18th century Europe. As Margarett Ezell argues, Locke’s writing on education largely
spearheaded the 18th century “Age of Education” (Ezell, 1983, 141). And while our
contemporary notions of childhood have been reformed/updated with the advent of
developmental psychology at the turn of the 20th century and the more recent emergence of a
new childhood studies in the 1990’s, Locke remains a central figure in this history of our
thinking about childhood. As David Archard puts it, Locke’s thoughts on childhood and
education permitted “Some Thoughts to be viewed, along with Rousseau’s Emile (1762), as the
earliest manifesto for a ‘child-centered’ education” (Archard, 2014, 1).
Despite this relevance in the history of childhood studies, the relationship between
Locke’s view of children and his political philosophy is often overlooked. However, Locke’s
status as the father of both philosophical liberalism and much of the contemporary studies on
childhood raises the question as to whether or not this relationship is more than just coincidental.
In fact, it is the goal of this chapter to relate the liberal conception of childhood with the theory’s
own political commitment. In doing so I hope to achieve two important steps towards finalizing
my overall conclusion that the deficit model of childhood is essential to a liberal politics. The
13

first goal of this chapter is to lay out the conceptual terrain of liberalism and of childhood within
it. That is, I want to define what exactly is meant by a liberal politics and contextualize how
children’s normative status is theorized within it. The second goal, and conclusion of this
chapter, is to highlight the conceptual utility of a deficit model of childhood in liberal political
philosophy. More specifically, I argue that the deficit model of childhood is crucial for
mitigating what John Rawls called “the problem of stability” (Rawls 2003, 434).
Broadly speaking, liberalism is threatened with a problem of stability because it denies
the state power to cultivate the proper moral disposition for living within a liberal society. Thus,
while Hobbes’ monarchical state has absolute power and Rousseau’s republican state can
legitimately “force” individuals “to be free”, Lockean and Rawlsian liberal states lacks the power
to enforce its own values and virtues (Rousseau, 2012, 11). Because of its emphasis on private
individual’s rational liberty, liberal societies lack a direct and politically legitimate means to
assure the reproduction of its own moral values and thus, by extension, cannot guarantee the
stability of their own political systems without some conceptual maneuvering. As this chapter
attempts to show, the deficit model of childhood conceptually functions to mitigate this problem
of stability. It does so by specifically depicting children as voiceless and therefore as passive
recipients of an externally constituted moral education. That is, through the deficit model,
philosophers have been able to strip the child of any relevant political or moral agency and, as a
result, is made dependent on the adult for its own actualization. In this way, the child’s own
moral development is depicted as the product of an external force that, ideally, can direct its
moral growth in the right direction.
To demonstrate my conclusion, I have divided this chapter into four different sections. In
the first section, I begin by highlighting what I consider to be two central points for
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understanding what liberalism is and how the concept of childhood fits within it: namely its
emphasis on 1) Individual rational interests and 2) a distinction between private and public. It is
important to note that I specifically look at Locke and Rawls’ versions of liberalism. Locke’s
work, as has already been stated, is a crucial historical point of reference due to his being
considered both the father of liberal philosophy and one of the first philosophers to emphasize
the nature of childhood in his pedagogical (and political) works. Rawls, on the other hand, is
addressed because of his status as one of the most important North American political thinkers of
the 20th century. One cannot discuss liberalism without taking into consideration Rawls’
contribution to this philosophical tradition. While both Locke and Rawls have some radical
differences, we shall see that, ultimately, both of their conceptualizations of childhood function
in the same way. Thus, while we cannot say that Rawls’ and Locke’s versions of liberalism are
entirely compatible, their views of childhood and its conceptual function within their theory very
much are. Following the description of their liberal philosophies, the chapter will then proceed
by giving a definition of the deficit model of childhood and looking at its political implication in
two of political philosophy’s most important thinkers: Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes. I turn to
these two for a specific reason, namely, to highlight the particular and unique implications of a
deficit model in liberalism. As I shall demonstrate in the third section, the deficit model of
childhood deployed within liberal theories has the unique quality of depoliticizing children by
stripping them of all moral and political autonomy. That is, while children retain a political
nature in both Aristotle and Hobbes, both Locke and Rawls make the child an a-political
individual—i.e. an individual with no political agency. Finally, I end this chapter by discussing
the political function of this depoliticization in relation to the problem of stability.
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Before starting it is important to note that I am not arguing that the problem of stability can
be or is addressed solely through the deficit model of childhood. Rather, I merely aim to show
the centrality of this particular conception of childhood in liberalism’s capacity to resolve the
problem of stability. As such I am not implying that the concept of childhood deployed by
liberalism is enough to solve this problem. As I will discuss in chapter 2, Rawls, takes this issue
seriously and aims to address it on multiple levels. It is in fact this very problem which pushes
him to review his Theory of Justice (1971) in favor of his later Political Liberalism (1993).
However, the concept of childhood deployed by liberal thinkers like Rawls and his
predecessors/contemporaries —i.e. a deficit conceptualization of childhood—never-the-less
plays a central role in answering this problem. In other words, while the deficit model of
childhood isn’t a sufficient condition for addressing the problem of stability, I want to show that
it ultimately is a necessary one. This work will be primarily done in the next two chapters in
which I respectively argue that the family institution is a significant cog in Liberalism’s
reproductive machine, and that the deficit model operates as the a-priori ground upon which
parental power can be justified. This chapter, on the other hand, merely aims to provide the
foundations for this claim by highlighting the political function of the deficit model— i.e. to
mitigate the problem of stability inherent within liberal politics.
1. The Liberal Subject and the Politics of Rationality
To address the relevance of childhood in liberal philosophy, we must first begin by
illuminating the basic principles necessary for any political project to be called “liberal” in this
philosophical sense. While Liberalism itself is a pluralistic field of political thought, we can find
at least two main conceptual grounds that a liberal project will uphold—its emphasis on rational
self-interest and the distinction between private and public. The first of these is the idea that the
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political authority of the state is grounded in the rational interest of its individual members. That
is, a governing body can legitimately exercise restrictions on individual freedom in so far as it
can be shown to be in line with the self-interest of its rational citizens. While the general
emphasis on the individual emerges from the reversal of Aristotelean political naturalism that
defines the social contract tradition, Liberalism individuates itself from both the Hobbesian and
Rousseauian versions of contract theory by emphasizing the role of individual rationality in
entering a just political society. For example, Hobbes also makes entry into a political society
secondary to the nature and a-political existence of individuals, but the motivation for entering
the contract is not necessarily grounded in the rational self-interest of the signatories. Rather, the
Hobbesian individual is motivated out of a pure natural instinct for self-preservation and the fear
of its own death. Furthermore, and as I shall discuss in more details in the next section, it cannot
be that the Hobbesian contract is grounded on individual rational interest since children, who
lack the use of reason, are nonetheless recognized by Hobbes as legitimate signatories to the
social contract. In fact, for him, the immediate feeling of fear fulfills a much more crucial
function for compelling individuals out of the state of nature and into a legitimate political state
than calculated rational deliberation (Hobbes, 1994, II, XX, 2). On the contrary, the liberalism
proposed by canonical figures such as Locke and Rawls require individuals to act on their selfprescribed rational interests for the contract (and the hierarchical establishment that follows) to
properly legitimize the sovereign power of the state. As both Locke and Rawls put it
respectively:
“Men being … by Nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one
can be put out of this Estate and subjected to Political power of
another, without his own [rational] consent.” (Locke, 1988, 330)
“Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which
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all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common
human reason.” (Rawls, 1996, 137)
The rational agency of human beings thus plays a crucial role for both motivating the emergence
of political power and legitimatizing its authority. In other words, both the state and its authority,
are primarily the product of rational decision making. What defines a rational decision will be
expressed differently depending on which liberal thinker we are interrogating. In the case of
Locke, reason is understood as the “the Voice of God” in man. God here is meant to represent the
perfect knowledge of an omniscient being, such that our rational faculty represents our human
capacity to obtain knowledge about the world. As he argues in An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding: “Reason, therefore, here … I take to be the discovery of the certainty or
probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such
ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection” (Locke,
1988, II.IV.18.2). As such, a choice based on rational deliberation will emerge out of process
carried forward by a sense of (probable) certainty. A rational choice will therefore be a choice
that retains a stable and consistent truth condition over time. Similarly, Rawls takes rational
deliberation to be a decision constituted through a kind of complete or perfected knowledge. As
Rawls puts it in A Theory of Justice, “one feature of a rational plan is that in carrying it out the
individual does not change his mind and wish that he had done something else instead. A rational
person does not come to feel an aversion for the foreseen consequences so great that he regrets
following the plan he has adopted” (Rawls, 2009, 370). In other words, for a choice to be
considered rational it must fit within a closed system of knowledge that remains stable over time.
Briefly put, rational deliberation is unanimous (i.e. any rational being would find a reason to
make the same choice) and irreversible (i.e. no rational person would regret a rational choice).
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Given their differing political commitments however, what exactly constitutes a rational choice
for Locke and Rawls will be different. That being said, we can, for the sake of clarity, briefly
outline some important elements that constitute the rational nature of sovereign power for each
author.
Locke, in his Two Treatise Concerning Government, equates the “Law of Reason” with
“Natural Law” (Locke, 1988, I.IX.101). By natural law, Locke means something different from
the metaphysical and scientific laws of nature, rather meaning something more akin to a moral
law.3 In other words, it is the law that dictates human behavior. Because Natural Law is equal to
the Law of reason, and human are by nature rational creatures, Lockean individuals in the state
of nature have access to a common moral law on which to ground their own actions. And it is
from this capacity for rational deliberation, that individuals come to understand and enact correct
moral behavior; even in the state of Nature where no earthly common authority exists. As he
writes: “The state of nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: And
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (Ibid,
II.I.6). While Locke never provides an argument for the existence of particular natural laws, or
even creates a systematic list of those laws (Forde, 2001, 387-398) the main idea to take away is
that rational individuals will act in accordance with natural law because natural law dictates
correct rational action— i.e. it represents a necessary obligation for any and all rational human
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The fundamental element of Locke’s moral philosophy is a debated topic amongst Lockeans. On the one hand, he
provides arguments from natural law like in the Two Treatise. On the other, he also presents a hedonistic picture in
which the motivation for correct action is not natural law itself but the rewards and punishment that come from
doing morally good and bad actions respectively. For a detailed analysis of this puzzle in Locke’s moral thought, refer
to J.B. Schneewind’s “Locke’s Moral Philosophy” (1994). However, because I am interested in the political philosophy
presented by Locke, I assume the position he presents in the Two Treatise as the correct one. That is, that Locke
derives the moral motivation of individuals from their understanding of the natural law.
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beings. In the case of the Second Treatise, this rational necessity resolves in the creation of the
social contract and the emergence of the liberal state. Similarly, Rawls argues that the rational
nature of sovereign power both motivates individuals to sign the contract and subjugate
themselves to its authority, as well as justifies the state’s power over free and equal individuals.
However, one important distinction to note is that while Locke derives his rational principles for
a just liberal state through divinely instituted natural law, Rawls are derived from what he calls
“the original position”.
The original position is meant to overcome some of the operative moral assumptions
present in the western political tradition. Previous philosophers such as Locke, David Hume, and
Immanuel Kant begin their political project by first formulating an impartial moral philosophy
that can ground a just politics. As we can see with Locke above, his liberal political philosophy
in firmly grounded on a Christian divine morality given to all human beings by God. Rawls calls
this approach “the moral point of view”, and his political philosophy is primarily meant to reject
this ground of justice for being too individualistic and considering the social world “arbitrary”
(Rawls, 2009, 14). “Rather,” he argues, “the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the
basic structure of society are the object of an original agreement” between “free and rational
persons concerned to further their own interests” (Ibid., 10). To ensure the necessary impartiality
of the original position and prevent ourselves from falling back into the moral point of view,
Rawls puts rational decision makers behind a “veil of ignorance” which assures that “no one
knows his place in society, his class position, or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like” (Ibid., 11). In
short, from within this original position, Rawls hopes to draw principles of justice that are not
individual specific or morally grounded. Rather, his political philosophy begins with what
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rational individuals, unaware of their potential political, economic, or social status, would
consensually agree to, were they given the capacity to create a just state.
According to him, each and every rationally self-interested signatory behind the veil of
ignorance will necessarily adopt two principles of justice which have been dubbed: “The greatest
equal liberty principle” and the combination of what he calls “the equal opportunity principle”
and “the difference principle”. Both of which he summarizes as follow:
“First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle: Social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just
savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” (Ibid., 266)
From these principles, Rawls further argues, any rational individual will find it in their interest to
obey the authority of the state in so far as the latter is able to provide and protect “primary
goods.” Simply put, primary goods represent the “things that every rational man is presumed to
want” and requires “for a rational plan of life” (Ibid., 54). That is to say, they represent the basic
fundamental interests that any and all rational individuals will require in order to live their lives
and actualize their own rational life plans. They include natural primary goods like “intelligence,
imagination, health, and speed”, as well as social primary goods like “rights, liberty,
opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect” (Ibid.). Each of these represents a good that a
purely rational individual behind the veil of ignorance would be expected to want and need for
their own individual projects. Making it such that a society unable to ensure access to them for
everyone, would be considered irrational and therefore unjust by an impartial judge within the
original position. Since individuals behind the veil of ignorance desire primary goods but cannot
know whether or not they will have access to them, the only way to make sure each individual
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signatory receives their fair share is to guarantee that every member of society receives equal
access to primary goods.
As such, we can clearly see how rational interest constitutes a fundamental tenet of
liberal political philosophy. Rational interest, specifically, represents both a legitimizing factor of
political power and the moral motivation for constituting and obeying the authority of an
artificial political authority. In Locke, reason is the faculty that lets individuals figure out the
divinely ordained natural law which both constitutes the moral ground for correct actions and the
motivation for obeying the laws of government. For Rawls, on the other hand, rational interest
represents the primary motivation for creating and binding one-self to a just political system. The
authority of a governing legislative body is therefore derived from the rational nature of
individuals.
The rationality of the liberal state furthermore implies a distinction between what is most
often referred to as the private and public spheres. This distinction constitutes the basic political
geography of any liberal state. It, in other words, represents the terrain and borders upon which
liberal philosophy can make sense of itself and operate, such that without it, liberalism would
hardly be considered rational by liberal standards. Broadly speaking, within liberal philosophy
the public houses those elements of a society that are considered in-common with everyone in
the society. It is built upon principles that everyone, in spite of their individual differences, can
and must adhere to. It is, in this sense, the sphere of political power and authority, and defines
the scope and limits of justice. External and opposed to this political public space, we find the
private sphere in which individuals are bound to their own moral and rational interests. The
private, in other words, represents a sphere beyond the common interest of the community; a
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space in which an individual has “a freedom to act or to perform [certain actions] free of
government interference” (Archard, 2010, 19).
In the Second Treatise, Locke distinguishes between public and private in two different
ways: through the distinction between 1) the paternal power of the family and political power of
the sovereign and 2) the private individual and the public governing body (Kelly, 2002). On the
one hand, Locke differentiates between the public realm of sovereign power and the private
realm of the family mainly as a rejection of Filmer’s Patriarcha. As he writes in the opening
pages of the Second Treatise, “the Power of a Magistrate over a Subject, may be distinguished
from that of a Father over his children, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his Wife, and
a Lord over his Slave” (Locke, 1988, II.I.2). We therefore cannot conflate the power of the father
over his children, or the power of a Husband over his wife, with the powers of a state over its
people. His argument for the distinction stands on three different points. First, the end of paternal
power, unlike that of sovereign political power, is the procreation and education of children
(Ibid., II.VII.80). While the chief aim of sovereign power is the protection of individual’s right to
life, liberty and private property, parental power over children emerges out of the natural and
divinely ordained necessity for procreation and moral education (Ibid., II.VI.58 and 69). The
second reason for keeping sovereign and paternal power distinct arises from Locke’s argument
about the temporary nature of the later. “Children”, according to him, are “not born in [the] full
state of Equality” shared in common between adults in the state of nature (Ibid., II.VI.55). While
children are born with the capacity for rational thought, and thus with the potential for freedom
and equality, they are unable to make proper use of this faculty unless it is developed and
cultivated in the right way (Locke, 1996). However, because the state’s sovereign power is
derived from the rational intent of individuals, the governing body cannot exercise this form of
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nurturing power over children. That is, because children cannot consent to the state’s authority,
the latter has no legitimate authority over the former. It is therefore the family’s role to care of
their children and develop their rational faculty through its paternal power. Only once they reach
“a state of Reason” and the child becomes a mature rational adult who is capable of acting on the
necessity of natural law through their own will, will the parent’s power over them ceases to be
legitimate (Ibid., 1988, II.VI.59). As such, because parent’s paternal power is meant to morally
educate future generations, Locke maintains that “the subjection of Minority places in the Father
a temporary Government, which terminates with the minority of the Child” (Ibid., II.VII.67).
Political power, however, isn’t meant to educate but to protect and maintain the natural rights of
every individual. And as a result, comes without any natural limits on its legitimacy other than
the one’s established in the social contract. Thirdly, because the power of parents over their
offspring is aimed at the cultivation of children’s reason, paternal power is also limited compared
to sovereign power. As Locke argues “Political Power” is defined as the “Right of making Laws
with Penalties of Death and consequently all less penalties for the Regulating and Preserving of
Property …” (Ibid., II.I.3). The family, however, “has no Legislative Power of Life and Death
over any” of its members (Ibid., II.VII.86). For these reasons, Locke therefore concludes that the
paternal power of the private family is not equivalent to the public sovereign power of the state
and that the two must be kept separate.
On the other hand, as Kelly (2002) argues, Locke’s distinction between the public and
private sphere is crucial for ensuring the limits of sovereign power and protection of individuals’
natural rights (especially that of private property). Specifically, the public/private distinction
ensures the rationality of the liberal state by guaranteeing a space in which individual rights and
liberties can be exercised free from state’s coercive influence. In this sense, the private sphere for
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Locke constitutes an important element of any liberal society for two particular reasons. The
first, is that the family, as a natural and divinely created association, demonstrates human beings’
capacity to live peacefully outside of civil society and, by extent, without sovereign power
(Gobetti, 1994; Kelly, 2002). Thus, unlike in Hobbes or Rousseau, Lockean individuals are
naturally social and able to live with one another without the Sovereign’s interference. Our
rational nature means that individuals in the state of nature have a capacity to form pre-political
communities. Since natural law is the universal of all rational humans, the state of nature already
comes with its own set of moral rules and codes— such as not harming anyone in their life,
liberty, and private property. This shows that individuals can live morally good lives without the
state and that therefore, nothing but reason itself can motivate individuals to form of social
contract. We, in other words, lack the Hobbesian fear and Rousseauian chains that gives the
social contract its urgency. The Lockean subject has the privilege of asking why they should give
up their natural freedom. Secondly, the private sphere of family also creates a physical space in
which “individuals can exercise the individual rights and freedoms that government was
designed to preserve” (Kelly, 2002, 370). That is, it gives a clear and concise limit to the
government’s power by mapping out its influence, and as such, constrains the state’s power over
its citizens; thus protecting them from absolute tyranny. As such, one’s home cannot be
trespassed on by state officials without a warranted reason, since this would constitute one’s
private rather than public property and, by extent, be outside of the sovereign’s sphere of
influence.
In Rawls, this distinction is a bit more difficult to clearly outline due to the fact that he
makes the physical separation between public/private more permeable than in the classical
Lockean sense. This is because one of the fundamental moves of Rawls’ theory is to make
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justice (as opposed to one’s private moral good) the fundamental value of his political
philosophy. What this implies is that the private elements of citizens lives will first and foremost
be determined by the principles determined within the original position. If a private end is not
allowed by the political constitution, it will not be just and therefore unacceptable by Rawls’
standard. As such, contra Locke’s total isolation of the private from the public, Rawls
reconceptualizes traditionally private institutions in relation to a public conception of the good.
For example, we can see the permeability of the public/private distinction in his formulation of
the family as both part of the non-public domestic sphere of a society and of the basic structures
of society that constitute the main subject of his theory of justice (Walsh, 2012). As such, there is
no physical border between private and public like we see in Locke. However, the public/private
dichotomy still exists in the abstract distinction between what he calls the rational and
reasonable. Briefly put, the rational represents an individual’s capacity for determining and
seeking private moral, philosophical, or religious ends. These rational ends are independently
constituted from the terms of cooperation established in the original position, and are derived
from an individual’s own moral, philosophical, and religious commitments. That is to say that,
while a just society will restrain rational ends that undermine the principles of justice, they are
not, in themselves, derived from the terms of just cooperation adopted by a liberal society. The
reasonable, on the other hand, represents individual’s capacity to align their own private rational
ends with the public ends of justice. While rational individuals seek to achieve their own private
moral goods, both rational and reasonable persons will seek to achieve their own private ends in
accordance with the principles of justice laid out in the original position. The reasonable is
therefore “public in a way that the rational is not” since it is the principal moral capacity through
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which individuals can enter the public realm as equals and “stand ready to propose, or to accept,
as the case may be, fair terms of cooperation with” others (Rawls, 1996, 53).
More specifically, both of these categories represent the distinctive yet complementary moral
powers of individuals. “They work in tandem” Rawls argues, “to specify the idea of fair terms of
cooperation, taking into account the kind of social cooperation in question, the nature of the
parties and their standing with respect to one another” (Ibid., 52). In order words, Rawls’ theory
of justice necessitates individuals with both the capacity for constituting their own private goods
and ends, as well as the capacity to enact these private goods within the broader public system of
cooperation. This is because, on the one hand, merely reasonable agents will lack any individual
motivation to advance their own ends by means of a fair system of cooperation. That is, the
citizens of a liberal society would have no private motivation or interest for advancing and
binding themselves to the principles of justice. On the other hand, purely rational agents would
merely be motivated by their own goals and would therefore “fail to recognize the independent
validity of the claims of others” (Ibid.). That is, they would lack what Rawls calls, a “sense of
justice” which he defines as “an effective desire to comply with the existing rules and to give one
another that to which they are entitled to” (Ibid., 2009, 274-275). It is, in other words, that moral
capacity to align one’s own personal goals with the fact that we live in a society with individuals
who have different rational goals. Without a sense of justice, a liberal society would therefore
not only be unpractical but also impossible due to the fact that no individual would have the
moral capacity to live a just life. Since the motivating force driving their behavior would solely
be informed by their own private moral ends (i.e. lacking any consideration for others), purely
rational and unreasonable persons would be unable to bind themselves to the system of fair
cooperation derived from the original position. In this sense, as Rawls argues, the purely rational

27

person would “approach being psychopathic” (Ibid., 1996, 51). Hence, the system of justice as
fairness that Rawls proposes needs individuals with both the moral capacity for private rational
and public reasonable thinking in order to create a just and stable political system.
2. The Deficiency Model of Childhood and Western Political Philosophy
Now that we have established liberalism as a political system that privileges rational selfinterests and a distinction between public and private, we can begin to understand how the figure
of childhood fits within the theory. But before diving into liberalism’s conceptualization of
childhood and its function within that system of thought, it is first important to discuss two
things: first, what exactly is meant by a deficit model of childhood, and second, its implication
for the political existence of children. I define the deficit model of childhood as a conceptual
framework that depicts childhood by means of two important tenets: 1) childhood’s status as a
mere potentiality or becoming without an actuality of its own and 2) adulthood’s status as the
universal standard through which childhood can be understood.
First and foremost, let us first address the adult-centrism of the deficit model since the
concept of adulthood operates as the universal standard for conceptualizing childhood. It should
be noted that beginning with adulthood is not only a means for clear exposition, but also a move
necessitated by the deficit framework. That is, within the deficit model, the concept of childhood
must always be prefaced by the more fundamental concept of adulthood. This becomes
especially apparent if we read the history of western philosophy as privileging the adult’s
perspective. When philosophers, especially humanist philosophers, discusses the good, justice,
beauty, truth, and reality, it is typically conceived in relation to the category of adulthood. Or, to
put it more concretely, philosophy has almost always been conceived as an adult’s activity not
suited to childhood. In Aristotle, for example, the child is depicted as an “imperfect” version of
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the adult whose “virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher,
and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master” (Aristotle, 1984, 1260a31-33).
Thus, as he famously argues, childhood’s lack of self-sufficiency denies the child a capacity for
achieving the chief end of a good life, eudaimonia. The primary subject in Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics—that is the subject privy to eudaimonia— is therefore the
virtuous adult who already has use of their deliberative faculties for achieving this end. And it is
only relative to this primacy of adulthood that we can then infer the virtues of childhood.
Similarly, most, if not all of western ethical and political philosophy has assumed the primacy of
adulthood over childhood. For more contemporary examples we merely need to turn to the two
most influential ethical theories of western enlightenment. Both Kant’s deontology and Mill’s
utilitarianism assume the moral agent to be a rational adult. Kant’s moral and political
philosophy is primarily based on autonomy which, in turn, assumes a rational capacity for
yielding to the moral law—a power which he explicitly denies children (Kant, 1999, 2012). On
the other hand, Mill explicitly argues in On Liberty (1859) that “it is, perhaps, hardly necessary
to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties.
We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which law may fix as that of
manhood or womanhood” (Mill, 1998, 9). As adulthood is the constitutive norm, childhood will
have to be secondary, specifically describing a lack thereof. In this sense, the child is “not an
adult” because it lacks the qualities of adulthood. Such that, to understand what a child is, we
merely need to take our concept of adulthood and strip it of specific qualities. Within the deficit
model, we are not trying to give this lack a voice of its own, or to make it into something in
itself, but rather we are always attempting to connect it with and understand it in term of, the
philosophically assumed adult. It will therefore follow that in order to understand and make
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sense of childhood, we will first have to consult our concept of adulthood since the latter will
ground the former’s metaphysical, epistemological, moral, and political import as its normative
standard.
This brings us back to childhood’s nature as a potential. The reason why childhood has
no philosophical relevance of its own is ultimately because it describes a developmental process
with a particular end in mind. That is, within the deficit model, adulthood is not only the primary
standard through which we can conceptualize of childhood, but also the very state of being that
childhood aims at. Childhood, in other words, must not only be understood in terms of “not
adulthood”, but must also point towards the necessity of the assumed adult philosophical subject.
That is, while philosophy begins with adulthood in order to describe childhood, it must also find
its way back to adulthood from the concept of childhood. As such, within the bounds of the
deficit model, childhood isn’t merely a form “not adulthood”, but rather a “not yet”. Or as Tamar
Schapiro4 puts it in her “What is a Child?” (1999), childhood typically refers to “a person who in
some fundamental way is not yet developed, but who is in the process of developing” (Schapiro,
1999, 716). To summarize, the deficit model therefore conceptualizes of childhood as a relatively
deficient state of being with the potential to achieve adulthood.5
From ancient theories of political justice to the social contract theorists and more
contemporary forms of western political thought, children are typically approached in terms of
this deficit model. However, as we shall see in the next two sections, liberalism has unique
relationship with this model of childhood. But before diving into the relationship between the
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It should be noted that aside from being one of the few resources directly addressing the question “what is a
child?” (at least in philosophy), Tamar Schapiro’s work is also especially relevant for our purposes since she
describes the moral status of a child on a Rawlsian reading of Kant’s philosophy of childhood.
5
For a deeper inquiry into the meaning of childhood’s potential nature consult “Beauvais, C., & Higham, R. (2016).
A Reappraisal of Children’s “Potential.” Studies in Philosophy and Education, 35(6), 573–587”

30

deficit model and liberal political philosophy, it will be productive to look at how previous
political philosophies theorized the political status of children. There are specifically two
different political philosophies that are helpful for understanding the move that liberalism makes,
the first being Aristotle’s political naturalism and the second being Hobbes’ contractarianism.
According to Aristotle, politics is the essential quality of human nature. For him, humans
are politikon zoon or political animals. To be a human essentially implies living in political
communities such that “he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state is either a
beast or a god” (Aristotle, 1984, 1253a2-4). In other words, Aristotle proposes a form of political
naturalism in which “the state is a creation of nature” and human nature is defined by means of
its political ontology (Ibid., 1253b2). While it isn’t exactly clear what he means by natural, we
can begin to look at the opening pages of the Politics to understand how he posits the natural
status of politics. He specifically defends his claim with three arguments. The first claims that
the city-state is the end of other natural associations and is therefore, itself, a product of nature.
(Ibid., 1252b30-1253a1). As he writes, “In the first place there must be a union of those who
cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue … and
of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved” (Ibid., 1252a26-27). The family is thus
the first association, temporally speaking, that emerges naturally, originating out of the need to
“supply … men’s everyday wants…” (Ibid., 1253b13-14). In other words, the goal of the family
is to create a self-sufficient unit through which individuals can sustain themselves by fulfilling
their everyday needs and desires like food and sleep. However, humans cannot achieve their
ultimate goal—i.e. eudaimonia— by just fulfilling their everyday necessities. As such, once
“several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily
needs, the first society to be formed is the village” (Ibid., 1253b16). Finally, when several
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villages come together into a “single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite
self-sufficing, the state comes into existence…” (Ibid., 1252b 28-30). This temporal progression,
Aristotle argues, demonstrates the natural status of the city state by highlighting its origins as the
natural progression of both the family and villages. Since the family is a natural association, and
the city state is an expansion of the family, the city state is also a creation of nature. What
distinguishes the family from the city state is not a distinction between the political and nonpolitical, but rather their different degree of self-sufficiency. The family and the state are
essentially the same kind of thing, a natural association, but only the state can properly and
completely fulfill the ends and needs of human beings. Thus, just like the family is a natural
association, so too is the state.
Afterwards, Aristotle shifts his attention from the origins of the city-state to an argument
from human nature. Specifically, his arguments rests on the idea that speech is fundamental to
political life. The capacity to communicate with other individuals is necessary for communal
associations. This is because this “power is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient,
and therefore likewise the just and the unjust” (Ibid., 1253a14-18). In other words, speech allows
individuals to define the moral and political parameters of their communal life, and as such
constitutes a fundamental component of any political association. In other words, speech gives
human beings a “sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like,” which is a condition for
the possibility of being part of “a family and a state” (Ibid.). As such, Aristotle argues that
speech itself is a “gift” given to us by Nature for the purpose of creating political associations.
As he writes, “Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom
she has endowed with the gift of speech” (Ibid., 1253a9-10). Just as we have legs for the purpose
of moving, we have speech in order to create self-sufficient political associations that lead
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humans towards eudaimonia. And if this is the case, then the city-state finds its own origins first
and foremost in nature in so far as it is thanks to nature that individuals have the capacity to live
in political organizations and engender conditions of justice.
The final argument is a metaphysical one relating to the nature and relation of the whole
and its part. As he argues,
the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual,
since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the
whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an
equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when
destroyed the hand will be no better than that. (Ibid., 1253a19-22)
As such, while the family is temporally prior to the state, the latter is metaphysically primary.
The political nature of humankind and its ideal form (the city-state) motivates individuals
towards a more perfect communal association. In this sense, political life is not an artificial
choice but rather a natural necessity fundamental to humanity.
Now, as pointed out above, Aristotle still understands childhood through a deficit model.
However, the deficiency of children doesn’t isolate them from political existence and
participation. From the moment human beings come into existence, they immediately occupy a
political status. More specifically from the very beginning, the family already contains the
fundamental political relationship between ruled and ruler. First, there is the relationship between
master and slave, second that between husband and wife, and finally that between the father and
the child; all of which are different expressions of this political relationship between ruler and
ruled. Because Aristotle takes the family to be just a less self-sufficient unity that ultimately aims
towards the city-state, we can say, then, that these three familial relations are all political in
nature. Childhood, while being understood through a deficit model, is therefore still considered a
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political status and the child thus occupies a political space from its very birth. We can further
see this by the fact that Aristotle does not offer any conceptual change in the child’s political
nature. That is, the child is not an a-political creature who then becomes political. Rather the
relationship between father and child is always already political in nature since it represents one
expression of the essential political relationship between ruler and ruled. Off course, that
relationship does change as the child ages, but this is not a difference in nature as much as it is a
difference in the expression of this nature. The internal elements of this political space may
change themselves, however, from a metaphysical perspective, the child and the adult are not
differentiated by their political nature. Both are humans and thus both are politikon zoon.
We find a similar example of the child’s political ontology in the modern political theory
presented by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes is an interesting figure for our purposes for two reasons.
First, he is a pivoting point of reference for the social contract theory that rejects Aristotle’s
political naturalism and eventually leads to liberal political philosophy. However, unlike the
liberal tradition, Hobbes’ Leviathan does not isolate childhood from the political space of the
contract. In other words, looking briefly at Hobbes’ political philosophy lets us clearly see how
the a-political nature of childhood is not a product of contract theory generally speaking, but a
symptomatic effect of liberalism’s own theoretical commitments. Hobbes begins the social
contract tradition by reversing the Aristotelian relationship between the state and nature. While
for Aristotle, as we saw, the city-state is the constitutive elements that makes individual humans
possible, Hobbes social contract begins from the freedom and equality of every individual in the
state of nature and derives the sovereign power of the state from this notion of the individual. As
is famously known, he begins his Leviathan, not with the nature of politics and society, as
Aristotle does, but from the nature of human beings independently constituted from social forces.
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In the state of nature, all individuals are born free and equal and as such no one can naturally
claim authority power over another’s will and action. As he argues, every person is born with a
natural right to self-preservation which lets that person dictate his or her life choices according to
his or her own powers and will. And because of this essential drive towards self-preservation, no
individual can tell another how to live their life without the latter first agreeing to the former’s
conditions. Furthermore, Hobbes argues, contra Aristotle, that individuals in the state of nature
do not have a natural right to rule over others. Everyone being equal with one another means that
no individual has a legitimate a-priori claims to authority. Even the idea that “might makes right”
doesn’t hold in Hobbes’ state of nature since human beings can overcome individual strength
with intelligence or numbers. As such, the natural freedom and equality of individuals rejects
Aristotle’s political naturalism by discarding any natural hierarchy and making the political order
an artificial product of individuals combined will. That is, political institutions and association
are no longer natural and prior to human agency, but rather a consequence of contractual
agreement between free and equal individual. Consequently,
The question “who is the better man?” has no place in the condition
of mere nature, where (as has been shown before) all men are equal.
The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. I
know that Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation
of his doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more worthy to
command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself
to be for his philosophy; others to serve, meaning those that had
strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he; as master and servant
were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit:
which is not only against reason, but also against experience.
(Hobbes, 1994, 1.15.21)
For Hobbes, any form of human hierarchy is thus the product of an artificial decision made by
free and equal individuals in the state of nature. From the family, to the village, to the
establishment of state, an artificial agreement is the primary cause that engenders these
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institutions and hierarchical relationships. Politics is therefore not a natural quality of human
nature, but an emergent property of free and equal individuals coming together to achieve peace
–i.e. the first Law of Nature.
Now this notion of individuals as free and equal in their capacity for self-preservation,
would seem to prima facie undermine the political nature of children. First because it is clear that
infants and younger children lack the same capacity for self-preservation that endows adults with
natural freedom and equality. A grown adult encountering a child would hardly feel threatened in
the same way that they may fear other grown adults. But also, Hobbes argues that “children …
are not endued with reason at all, till they have the use of speech, but are called reasonable
creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come” (Ibid., 1994,
I.V.18). Here we can see that Hobbes is clearly using the deficit model of childhood. The child is
understood in terms of the potential capacities it currently lacks relative to its adult counterpart.
Hence, if the child lacks rational thought and the capacity for speech (at least at the beginning of
their lives), it would seem clear that the child cannot enter into a voluntary agreement with other
individuals. In this sense, children are not only weaker, but also less cognitively able than adults.
To imagine them as free and equal individuals would therefore seem absurd. However, if it is the
case that they are not equal and free, Hobbes’ rejection of Aristotelean political naturalism would
seem to nullify its own ground (King, 1998, 4-5). If the child-parent relationship is a naturally
unequal association, then the state of nature would already contain familial hierarchies and
therefore on the same of nature would no longer be a state of freedom and equality between all
individuals. However, the contract cannot work if individual do not see one another as free and
equal individuals. Human equality is crucial for explaining the fear that motivates signatories to
leave the state of nature. Since we are all equal in our capacity to kill each other and no one is
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assured survival in the state of nature, we are pushed, for the sake of self-preservation, to create a
commonwealth. In other words, if individuals, as Hobbes wants to maintain, must be free and
equal for artificial social hierarchies to become legitimate, we cannot assume that children exist
in a state of natural inferiority. Rather, Hobbes needs to give a story as to how the child-parent
hierarchy can be contractually constituted despite the child’s deficient nature.
When we look at what encompasses voluntary consent for Hobbes, we realize that the
child has an equal capacity for self-determination and the power to legitimize the hierarchical
institution of the family.
The attaining to this Sovereign Power is by two ways. One, by
natural force, as when a man maketh his children to submit
themselves and their children to his government, as being able to
destroy them if they want, or by war subdueth his enemies to his
will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other is when
men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly
of man, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all
others. (Ibid., I.XVII.15)
As we can see, Hobbes makes parental power a form of sovereign power which is as legitimate
as the sovereign power emerging out of a consensual agreement between free and equal
individuals. In this way, parental power is therefore political by nature since it imbues the parent
with sovereign power. Furthermore, just as the contract between equal individuals is established
through their voluntary consent, so is the child-parent hierarchy the product of both the parent’s
and the child’s capacities for consent. As he argues:
The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath
over his Children; and is called paternall. And is not so derived from
the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his
Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either
expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. (Ibid., II.XX..4)
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How can the child consent, if as Hobbes tells us, they “are not endued with reason at all”? (Ibid.,
I.V.18). Consent, for him, can be expressed in two different manners: the first being by direct
expression and the second being by inference. The first form of consent represents the typical
form of voluntary agreement we generally associate with social contract theory, that is between
free and equal adults and through “words spoken with understanding of what they signifie”
(Ibid., I.XIV.13). That is, Individuals come together and express their desire to form a
commonwealth by means of rational deliberation and speech. The second, however, does not
require the same rational expression, but can be inferred by “whatsoever sufficiently argues the
will of the Contractor” (Ibid., I.XIV.14). To understand how the child’s consent can be inferred,
we must briefly look at what Hobbes means by “voluntary motion.” In the broadest sense
possible, a voluntary motion is an action which is not directly caused by something external to
the individual, but rather must involve that individual. These internal motions are identified with
the passions that direct our actions such as “appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief
…” (Ibid., I.VI.13). That is to say that a “voluntary motion”, such as, “to go, to speak, to move
any of our limbs, in such a manner as is first fancied by our mind” begins “in the organs and
interior parts of man’s body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c, and that fancy
is but the relic of the same motion, remaining after the sense” (Ibid., I.VI.1). As such, when one
eats foods, it is not only the natural necessity for eating that leads an individual to go grab food
and then eat it. Rather, in order for eating to happen, the will must be activated such that the
individual moves their bodies with the goal of eating. This is contrasted with what Hobbes calls
“vital motions” such as the pumping of blood in our body, which does not require the
intervention of the individual’s will for its operation. That being said, no rational deliberation is
necessary for an individual to voluntarily move their bodies with the goal of eating or self-
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preservation. Similarly, when the baby cries for food, it is voluntarily moving its body with the
goal of being fed. The child’s passions, in other words, lead them to act in certain ways that
require their will in order for their desire to be fulfilled. Unlike the body’s instinct to pump
blood, here the child’s will is directly participating in its activity.
With this in mind, we can now see how the child is able to consent to their parent’s
sovereignty. The child’s consent is not derived from their rational capacity, but from the fact that
they act in accordance with their own passions. In so far as the child cannot assure its own selfpreservation, its existence is first and foremost dependent on its parent’s nurture. As Hobbes
claims, “seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother, so as she may either nourish or
expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her
rather than any other, and by consequence the dominion over it is hers” (Ibid., II.XX.5). In other
words, without the mother’s (or father’s) care, the child will inevitably perish and selfpreservation can only be attained by means of subjugating oneself to the will of another. Hence,
just as the contract between a conqueror and a conquered is legitimate because it is necessary for
the survival and self-preservation of the latter, the child’s contract with its parent is legitimate in
so far as it makes the former’s self-preservation possible. Because the child is acting on its
passions, when it cries for food, it is requesting the care of its parents, and is therefore
voluntarily agreeing to the sovereign power of the mother and/or father. What this means, for our
purposes, is that Hobbes provides us a contractarian theory that adopts the deficit model of
childhood without de-politicizing the child. In other words, Hobbes’ contract theory gives
children a capacity for contracting into social hierarchies. And as such, also grounds parental
paternalism through the political consent of the child. While many contemporary thinkers would
find Hobbes’ notion of consent problematic, the point is that he does not alienate childhood from
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the political contract because of their deficient nature. Children are considered agents in the
legitimizing process of the parent’s artificial sovereignty, just as individuals in the state of nature
come together and consent to exchanging their natural rights for protection and order.
3. Liberalism’s Depoliticization of the Child
From the last section, we can see how a deficit model of childhood does not necessarily
isolate children from the political sphere. Whether we look at Aristotle or Hobbes’ political
theory, both of them use the deficit model of childhood without depoliticizing the child. For
Aristotle, children, as human beings, are already considered political by nature, while for
Hobbes, children have the most fundamental political capacity; that is, a capacity to enter into
legitimate contract that gives rise to a sovereign. In other words, the deficit model of childhood
does not entail the pre-political or a-political nature of the child in either of these theories.
However, within the liberal tradition we find that the deficit model of childhood strips children
of any moral and political agency and rather depicts them as pre-political creatures in virtue of
their deficient status.
Let’s briefly take a look at Rawls’ A Theory of Justice to exemplify how the child is excluded
from the political realm of justice as fairness. As we discussed above, Rawls’ argument for
justice as fairness is derived from the hypothetical original position that rational and reasonable
individuals can take up. Within this original position, individuals, are subjected to a “veil of
ignorance” behind which they are ignorant of their own “place in society … class position or
social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities,
his intelligence, strength and the like” (Rawls, 2009, 11). However, one thing that individuals in
the original position know about themselves is that they are from the same generation. And from
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this fact, the veil of ignorance fails to protect the interest of future generations. As Rawls writes
in A Theory of Justice
The one case where this conclusion fails is that of saving. Since the
persons in the original position know that they are contemporaries
(taking the present time of entry interpretation), they can favor their
generation by refusing to make any sacrifices at all for their
successors; they simply acknowledge the principle that no one has a
duty to save for posterity. (Ibid., 121)
To remedy this failure of the original position, Rawls argues that we can assume individuals in it
to be “heads of families and therefore have a desire to further the well-being of at least their
more immediate descendants” (Ibid, 111). However, by representing individuals in the original
position as “heads of families”, his theory of justice cannot accommodate claims of justice
between members of the same family. More specifically, the interests of children as individual
persons become isolated from the bounds of justice as fairness. This is because, by formulating
individuals in the original position as heads of the family, they do not have to take into
consideration their own self-interest within the private space of the family or worry that they will
become a less powerful and inferior members of its association. As such, “children drop out of
Rawls’ contract picture entirely … at best, the interests of children are represented by a parent …
at worst (in the case of their life within the family) issues concerning them are not part of the
subject matter of justice at all” (Brennan and Noggle, 1999, 49). As such, the nature of childhood
as “future citizens,” to use Rawls’ terms, automatically excludes children from the claims of
justice. To be a child in Rawls’ liberal society, does not only mean being understood as imperfect
and deficient relative to the universal standard of adulthood, but, by extension, also means
lacking any form of political autonomy and therefore relevance.
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Why is the child considered a-political within liberal thinking? The first and most
obvious answer to this question is that they are irrational or unreasonable. As we saw in the first
section, Locke’s liberal philosophy grounds its own principles of justice by means of a
constitutive rational interest grounded in knowledge of the Natural Law, while Rawls makes
individual’s reasonableness or sense of justice primary for the creation of a stable liberal state. In
other words, the child lacks a crucial moral power to bind itself to the law of the state and thus
cannot be recognized as an active member of a liberal democracy. In Locke, because everyone is
born a tabula rasa, children lack the necessary knowledge of Natural Law that motivates
individuals to act justly. As he argues,
Is a man under the law of Nature? What made him free of that law?
what gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own
will, within the compass of that law? I answer, an estate wherein he
might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might keep
his actions within the bounds of it. (Locke, 1988, II.VI.59)
Until the child gains knowledge of the law he is “free by his father’s title, by his father’s
understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own” (Ibid.). Consequently, as
mentioned above, “Children … are not born in this full state of equality, though” he finishes,
“they are born to it” (Ibid., II.VI.55). Because they lack the proper knowledge, they are born
under “a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into the world, and for some
time after …” and as such lack a legitimate political voice as free and equal members of society
(Ibid.). And it isn’t until they have achieved the same level of knowledge and understanding of
the law that the child will become free and equal like their parent.
While I’ve already addressed how Rawls’ A Theory of Justice depoliticizes children
through the “Head of the Family” assumption, it is important to note that he changes his position
in his later Political Liberalism. Rather than being assumed as “Heads of Families,” individuals
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in the original position are now assumed to be “representatives of free and equal citizens”
(Rawls, 1996, 97). He also revisits the issue of future generation by arguing that “the parties can
be required to agree to a savings principle subject to the further condition that they must want all
previous generations to have followed it” (Ibid., 274). However, Rawls’ depoliticization of
children does not rest on the “head of families” assumption, but rather on the nature of children
as unreasonable and lacking mature rational capacities. The child lacks both a mature faculty of
deliberation and the required sense of justice that motivates rational individuals to pursue their
private ends in line with the fair terms of cooperation. That is, they have not yet developed the
cognitive and moral capacities required for binding themselves to the principles of justice, and
are therefore proto-rational unreasonable creatures (Rawls, 2009, 406). To see how this leads to
children’s depoliticization, I briefly turn to Marilyn Friedman’s argument regarding the political
autonomy of unreasonable persons in Rawls. According to her,
while supporters of reasonable doctrines will enjoy basic rights and
liberties, supporters of certain unreasonable doctrines, in particular
those that reject democratic freedoms, will be treated like the bearers
of a pestilence. Their political autonomy will be denied in two ways.
First, they will be excluded from the legitimation pool, that
collection of citizens whose consent to the political system confirms
its legitimacy. Second, in daily life, they will be denied the full
protection of its basic rights and liberties, particularly freedom of
expression. (Friedman, 2003, 170)
Part of her argument stands on a strong interpretation of the word “containing” in the following
footnote found in Rawls’ Political Liberalism: “That there are doctrines that reject one or more
democratic freedoms is itself a permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical
task of containing them—like war and disease—so that they do not overturn political justice”
(Rawls, 1996, FN. 125). Because unreasonable persons lack the sense of justice necessary for
cooperating in a just and fair system of politics, Friedman argues that they become isolated from
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the “legitimation pool”—i.e. “the pool of persons whose endorsement would confirm the
legitimacy of Rawls’s political liberalism—or whose rejection would confirm its illegitimacy”
(Friedman, 2003, 163). As a result, she concludes that, in the Rawlsian Model, the autonomy of
unreasonable people becomes irrelevant to the legitimation of the fair terms of cooperation and
can, by virtue of their unreasonableness, be denied their political rights and autonomy. That is to
say that since unreasonable persons do not have a voice in determining the fair terms of
cooperation, there is nothing stopping the state from denying them their rights as a way to
“contain” their unreasonable doctrines. We can easily relate Friedman’s conclusion to children’s
political status. Children, being semi-rational and unreasonable are “contained” by being denied
a form of political autonomy and can therefore be coerced into obeying the constitution
established by reasonable persons.
There is, however, some reason to reject this argument if we are discussing unreasonable
adults. In “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens” (2004), Jonathan Quong rejects Friedman’s
interpretation by arguing that “if we conclude, with Rawls, that … freedom and equality entitles
persons to certain basic rights and freedoms, then we must believe that all persons are entitled to
these rights” (Quong, 2004, 316). As he points out, Friedman assumes that Rawlsian principles
of justice only apply to those that consent to their authority. However, because the decisions
made in the original position applies to all persons equally and are based on a hypothetical,
rather than actual, consent, the democratic rights of unreasonable persons would still be
recognized and protected to the full extent of the law. In other words, just because one does not
agree to the principles of justice does not mean that they will not apply to them. Or, as Rawls
himself puts it, a “citizen receives the same protection from foreign invasion regardless of
whether he has paid his taxes” (Rawls, 2009, 236). Hence, unreasonable persons’ right to free
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expression would not necessarily be infringed in so far as it is a right they have by virtue of
being free and equal citizens rather than their reasonableness. As such Quong proposes a weaker
reading of containment which he defines as
any policy whose primary intention is to undermine or restrict
the spread of ideas that reject the fundamental tenets of liberal
democracy, that is, (1) that political society should be a fair
system of social cooperation for mutual benefit, (2) that citizens
are free and equal, and (3) the fact of reasonable pluralism. (Quong,
2004, 323)
The fate of unreasonable persons is therefore not a-priori set. On the contrary, Quong argues that
containment is only justifiable in so far as it threatens the democratic stability of the liberal state.
Thus, if a private religious school teaches children that their doctrine is the only tolerable view
and that their members are morally superior to other non-believers, it is perfectly justifiable to
contain such an ideology because it threatens the very principles of justice that ground
liberalism’s reasonableness. As such, while “unreasonable persons have all the normal rights and
liberties of citizenship, it turns out that they cannot exercise these rights in the pursuit of
unreasonable objectives” (Ibid., 332). That being said, it is arguable whether this reading applies
to children. Even if we agree with Quong’s weaker interpretation of containment, it is entirely
consistent to read Friedman’s stronger sense of containment when discussing children. While
unreasonable citizens are still considered free and equal, children are not equal in the same
respect. For example, children do not have a right to vote, to run for office, or to represent
themselves in court, which, arguably, all constitute basic rights of free and equal citizens.
Children are cognitively deficient and unreasonable to such an extent that, according to Rawls
himself, “we are not required to treat [them] in accordance with political principles. Here those
principles are out of place” (Rawls, 1997, 790). Thus, even if we agree with Quong’s weaker
sense of containment when it comes to unreasonable persons, Friedman’s strong sense seems to
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apply to the child. Due to their deficient status and lack of reasonableness, we are not obliged to
treat them as free and equal political agents and can justifiably deny them equal political status.
Secondly, the child must be construed as a-political or pre-political so as to reject the
conflation between the state’s political power and the family’s parental power. As mentioned
above with Locke, Liberalism partly grounds its own political system in its rejection of Filmer’s
paternal political power. On the one hand, liberal political power rests on the assumption that all
signatories are understood as free and equal. As such, political power implies a form of
reciprocity such that what is considered just for me must also be considered just for other
signatories. On the other hand, parental power lacks both a notion of moral reciprocity and
equality. Parental paternalism is not based on individuals’ rational agreement nor is it legitimized
through a reciprocity condition. To introduce paternal power into the political public sphere
would therefore undermine the fundamental tenets of individual freedom and equality of
liberalism. More specifically, because paternal power is based on the naturally necessitated
hierarchy between parents and children, it would imply that the natural hierarchy between
parents and their children precedes the grounds of political power, thus eliminating the
fundamental necessity of equality and freedom upon which liberalism stands. In other words, to
say that the parent’s power over their children is political in nature, would reintroduce a natural
hierarchy and undermine the necessary consideration of rational equality and freedom. To
conflate the two forms of power would then bring liberalism back to the divine right of
Fatherhood and thus reject the very premises that make it a rational form of governing according
to its own standards of justice. Consequently, the depoliticization of the child becomes a
necessity so as to keep the distinction between both political and paternal power. Because
children remain outside of the political sphere, the parent’s authority cannot be grounded in a
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similar manner as the authority of the state over freely consenting citizens without reintroducing
a Filmerian view of politics.
To give a more specific example, we can take a look at how liberal thinkers (in this case
Locke and Rawls) justify and legitimize the authority of parents over their children. For Locke,
the parent’s authority and the obedience of their children is grounded on God’s will. As he
claims,
This is that which puts the Authority of the Parents hands to govern
the Minority of their Children. God hath made it their business to
imploy this Care on their Off-springs, and hath place in them
suitable Inclination of Tenderness and Concern to temper this
power, to apply it as his Wisdom designed it, to the Children’s good,
as long as they should need to be under it. (Locke, 1988, II.VI.63)
God having made the Parent instruments in his great design of
continuing the race of Mankind, and the occasions of Life to their
Children, as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve,
and bring up their Off-spring; So he has laid on the Children a
perpetual Obligation of honouring their Parents, which containing
in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shewn by all outward
expressions, ties up the Child from anything that may ever injure or
affront, disrupt, or endanger the Happiness or Life of those, from
whom he received this. (Ibid., II.VI.66)
The legitimacy of parental authority and childhood obedience is therefore derived by means of
divine command. The relationship between the child and its parent is not derived from consent
between equals, but from something external to human agency. For Locke, it is God who has
imbued children with “a perpetual obligation” to obey their parent’s authority, and parents with a
duty to care for their offspring. Thus, unlike Hobbes’ version of contractarianism, the child
doesn’t sign a contract with their parent, but is rather already in a divinely situated position of
inferiority with relation to its parents.
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In Rawls we find a similar distinction in the legitimacy of political power and familial
paternalism—at least in relation to the child’s state of being. Following what was said earlier
about children’s rational deficiency and unreasonableness, the paternal power of parents over
children cannot be similarly grounded on the political notion of justice. While the family
remains within the influence of the political claims of justice due to its status as a basic structure
of society, the child’s relationship with its parent cannot be considered political in this way since
it lacks the reciprocal element of political justice. Rather Rawls theorizes the nature of this
private association as distinct from the “special domain of the political” by virtue of the fact that
such associations “are affectional … in ways that the political is not” (Rawls, 1996, 137). So,
while parents’ attitudes towards their children are restrained by the established principles of
justice, “these principles do not inform us how to raise our children” (Ibid., 1997, 790). This is
because children themselves are not privy to the principles of justice. They lack the necessary
adulthood to interact with their parents and other member of society as free and equal persons.
And due to this underdeveloped moral capacity
… parental norms are experienced as constraints and the child may
rebel against them. After all, he may see no reason why he should
comply with them; they are in themselves arbitrary prohibitions and
he has no original tendency to do the things he is told to do. Yet, if
he does love and trust his parents, then, once he has given in to
temptation, he is disposed to share their attitude towards his
misdemeanor. (Ibid., 2009, 407)
Consequently, we cannot appeal to the principles of justice that define the scope of political
power in order to define the scope of good or just parenting. The former will be purely based
upon the assumption of reciprocity between free and equal citizens, while the later, due to the
deficiency of the child, will be grounded on affection. In other words, parental authority is not
justified towards unreasonable children in so far as parenting is reasonable and therefore just, but
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in so far as “we may suppose” that parents “love the child” and that “in time the child comes to
love and trust his parents” (Ibid., 405). Because the justification for both forms of association are
distinct by their very nature, the child cannot be politicized without re-embracing the political
nature of familial association – which in turn would bring us back to a Filmerian Right of
Fatherhood. Similarly, to Locke’s political system, the child is therefore excluded from the
political sphere so as to not conflate the political justifications for justice and state coercion with
the affectional foundation of parental paternal power.
It is important to note, before proceeding to the next section, that this particular view of
childhood within the theoretical context liberal philosophy, means that the a-political nature of
children is not a matter of degrees but a matter of kinds. Because political recognition and
agency require particular rational and reasonable dispositions, children only gain these once they
have completed their cognitive and moral development. This is why it is fairly common for
western liberal nations to codify a particular age after which dependent children suddenly
become recognized as independent adults.6 As we discussed in section 1, both Locke and Rawls
take the rational nature of individuals to constitute the bounds of political power. Citizenship and
political agency, in turn, can only be recognized in so far as one possesses the full rational moral
capacities of a mature adult citizen. While children may develop more complex forms of rational
thinking throughout their childhood, this does not entitle them to also progressively gain more
complex rights and forms of participations. Either one is rational and reasonable enough to
properly participate in liberal democratic societies, or one is not. As a result, while Rawls
discusses the moral development of children as a process towards a sense of justice, it is,

6

This is not to refute the fact that children are often treated like adults, as in, for example, when some children are
tried as adults. However, such cases typically requires some form of waving the codified age because of
circumstances.
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political speaking, irrelevant whether the child is currently in the first or second stage of moral
development. From the public perspective of a society’s basic structure, the child is a child until
they suddenly gain their rights and liberties as equal citizens.
This is why for Locke, the answer to the question: when does the child become free? is
definitive: “I answer; a State of Maturity wherein he might be suppos’d capable to know that
Law, that so he might keep his Actions within the Bounds of it” (Locke, 1988, II.VI.59 my
emphasis). “Natural birth” for Locke, “produced [children] ignorant and without the use of
reason” and as such are “not presently under that law” because “nobody be under a law which is
not promulgated to him; and by this law being promulgated or made known by reason only”
(Ibid., my emphasis). I emphasis the terms “reason only” because it demonstrates the condition
under which “understanding” of the law is possible. A person who understands the law,
understands it by virtue of their rational capacities—nothing more and nothing less. In other
words, in arguing that children must understand the law to be free, Locke specifically means that
they should be able to derive Natural and Civil law from the full use of their reason. An
individual who has some degree of rationality, but cannot derive the laws from their own
deliberative capacity, does not understand the law and is therefore not considerable as free and
equal individual. A rationality in the making may demonstrates hints of this capacity, but it does
not entitle the child to full and equal citizenship. From a political perspective, the child and adult
are therefore different kinds, and the various stages of childhood’s moral complexity is irrelevant
when it come to their rights and liberties. Rawls doesn’t codify the age of maturity quite as
explicitly as Locke does, but he does condition democratic participation upon the development of
a reasonable sense of justice. As such, children who are still in the midst of their moral
development will be inadequately equipped to participate in liberal democracies. They can surely
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participate, at the discretion of certain authorities, within the internal life of more private
institutions like the family. But their lack of a sense of justice means that children cannot be
proper political agents entrusted with the equilibrium and stability of a liberal democratic
society. As such, recognition as a political agent, for both thinkers, will be conditioned on
developing the full scope of our rational and moral human nature. Until then, children will have
to be politically represented through their parents or recognized legal guardian by virtue of their
own voicelessness (Schapiro, 1999, 2003).
4. The Deficiency Model of Childhood and the Problem of Stability
While children are not considered political agents within liberal thought, this does not mean
that the deficit model of childhood is itself philosophically or politically inoperative. On the
contrary, it is the goal of this dissertation to demonstrate the necessity of a deficit model of
childhood for liberal philosophy to be completely consistent with itself. However, this work will
be mainly done by the following two chapters. For now, I would merely like to finish the first
chapter by demonstrating the philosophical connection between the deficit model of childhood
and liberal philosophy. That is, I want to specifically show how the conceptual deployment of
childhood, as a deficient potential adult, functions as a premise for liberalism’s own conclusion
about the nature of just politics.
One appeal of liberal political philosophy is its claim to stability. That is, liberalism partly
appeals to the rational self-interest of individuals by depicting itself as stable political system—
i.e. a political system with a set of basic structures that will not easily fall into disequilibrium and
that, when they do, have the capacity to reinstate a stable equilibrium without much change
(Rawls, 2009, 399-400). Without the assurance of stability, rational individuals would most
likely end up choosing a different kind of political system—since the function of a just state is
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the protection of natural rights, as is the case with Locke, or primary goods, as is the case for
Rawls, over time. However, there arises a problem when we realize that, on the one hand,
liberalism’s stability is conditioned on citizens’ internalization of a particular moral disposition,
while, on the other, the liberal state itself does not have the necessary authority to cultivate such
a disposition directly. And because of this, Rawls argues that “to ensure stability, men must have
a sense of justice or a concern for those who would be disadvantaged by their defection,
preferably both” (Ibid., 455). The liberal state can enforce the cultivation of “such things as
knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights”, it cannot however “… seek to cultivate the
distinctive virtues and values of the liberalisms of autonomy and individuality, or indeed of any
other comprehensive doctrine” (Ibid., 1996, 199). In other words, while the state requires that
citizens be morally trained in a particular way, it itself has no power to prescribe or cultivate the
necessary moral disposition it is assuming. “For in that case” Rawls tells us, “it ceases to be a
form of political liberalism” (Ibid.).
Because of this lack of power, the liberal state is constantly threatened by, to use Rawls
terms, rational but unreasonable individuals—i.e. those who are solely motivated by their own
rational interests without any allegiance to the fair terms of cooperation— and, by extent, the rise
of unreasonable doctrines. This is especially the case when we remember liberalism’s
commitment to private rational self-interest. As discussed above, rational self-interest is the
primary motivation for individual citizens to bind themselves to the principles of justice.
Individuals are assumed to be egoistic with the desire to pursue their own private ends and liberal
philosophy relies on this general egoism to highlight the reasonability of its own terms of
engagement. It appeals to rational individuals by ensuring them that they will be able to pursue
their own private ends (with some conditions attached). As such, the state cannot enforce a
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particular moral disposition onto its own citizens since it rather depends on individuals reaching
this conclusion by themselves. The separation between private rational interest and public
reasonableness hence allows for the possibility of unreasonable doctrines to take hold within a
liberal society since neither one can constitute the other (Ibid., 51-52). If individual members of a
society lack the rational motivation to recognize the authority of the fair terms of cooperation,
the political system itself is at risk of undermining its own stability by allowing rational yet
unreasonable persons to participate in society. For, if members of a liberal society do not do their
parts in keeping with the fair terms of cooperation, as Rawls argues, other citizens will likely
find the system unmotivating and defect from doing their share as well (Ibid., 2003, 236).
One such example that many liberal thinkers (e.g. Ackerman, 1980; Arneson and Shapiro,
1996; Callan, 1994, 1997; Gutmann, 1980, 1995, 1999; Raz 1986) refer back to is the Supreme
court case Wisconsin v Jonas Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 that ruled against the state of Wisconsin’s
authority to enforce compulsory education onto Amish children beyond 8th grade, as it conflicted
with the group’s religious and private interests. While some have argued that the ruling was
consistent with liberalism’s commitment to the protection of individual’s rational ends (in this
case religious end), others have argued that the decision undermined the state’s capacity to
ensure the reproduction of its own values and as such, undermined the very stability of a liberal
political system. As Amy Gutmann argues, by prematurely taking children out of school, the
court gave families the right to define the standards of education such that they could promote
“what [children] will need to become fully active members of their familial society” rather than
developing the correct moral disposition for becoming fully active members of a political society
(Gutmann, 1980, 342). This is partly why the notion of containment discussed above is crucial to
making liberalism work. If the state cannot promote a particular moral disposition, then it can, at
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the very least, reduce the visibility and accessibility of unreasonable doctrines that put its
stability in peril. If the state can contain unreasonable doctrines by undermining the rights of
unreasonable persons, as Friedman argues, then a form of state paternalism that takes away the
unreasonable person’s citizenship rights can ensure the stability of the state. However, if
unreasonable individuals still retain their rights as citizens, as Quong argues, then the state
cannot enforce the suppression of unreasonable doctrines to the same effect and is rather still
open to destabilization.
Nonetheless, some form of state paternalism will be necessitated to contain the rise of
unreasonable doctrines and ensure the stability of the liberal state over time. That is, there will
exist some special cases in which the state has the legitimate authority to cross the public/private
boundary and infringe upon individual rights for the sake of preserving the conditions for liberal
justice. This is apparent, for example, in Locke’s treatment of atheists in A Letter Concerning
Toleration. As he writes, “those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God.
Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an
atheist” (Locke, 2013a, 81). Because atheists do not recognize the divine origin of the natural
law, they cannot be truly bound to its authority. And as such, cannot be allowed to enter into
political society for the sake of protecting “the bonds of human society”. While the Letter itself
argues for an “impartial execution of equal laws” in line with the protection and preservation of
the “public Good”, the atheist is a-priori denied such privileges because of the threat they carry
with them (Ibid.). Similarly, Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, allows, for the sake of stability, some
form of state paternalism within the fair terms of cooperation. As he writes:
It can even happen that there are many who do not find a sense of
justice for their good; but if so, the forces of making for stability are
weaker. Under such conditions penal devices will play a much larger
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role in the social system. The greater lack of congruence, the greater
likelihood, other things equal, of instability with its attendant evils.
(Rawls, 2009, 505)
Or, as Brian Barry puts it in his review of Political Liberalism, “In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
has no qualms about falling back on Hobbesian Methods” (Barry, 1995, 888). This is off course,
as Quong argues, only allowed in so far as the stability of the liberal system and its principles of
freedom and equality are endangered and need to be protected.
However, this form of state paternalism is purely restrictive and operates to contain
unreasonable doctrines. It cannot, in other words, be used to productively prevent the rise of
unreasonable doctrines by cultivating the correct reasonable disposition. And this is especially an
issue with regards to children. Because no citizen is born with the correct moral character needed
for liberalism to work, and all have the potential to be in this sense maladapted, liberalism
necessitates some form of moral education to ensure the reproduction of its own values over
time. Thus, it isn’t just that the state has no authority to promote a particular moral disposition to
its current citizens, but it also lacks the power to cultivate its future citizen’s own moral
character. Rather, a different form of paternalism is needed to ensure the cultivation and
reproduction of the correct moral disposition—i.e. parental paternalism. That is, as mentioned
above, and as both Locke and Rawls argue, the family will be the institution with the power to
cultivate children’s sociality.
The necessity and inner workings of the family’s paternal power will be the main subject
of the next chapter. For now, I would merely like to look at how the deficit conception of
childhood helps ensure the reproduction of liberal values and virtues. While the family is a
crucial institution, its power over children, as chapter 3 will argue, is predicated upon the deficit
conception of childhood. This is because, as I would like to sign post in the concluding pages of
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this chapter, the deficit model denies children’s imminent capacity for self-actualization and by
extent, implies the need for an external authority to guide their actions. As Garett Matthews
(2009) puts it, “If the relationship we adults have to our children is focused solely on those
competencies that we can be assumed to have and our children can be assumed to lack, then it
will be no surprise if our attitude toward our children is completely paternalistic” (Matthews,
2009, 15). And, as I hope to show with this project, it is because the deficit model of childhood
a-priori entails a paternalistic hierarchy that it can also function as a cog in the liberal
reproductive machine.
To understand how the deficit model fulfills this function, we must come back to our
definition. As I have said, the implied paternalism is a-priori, meaning that it should fall out of its
own conceptual definition. We do not need to empirically question whether or not childhood
implies it. And this seems to represent the general contemporary attitude we have towards
children. The now relatively famous 2016 “Killing of Harambe” exemplifies this perfectly. The
incident, which quickly went viral on the internet after the ordeal had taken place, had a 3-year
old child falling into the Cincinnati zoo gorilla habitat, and resulted in the death of the 17-year
old silver back gorilla, Harambe. What followed was a nationwide mourning, as well as a wave
of criticisms attacking the boy’s parents, holding them responsible for the death of the animal.
Online harassment began, death threats were sent, and a petition with more than half a million
signatures requested that the parents "be held accountable for the lack of supervision and
negligence that caused Harambe to lose his life" as well as "actively encourage[ing] an
investigation of the child's home environment " was circulating (qtd. In Lopez, “the Freakout
over Harambe”, 2016). Parents, as per the logic of these infuriated individuals, are supposed to
look after their child such that when the child does something, it is primarily because the parent
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has allowed it to happen. In other words, the sudden and strong responses against the boy’s
parents demonstrates this swift adjudication of children’s agency onto that of the parents. It was
not because of a failure of the child, but primarily because of a failure of parental paternalism
that Harambe died. Despite the multiple factors at play in the gorilla’s death, (including but not
limited to, the crowd’s commotion, the opening into the habitat, the child’s injuries) the deficit
model easily connects the child’s action with the apparent lack of parenting. The killing of
Harambe is one of many examples that demonstrate this a-priori implication of parental
paternalism in the deficit model of childhood.
As we saw earlier, the deficit model conceptualizes of childhood in terms of its potential
for adulthood. Childhood, in other words, receives its own conceptual content in terms to what it
is not and what it lacks; it is defined in terms of something external to itself. And it is this feature
of the deficit model that allows liberalism to alleviate its stability problem. First, off course, we
all know that everyone who has ever existed has at some point been a child.7 This is not specific
to the deficit model, but nonetheless important to state since the universal status of childhood is
part of the reason it can operate as a stabilizing concept. The concept of childhood is applicable
to everyone at some point. But more in line with our project, the deficit model specifically allows
two stabilizing moves: It first denies the relevance of childhood as a matter of political
consideration and by extension, rejects the possibility of children’s political agency. And second,
it derives the conceptual content of childhood from the source of universal value, that is,
adulthood. In other words, the deficit model mitigates the problem of stability by constituting
children as voiceless, and making adults their automatic representative.

7

Except for Locke who believes that Adam was the only human born perfect.
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There is thus an entanglement between the category of childhood and that of adulthood
such that their relationship will necessarily be a one-sided. Adulthood is not only the norm, but
also a functional concept in its own rights—i.e. its conceptual status is not relative to another
concept. That is, from the perspective of the deficit model, while childhood is temporally prior to
adulthood, the latter is metaphysically foundational. The adult is the rational human, the
expression of human essence and the metaphysically real. The child, while important, must
necessarily be represented as secondary to this essential form of adulthood. Within the
parameters defined by the deficit model, the concept of childhood is dysfunctional without an
accompanying conception of adulthood. It cannot, as a concept, tell us anything productive
without a concurrent category of adulthood. In other words, the deficit model depicts “the child
as possessing no ontological status, no fundamental moral standing other than that which is
conferred by adults” (Rollo, 2018, 3). Furthermore, if, conceptually speaking, adulthood gives
childhood its metaphysical reality, thus making childhood an empty dysfunctional concept in
isolation, then it follows that children themselves will also be described as voiceless. Or, as
Schapiro herself puts it, “the condition of childhood is one in which the agent is not yet in a
position to speak in her own voice because there is no voice which counts as hers” (Schapiro,
1999; 724). In other words, the conceptual emptiness of childhood is projected onto the child as
describing its natural lack of political agency.
It is clear from what has been said above that the voicelessness of the child and
conceptual emptiness of childhood, at least in the deficit model, are compensated by the adult
and the concept of adulthood respectively. In so far as the conceptual content of adulthood gives
form to a shapeless childhood, we can say that the former has a productive agential relationship
to the later—that is, it defines it and gives it its form. Again, this merely falls out of the deficit
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model’s definition. If childhood is merely that which lacks adulthood but has the potential for
achieving it, then it follows that adulthood will define the limits and scopes of childhood. This is
why, for example, Locke tells us that children are free by virtue of their father’s freedom. The
child is not born free and equal, but rather first obtain this status through the external authority
figure of their father—i.e. the representative figure of adulthood. Their life, liberty, and private
property are not their own, but that of their father, and by extent, a violation of their rights is
actually a transgression of the father’s natural rights. As such, the adult, that is, the one who
embodies the rational and reasonable qualities of adulthood, already stands in as the child’s
moral superior and as its teacher. First, because, the child, as per the deficit model, is unaware of
its own proper nature. For if children were rational and reasonable enough, that is, if they had the
moral powers of adulthood, then there would seem to be very little reason for describing children
as pre-political, unfree or unequal. The child lacks the moral powers of the adult, and for this
reason cannot be subsumed under the concept of adulthood. But, and second, because the child
also embodies the potential for adulthood, they become dependent on the adult for its own selfactualization. In other words, the child’s self-actualization is made possible by the adult’s otheractualization.
This is why imitation plays a particularly important role in both Rawls and Locke’s
theories of moral development. That is, part of learning correct moral disposition will involve an
imitation of the virtuous adult figure. While the child lacks an awareness of its own potential
moral powers and therefore lacks a capacity to act in accordance with them, it is aware of the
adult’s external presence. The adult, in this sense, becomes the external representation of the
correct moral disposition that exists as a mere potential in the child. In other words, it is the
empirical representation of the ideal form of adulthood that is already implied in childhood. In

59

acting with proper moral character, the adult is performing the child’s own hidden nature as a
potential rational adult in front of them. In other words, the child learns to speak, i.e. learns to
become an adult, by borrowing the voice of the parent. Children are not presented with a choice,
but their nature is rather such that they can only actualize themselves by means of another. In
Imitation, the parent gives the child its moral conduct so that the child can then give it back to the
parent. The parent, in this case, becomes both the giver and judge of children’s moral behavior.
As Locke argues,
But of all the ways whereby children are to be instructed, and their
manners formed, the plainest, easiest, and most efficacious, is, to set
before their eyes the examples of those things you would have them
do, or avoid; which, when they are pointed out to them, in the
practice of persons within their knowledge, with some reflections on
their beauty and unbecomingness, are of more force to draw or deter
their imitation, than any discourses which can be made to them.
(Locke, 2013b, Section 82)
Similarly, Rawls makes use of imitation in his account of the moral development. He divides
children’s moral development into three stages: “the morality of authority”, “the morality of
association”, and the “morality of principles”. Each stage represents the internalization of
particular virtues necessary for developing a sense of justice. In the first stage, the child learns
“obedience, humility, and fidelity to authoritative persons”, in the second “justice and fairness,
fidelity and trust, integrity and impartiality,” and finally, during the third stage, they “develop a
desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice” (Rawls, 2009, 408, 413, 415). During
the first two stages, an older more mature figure, we can assume an adult, is represented as the
moral exemplar that motivates the child to internalize the end virtues of his liberal system. As
Rawls tells us, during the first stage, children ought to “strive to be like [their parents]” and
during the second stage they should “desire to model [themselves]” after virtuous family and
community members (Ibid., 408, 413). Before reaching the third stage of moral maturity, the
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child’s moral education is first and foremost tied to an external representation of correct moral
character— the virtuous rational adult.
The deficit model of childhood has the capacity to mitigate the problem of stability
precisely because it denies children’s capacity for self-actualization and adjudicates this process
to adults. In doing so, the deficit model gives way to the necessary positive paternalism required
for moral education. First, in denying the child a voice and childhood a conceptual content of its
own, it becomes impossible to find agency within either. Not only does the concept of autonomy
exclude any connection with the concept of childhood, but, by extent, the child is a-priori judged
to lack autonomy because of its status as a child. Thus, if a productive form of paternalism is
rejected by liberalism on the basis that individuals have political autonomy, then its
wrongfulness will seemingly fall away if individuals lack this quality of adulthood. Or to once
again quote Schapiro,
if the being whose will is bypassed does not really ‘‘have’’ a will
yet, if she is still internally dependent upon alien forces to determine
what she does and says, then the objection to paternalism loses its
force. Because the nature of the inability is normative, because it
consists in the agent’s lack of effective authority over herself, the
excuse for paternalism follows without a further story. (Schapiro,
1999, 731)
Hence, and secondly, the deficit model of childhood adjudicates children’s agency to that of
adults. Since the child lacks the required autonomy, but nonetheless has the potential for
achieving it, then only someone who has already achieved this political freedom and equality
will be able to cultivate the child’s true nature. The deficit model of childhood, as such, mitigates
the problem of stability by opening up a possible justification of the necessary positive parental
paternalism and by extent making possible the reproductive mechanism that ensures the stability
of liberal values and virtues without compromising its commitment to individual freedom and
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equality. In both denying children’s agency and adjudicating it to adults, liberalism can not only
contain the maldevelopment of children, but can also ensure that they develop the proper virtues
and values.
This is not to say that the deficit model, by itself resolves the problem of stability.
However, it is central to ensuring the possibility of a stable system. Rawls himself saw the
centrality of the child’s moral development for ensuring the stable equilibrium of a liberal
society. The eighth chapter of A Theory of Justice—which details the child’s moral development
in liberal societies—is meant “to examine the question of stability and to contrast the
psychological roots of the various conceptions of justice” (Rawls, 2009, 404-405). A view which
he re-endorses later in Political Liberalism (Ibid., 1996, 143 FN. 9). But off course, the deficit
model of childhood is only a conceptual framework and cannot, by itself, ensure the proper
moral education of future generations without some institution that can apply this implied
paternalism. As we’ve already discussed, this institution cannot be public, but rather must be
private in order to stay consistent with liberalism’s emphasis on rational interest. The family thus
takes on the role of cultivating future citizen’s moral character. To fully understand how the
deficit model of childhood stabilizes liberal politics, we must therefore turn to our attention to
the familial institution and its political function as “the school of justice” (Okin, 1989). This is
because, as I will argue in chapter 3, while the family represents the institution with the capacity
to morally educate children, the paternal power of parents over their children is ultimately
grounded on this exposition of the deficit model. The familial function, in other words, is
founded on the deficit conceptualization of childhood. But first, we must see how the family can
fulfil its political role as a stabilizing institution with the power to develop the moral capacities
of children.
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CHAPTER 2: THE JUST FAMILY, LIBERALISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF
STABILITY
In the previous chapter, I aimed to lay out the basic claim of this dissertation; namely that
the deficit model of childhood is conceptually necessary for liberal political philosophy to
mitigate the problem of stability. I specifically proposed that the deficit model of childhood
mitigates the problem of stability by legitimizing the necessary paternalism required for the
development of the proper moral dispositions in a liberal democracy. I have talked plenty about
the deficit model thus far, but have said very little about the institution(s) that make use of this
concept for the sake of stabilizing a well-ordered society. Because of liberalism’s commitment to
individual freedom and equality, public institutions, such as the state, do not have the legitimate
authority to enforce its own moral requirements. Rather, as mentioned previously, the family
must take on this role for liberalism to sustain itself over time. The goal of this chapter is to
support this claim by arguing that the family is fundamental to liberalism’s stability by virtue of
its ability to cultivate the moral sentiments that conditionally precede the required sense of
justice. In this sense, the family is not taken to be the only institution working to stabilize a
liberal society, However, it is asserted as a necessary institution for stability without which
liberalism could not be liberal by any standard.
To support my claim, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first two section
begin by looking at the problem of stability in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. The first section
specifically takes the time to lay out the specifics of the problem and the manner in which Rawls
answers it with 1) the development of a sense of justice and 2) state paternalism. The second
section then follows by demonstrating how “the just family” embodies both of these answers by
virtue of its dual nature as both a public and private basic structure of society; making it a
63

fundamental stabilizing institution for liberal society. The third and fourth section will then
switch to Rawls’ Political Liberalism to show that, with the correction introduced to A Theory of
Justice, the family becomes an even more necessary and fundamental institution for the
reproduction of liberal values over time. The third section specifically begin by addressing the
limits of A Theory as seen by Rawls. Specifically, we will see that it fails to take into
consideration the fact of reasonable pluralism and as such his theory of justice over relies on
state-paternalism as a force of stability—an option he implicitly rejects in A Theory. Finally, the
fourth section will discuss the new formulation of his answers to the problem of stability, and
finish by once again demonstrating the centrality of the family as a stabilizing mechanism.
As is implied by this short summary, I have decided not to focus on Locke’s ideas of the
family and the problem of stability. While it would be fairly easy to do as much, I have taken this
step for a couple of reasons. First, Locke’s view of moral development is very scarce and even
sometimes contradictory. On the one hand, Locke often turns to hedonistic principles to explain
why children come to recognize the moral authority of parents and other adults. On the other, he
also argues in the Second Treatise that just citizens are motivated by their understanding of
Natural Law. While these two facets of moral behavior are not entirely exclusive, Locke fails to
ever reconcile the two. As Jerome B. Schneewind writes: “Locke's failures are sometimes as
significant as his successes. His views on morality are a case in point” (Schneewind 1994, 199).
The second reason is that Locke’s view of the family is grounded in a divine metaphysics that
essentially breaks the separation of church and state—a fundamental tenets of contemporary
liberal political philosophy. Hence, while for him the family is, like Rawls, a necessary
institution for the reproduction of society, it by no means adheres to the liberal standards it aims
to reproduce since it begins from an inherently Christian perspective. Rawls, on the other hand,
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not only gives us a much richer picture of the family that is consistent with liberal principles, but
also informs his views of childhood moral development with the work of contemporary
developmental psychologists like Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. As such, it seems to be
more productive to altogether skip Locke and take the time to unpack Rawls’ much more
profound view. It is also important to note that this chapter is merely concerned with the status of
the family as a stabilizing institution. It is clear that the family is a complex organization with
many layers and functionalities in human life. But since we are concerned with the conceptual
necessity of the deficit model of childhood in for theorizing stability within the liberal paradigm,
the family is merely approached in terms of a stabilizing institution for the reproduction of
liberal democratic societies. In other words, our approach to the family is restricted to its
conceptual use in Rawls’ political philosophy.
1. The Problem of Stability in A Theory of Justice
A Theory of Justice is divided into two parts. The first “develops the conception of a
perfectly just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of persons under the
fixed constraints of human life” (Rawls, 2009, 214). In other words, it imagines a just and wellordered society with the assumption that everyone is an ideal individual with full rational and
reasonable moral capacities. As Rawls elaborates:
The description of the original position interprets the point of view
of noumenal selves, of what it means to be a free and equal rational
being. Our nature as such beings is displayed when we act from the
principles we would choose when this nature is reflected in the
conditions determining choice. Thus, men exhibit their freedom,
their independence from the contingencies of nature and society, by
acting in ways they would acknowledge in the original position.
(Ibid., 225)

65

From this ideal position, Rawls comes to the two principles of justice—i.e. the greatest equal
liberty principle, and the difference and equal opportunity principles. It is the fundamental pillar
of his theory and leads the way to the second part of the book.
While Rawls is often read as an ideal theorist, there is a deep commitment to the
pragmatics of his theory that underlies his work—especially his later writing (Scheffler, 1994).
For example, he begins his essay “The Idea of Overlapping Consensus” (1987) in a very “nonidealistic” fashion stating that: “The aims of political philosophy depend on the society it
addresses” (Rawls, 1987, 1). The revisions he makes to A Theory in Political Liberalism (1993),
as we shall see, further attest to the importance of liberalism’s concrete possibility as a system of
justice. It should be to no one’s surprise then, that even in A Theory, we find a political thinker
who is deeply concerned with the pragmatic elements of establishing and sustaining a particular
social order. But there are also theoretical reasons why Rawls feels the need to discuss the nonideal elements of justice. At the center of the theory, there is a question about the motivation of
individuals to follow the fair terms of cooperation. As we saw in chapter 1, the primary
motivation for adopting the conception of justice comes from citizens’ own private rational plans
for their lives. Thus, to ensure that no one favors themselves in establishing the terms of justice,
the parties are placed behind a veil of ignorance, thus stripping them of any awareness about
their social status and natural endowments. But while parties behind the veil of ignorance can
establish fair terms of cooperation that can be said to be impartial, it cannot ensure that
individuals will be motivated to follow the established conception of justice outside the original
position. Furthermore, since, as we saw in the first chapter, the state does not have the authority
to morally educate its own citizens, we are pressed to ask: why believe that members of a liberal
society will be motivated to follow the established conception of justice?
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This is essentially what Rawls refers to as the problem of stability—the central topic of
the second non-ideal element of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Before understanding exactly how
stability presents itself as problem, it will be useful to briefly look at what stability means.
Stability is specifically framed in terms of systems in equilibrium. A system is in equilibrium
when “it has reached a state that persists indefinitely over time so long as no external forces
impinge upon it” (Rawls, 2009, 400). A society with the necessary internal components for
sustaining itself over time is therefore in equilibrium. Equilibrium, in other words, judges a
system as closed and overlooks its capacity to respond to external disruptions. This capacity to
respond and adapt in light of disruptive external forces is what determines the system’s degree of
stability. As Rawls puts, a system’s stability depends “upon the strength of the internal forces
that are available to return to equilibrium” once the it experiences “external disturbances” (Ibid.).
While an unstable system would cave under the pressure of “outside shocks”, a stable one can
“call into play forces within the system that tend to bring it back to this equilibrium state”
(Ibid.).8
The system at play in A Theory of Justice is the “complex of political, economic, and
social institutions when it satisfies, and is publicly known by those engaged in it to satisfy, the
appropriate principles of justice” (Ibid., 400-401). That is, it is first defined in terms of its
internal components— i.e. the “basic structure of the well-ordered society corresponding to the
different conception of justice” (Ibid., 400). It is also defined in terms of its public visibility.
That is, institutions that function to satisfy the requirements of justice must also be publicly

8

It is important to note that Rawls does not mean to imply that “the institutions and practices of the well-ordered
society do not alter.” (Rawls, 2009, 401) On the contrary, he argues that “such a society will presumably contain
great diversity and adopt different arrangements from time to time.” (Ibid.) What is meant by stable is that the
principles of justice at play will not need to be revisited and that “however institutions are changed, they still
remain just or approximately so …” (Ibid.)
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known to do so. Institutions that work in the background and are not visible to public
consciousness would therefore be outside the bounds of justice and not included within the
definition of the system itself. While the first ideal portion of the theory is an attempt to define
the equilibrium state of a liberal democracy, it will be the role of the non-ideal part to assess its
stability.
There are specifically two destabilizing possibilities that Rawls needs to consider in order
to resolve the problem of stability— i.e. “the problem of isolation and assurance” (ibid., 237).
“The first sort of problem” he tells us, “arises whenever the outcome of the many individuals’
decision made in isolation is worse for everyone than some other course of action, even though,
taking the conduct of the others as given, each person’s decision is perfectly rational” (Ibid.,
238). In other words, the problem of isolation states that a purely rational and self-interested
perspective may not always produce the best or most desirable outcomes for the whole. Rawls
points to the prisoner’s dilemma as a paradigmatic case of this problem. This may threaten the
stability of the social order since individuals acting purely on rational self-interest could lead to
accepting unjust terms of cooperation that contradict the public good. The second problem, on
the other hand, states that “[each] person’s willingness to contribute is contingent upon the
contribution of the others” such that if someone is benefiting from the system without doing their
fair share, others will lack the motivation to reproduce that system (Ibid.). Thus, if individuals
within a just liberal society cannot be assured that everyone will behave in accordance with the
fair terms of cooperation, they will lack the rational motivation to live in accordance with
principles of justice as fairness (Ibid., 236). This is the paradigmatic example of the “free-rider”
who reaps all the benefits of a system without having to put in the work for them (Ibid.). As
discussed in the previous chapter, both of these problems result from liberalism’s emphasis on

68

rational self-interest. As such, to show that his political liberalism is the most stable alternative to
other forms of justice, Rawls must first propose a solution to both without undermining the
freedom and equality of all within the system. That is, he cannot just ignore the rational selfinterest of citizens without also undermining the very appeal of a liberal political system.
We have already indirectly addressed both solutions to the isolation and assurance
problems in the first chapter. However, it may be beneficial to specifically talk about them in the
context of the problem of stability as they are presented in A Theory of Justice. Briefly put, the
solutions to the isolation and assurance problems respectively are the development and
internalization of “a sense of justice” and a legitimate state paternalism. First and foremost,
Rawls tells us that a well-ordered society, by virtue of its just nature, should be able to cultivate a
desire to comply with the fair terms of cooperation in its citizens—i.e. a sense of justice. He
details the moral psychology behind this claim in Chapter 8, where he lays out three different
stages of moral development both necessary and sufficient for participation in a liberal
democracy. Assuming a society is already structured according to the notion of justice
established in the ideal part of A Theory (i.e.in equilibrium), a sense of justice comes about as the
result of three sequential and successive stages of moral development. Each stage represents a
degree of moral reasoning that builds upon the previous one to ultimately culminate in a sense of
justice. This is an especially important point to emphasize since the rest of the chapter will be
mainly focused on the first stage of this moral development—during which the family qua childparent is of central importance. The first stage supports all the other stages such that
maldevelopment early on will result in a deficient or a complete lack of a sense of justice.
The three stages of moral development are 1) morality of authority, 2) morality of
association, and 3) morality of principles, each respectively “representing the development of the
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three forms of guilt feelings in this order: authority guilt, association guilt, and principle guilt”
(Rawls, 1963, 286). The first stage traces the transformation of the child’s self-love into a love
for a person in authority. While at first, the child is “moved by certain instincts and regulated
only (if at all) by rational self-love,” by the end of the first stage they will “come to love, and to
recognize the love of, the parent” (Ibid., 287). This love for another is the first step towards
developing the desire to bind oneself and uphold the just terms of cooperation. But it is also
limited in so far as it is a love for a parent—it is a feeling to which others are not privy. So, how
does the emergence of this new feeling lead to developing a sense of justice? Love is required for
the child to learn certain prized virtues such as “obedience, humility, and fidelity to authority”
(Rawls, 2009, 408). Since from birth the child is first motivated by instinct and self-love, the first
step towards cultivating a sense of justice requires them to cultivate a disposition to subject their
actions to an external authority. However, since children lack the cognitive capacities for
rational-self-determination, appeal to reason cannot propel them to subject themselves to any
authority figure. Rather, the prized virtues of obedience and filial piety are made possible only in
so far as the parental figures first demonstrate a love for the child. As Rawls writes, having
a morality of authority consists in his being disposed without the
prospect of reward or punishment to follow certain precepts that not
only may appear to him largely arbitrary but which in no way appeal
to his original inclinations. If he acquires the desire to abide by these
prohibitions, it is because he sees them as addressed to him by
powerful persons who have his love and trust, and who also act in
conformity with them. (Ibid., 408)
That his love of them does not have a rational explanation follows
from the concept of love: to love another is to care for him for his
own sake as his rational self-love would incline. The child’s love of
his parents has an explanation–namely, that they first loved him—
but not a rational explanation by reference to his original self-love.
(Rawls, 1993, 287)
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Through this loving relationship the child learns the first disposition towards developing a sense
of justice, a feeling of “authoritative guilt”. To understand how this is the case it is first
important to note that “the child does not have his own standards of criticism” (Ibid., 288). They
lack the cognitive moral capacities for evaluating their and other’s actions, and therefore, are not
in a position to reject authority claims. As such, if the child loves their parents they will tend,
Rawls posits, to accept their injunctions. Assuming a mutual love, the child “will impose on
himself the standards [that parents] embody, and he will judge himself as they would when he
violates their precepts” (Ibid.). Thus, they will internalize the normative standards of the parents
such that, when committing acts of transgression, they will “be disposed to reveal [their] fault by
confession and to seek reconciliation”—i.e. they will have acquired a sense of authoritative guilt
(ibid.).
Once the child acquires authoritative guilt, they go on to the second stage of moral
development—the morality of associations— and begin to develop “association guilt.” During
this stage, the child’s moral horizon expands considerably. It is no longer restricted to the
relationship they have with their parents, but now includes larger associations and communities.
The “content of the morality of association” Rawls tells us, “is given by the moral standards
appropriate to the individual’s role in the various associations to which he belongs” (Ibid., 409).
As children grow up, they, in time, enter into various communities—like the family, schools,
neighborhoods etc…, and begin to understand themselves as part of larger associations in which
they are given specific roles and duties (Rawls, 2009, 409-410). Rather than love and filial piety,
here the goals are the development of “friendly feelings … together with feelings of trust and
confidence” as well as the cultivation of “cooperative virtues” like “those of justice and fairness,
fidelity and trust, integrity and impartiality” (Ibid., 411, 413). Briefly put, Rawls explains that
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As individuals enter the association one by one over a period of time,
or group by group (suitably limited in size), they acquire these
attachments when others of longer standing membership do their
part and live up to the ideals of their station. Thus, if those engaged
in a system of social cooperation regularly act with evident intention
to uphold its just (or fair) rules, bonds of friendship and mutual trust
tend to develop among them, thereby holding them ever more
securely to the scheme. (Ibid., 411-412)
Once these relationships are established, the individual will feel association guilt when they fail
to follow the duties and requirements of their role. Like in the first stage, the goal of the second
stage is to develop certain feelings towards a moral authority that eventually disposes the child to
act in accordance with the injunctions of said authority figure. However, and unlike the first,
morality of association requires certain cognitive capacities that the child must develop through
the second stage. Not only must they be able to understand themself as part of a larger group, but
they must also develop the cognitive capacity “to put [themself] in [another’s] place” (Ibid.,
411). While the first stage requires the child to cultivate feelings of love for individual who are
directly involved in its care and growth, the second stage requires them to develop feelings of
mutual trust with others who are not directly involved with their care. Within association guilt,
we therefore find the first glimpse of a sense of justice proper—a desire to act according to the
scheme of co-operation established in an association. By the end of the morality of association
stage, individuals have developed a capacity to understand how their actions can potentially
harm others that they care about. If mutual ties of friendship are cultivated, then they will also
cultivate “inhibitions and reaction to failing to do one’s part” within the limits of their
associations (Rawls, 1993, 290). Hence, by the end of the second one learns to be “a good
student and classmate” as well as “a good sport and companion” (Rawls, 2009, 409). To learn,
however, what it means to be a “just person” we must turn to the third and final stage of moral
development, “the morality of principles” (Ibid., 414).
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In both the previous forms of guilt,” Rawls tells us, “I have supposed it to be connected
with an actual natural attitude toward certain particular persons” (Rawls, 1993, 291). However,
many times people will feel guilt for injuring or wrongdoing those individuals that “are not
persons with whom we are tied by any form of particular fellow-feeling” (Ibid.). What replaces
the love of the first stage, and the mutual trust of the second, is the sought sense of justice. How
does it arise? Rawls posits that, “that the morality of association quite naturally leads up to
knowledge of the standards of justice” (Rawls, 2009, 414). As the third psychological law states:
once the attitudes of love and trust, and of friendly feelings and
mutual confidence, have been generated in accordance with the two
preceding psychological laws, then the recognition that we and those
for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and
enduring just institution tends to engender in us the corresponding
sense of justice. (Ibid., 414-415)
Thus, if the child develops the two preceding natural sentiments, they will already be disposed to
internalize a sense of justice. Because they love their parents and have cultivated friendly
feelings towards members of particular associations, the child has an interest in making sure that
the political conditions which made these relationships possible remain. As such, after
recognizing the role that liberal justice plays in fulfilling their own rational interests, as well as
that of others for whom they care, they will be inclined to develop the correct moral disposition
for liberal life—i.e. a sense of justice. It is important to note that this is not meant to describe the
natural development of moral attitudes in children. Rather, Rawls is trying to establish the
possibility for the development of a sense of justice. Drawing from contemporary developmental
psychologists like Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, Rawls aims to show that this sense of
justice is perfectly within the means of human psychology. Hence, this developmental picture is
solely deployed as a means to demonstrate the stability of a democratic liberal social systems.
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As such, within the bounds of a well-ordered liberal society, the problem of isolation
would already be moot due to its capacity to instill a sense of justice into its citizens first through
the family and second through other institutions. As Rawls argues, a strong sense of justice
accompanied by “relations of friendship and mutual trust” means that “no one wishes to advance
his interests unfairly to the disadvantage of others” which “removes the instability of the first
kind” (Ibid., 435). In a certain sense, given these “natural attitudes and the desire to do what is
just”, Rawls further posits that we can resolves also the “instability of the second kind” (Ibid.).
As he writes, “since each recognizes that these inclinations and sentiments are prevalent and
effective, there is no reason for anyone to think that he must violate the rules to protect his
legitimate interests” (Ibid.). However, this assumes that ideal conditions are in place such that
there is congruence between citizens private interest and their reasonable public duties. Hence, to
truly guarantee that everyone plays by the fair terms of cooperation, the state must be given some
power to enforce the established ruling. As Rawls himself puts it
[Under] normal circumstances a reasonable assurance in this regard
can only be given if there is a binding rule effectively enforced.
Assuming that the public good is to everyone’s advantage, and one
that all would agree to arrange for, the use of coercion is perfectly
rational from each man’s point of view. Many of the traditional
activities of government, insofar as they can be justified, can be
accounted for in this way. The need for the enforcement of rules by
the state will still exist even when everyone is moved by the same
sense of justice. The characteristic features of essential public goods
necessitate collective agreements, and firm assurance must be given
to all that they will be honored. (Ibid., 236)
As mentioned in the first chapter, Rawls has no qualm about using “penal devices” for
containing unreasonable doctrines from destabilizing the social order (Ibid., 505). In this way, he
is able to argue that liberalism is a just and stable political philosophy by virtue of the
congruence between private interest and public good, and the reasonable restrictive powers of the
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state for containing the rise of unreasonable doctrines. It should also be noted that, for Rawls this
restrictive paternalism is not a primary mechanism of stability but more of a formality against the
assurance problem. In an ideal liberal democracy, the congruence factor is more than enough to
ensure that everyone does their fair share—a moral attitude learned during the second stage of
moral development. Or as Rawls himself puts it, “In a well-ordered society there would be no
need for the penal law except insofar as the assurance problem made it necessary” (Rawls, 1993,
277). The point being that, in its ideal form, a well-ordered society would not fall prey to either
the problem of isolation or that of assurance. This does not undermine the need for a state
paternalism, but it does make this defensive power a mere formality. The need for assurance is
part of the deal. However, a strong sense of justice, according to Rawls, is a much more efficient
stabilizing mechanism than sovereign power. As he points out, while Hobbes commits himself to
the “sovereign’s efficacy [for removing] the two kinds of instability … a society regulated by a
public sense of justice is inherently stable: other things equal, the forces making for stability
increase (up to some limit) as time passes” (Rawls, 2009, 435-436).
2. The State-Parent-Child Triad: The Just Family as a Stabilizing Mechanism
Having presented Rawls’ solutions to the two problems of stability, we now turn to the
specific institution of the just family and its function as a stabilizing mechanism. First, I would
like to give a few brief remarks addressing my focus on the just family. The family, after all, is
not the only institution at play in stabilizing liberal democracies— as we saw both schools and
government also play a part— which all warrant some attention. However, there are three
specific reasons as to why the family is the main subject of this chapter. In so far as we are
concerned with liberalism’s conception of the child and childhood, and first, the family becomes
automatically included in the conversation. When one thinks of childhood, especially through a
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deficit model, one already evokes a certain hierarchical association depicted in terms of a parentchild relationship—i.e. a family in its rawest form. Furthermore, just as the figure of the child
often entails familial ties, the family itself is often defined in terms of its parental duties. For
example, while Rawls never directly defines the family, he does see that “a central role of the
family is to arrange in a reasonable and effective way, the raising of and caring for children”
(Rawls, 1997, 788). An emphasis which we see taken up by other liberal thinkers like David
Archard and Susan Okin who respectively define the family as “a multigenerational group,
normally stably co-habiting, whose adults take primary custodial responsibility for the dependent
children” (Archard, 2010, 26 my emphasis) and “an important school of [children’s] moral
development” (Okin, 1989, 21).
Second, the family is unique in so far as it is the only institution with the power the
bridge the child’s instinctual ego-centrism with the social requirements of justice. That is, as we
saw in the previous section the parent’s love transforms the child’s natural and instinctual selflove into a love for another. While the second stage transforms the love for the parent into a
friendly feeling, and the third stage develops this friendly feeling into a sense of justice, the first
stage is the only one during which we see an amoral individual transform into a moral subject.9
The family, as Rawls states, is not necessary for the development of love towards another
(Rawls, 2009, 405). However, throughout A Theory of Justice, he operates on the assumption
that parents “have a desire to further the well-being of at least their more immediate

9

While Rawls does not explicitly state that children are born amoral we can assume so by the fact that he is
following Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories of moral development. Both developmental psychologists trace the
origins of moral thinking to around 5-9 years old. Furthermore, what Rawls calls “the morality of authority” is
bluntly influenced by Piaget’s first stage of moral development which he dubs “heteronomous morality” and take
place at the ages of 5-9 years old. See Brennan and Noggle. 1999. “Rawls’ Neglected Childhood” in The Idea of
Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, ed. by Clark Wolf and Victoria Davion. Rowman and Littlefield Publishing. for a
more detailed analysis of the connection between Rawls, Piaget, and Kohlberg.
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descendants” (Ibid., 111). Thus, when discussing the first stage of moral development, he tells us
“the parents, we may suppose, love the child” (Ibid., 405). Since love is the first requirement for
the cultivation of a sense of justice to begin, the natural tie between child and parent offers an
obvious way to fulfill this condition.
Finally, and third, the natural ties implied by the family are also crucial for the
establishment of a just savings principle. As discussed in the first chapter, Rawls assumes that
parties in the original position are “Heads of Families” to explain why they would be compelled
to save for future generations. As Okin clarifies
Rawls says that it is not necessary to think of the parties as heads of
families, but that he will generally do so. The reason he does this,
he explains, is to ensure that each person in the original position
cares about the well-being of some persons in the next generation.
These "ties of sentiment" between generations, which Rawls regards
as important for the establishment of intergenerational justice—his
just savings principle—, would otherwise constitute a problem
because of the general assumption that the parties in the original
position are mutually disinterested. (Okin, 1989, 92)
These last two reasons can be further condensed into one; namely, that the family prescribes the
pragmatic appeal of liberalism. In other words, it is through the family institution that individuals
come to internalize the motivation to create and/or sustain the principles of justice established
within the first part of A Theory. Of course, this is not to say that the family is sufficient by itself
to ensure the stability of liberal democracies. But it is to say that without a properly “just family”
the forces that keep a well-ordered democratic society stable will weaken to the point of
becoming dysfunctional.
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Figure 1: The State-Parent-Child Triad as a Stabilizing Mechanism
To understand specifically how the just family acts as a stabilizing institution, we can
represent it as a tripartite relationship between state, parent, and child—represented in figure 1
above. Together each element plays a role in constituting the just family as a stabilizing
mechanism for democratic social systems. The state regulates the parents, the parents morally
educate the child, and the child reproduces the state. Before diving into each of the relationships
in the triad, we should note that each element of the tripartite is within its own sphere of
influence; the state is isolated in the public, while the child is alienated into the private domestic
sphere. This distinction also shows how the family, for Rawls, is not a merely private and natural
institution separate from the just terms of cooperation. As Mary Barbara Walsh argues “for
Rawls, the family is both private and public” (Walsh, 2012, 427). The parent is the agent who
unifies both spheres into the just family. Namely, it is the agent who is defined in terms of both
its public and private capacities. It is, on the one hand, a public citizen under the legitimate
authority of the state, and, on the other hand, a private individual with legitimate authority in the
family. This dual nature of the family also reflects its ability to socialize the child from an
instinctual creature acting out of self-love into a moral individual driven by a sense of justice.
The congruency between the parent’s rational self-interest and reasonable sense of justice means
that it is able to bridge the public and private sphere. In other words, it is able to create a
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connection between the child and the state; a connection that would be otherwise impossible
given the child’s deficient nature and liberalism’s commitment to rational thinking.
To understand how this tripartite relationship resolves the problems of stability let us come back
to the respective solutions to both the isolation and assurance problem. The solution to the
instability of the first kind, as Rawls tells us, is the development of a sense of justice. While the
state itself does not have the legitimate authority to develop such a moral feeling, the private part
of the family does thanks to the natural affective relationship implied in the parent-child
relationship. It is because the child lacks their own evaluative norms and loves their parents, that
they develop authority guilt and “do what is expected without questioning” (Rawls, 2009, 409).
Within the private sphere of the just family (i.e. the parent-child relationship) parents therefore
have the legitimate authority to morally educate the child because the child is both loved and
deficient. This authority over the child is not socially determined (i.e. not the product of a
particular form of consent) but rather derived from child’s deficient nature. As Brennan and
Noggle point out:
Both Rawls and Piaget endorse the same basic picture of the child’s
nature. The child has certain dispositions, most notably, the
disposition to love someone who loves her, and the disposition to
imitate, obey, and judge oneself by the standards used by the one
who is loved and respected. (Brennan and Noggle, 1999, 11).
The child, by nature, is already predisposed to obey the command of the parents. The latter’s
love naturally leads to the subjection of the former; giving parents a natural authority to morally
educate their children. Furthermore, since parents are assumed to be both rational and reasonable
agents, they will, ideally speaking, raise their child is a way that is not only consistent with
liberal principles, but also promotes their adoption— such as, for example, elevating children’s
self-esteem and affirming their worth as individuals (Rawls, 2009, 407).
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Second, we have the solution to the instability of the second kind which, as we saw,
Rawls resolves with some form of rational and reasonable state paternalism. Parties in the
original position, he points out, would find it “rational to authorize the measures needed to
maintain just institutions, assuming that the constraints of equal liberty and the rule of law are
duly recognized” (Rawls, 2009, 504). In so far as the just terms of cooperation are threatened by
instability, the state is granted powers to intervene. This part of the solution to the problem of
stability is represented by the state-parent relationship. This relationship is best exemplified, at
least in A Theory, by coming back to Rawls’ assumption about the parties in the original position
being “heads of families.” The parent, in other words, is not only this private figure of authority
but also the hypothetical rational agent who determines the principles of justice from within the
original position. Thus, parents already hold a relationship to the state in so far as they are the
just liberal citizen who hypothetically consented to the fair terms of cooperation by means of
their rational and reasonable moral capacities. This also means that the state has the legitimate
authority to intervene into the parent-child relationship when the strength of a liberal
democracy’s stability is in jeopardy. Thus, if parent fail to morally educate their children
properly, as dictated by the theory of moral development proposed, the state can claim a
legitimate right to intervene and penalize the parents (Steutel & Spiecker, 1999). As Rawls
clarifies, “It can even happen that there are many who do not find a sense of justice for their
good; but if so, the forces making for stability are weaker. Under such conditions penal devices
will play a much larger role in the social system” (Rawls, 2009, 505).
There is an additional way in which the just family lends itself as a necessary stabilizing
institution in liberal democratic societies. Aside from its subjugation to the state and its own
authority to morally educate children, the just family, as Okin points out, stabilizes democratic
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liberal societies by acting as “the link between generations necessary for the just savings
principle” (Okin, 1989, 94). Rawls realizes the difficulty that the question of intergenerational
justice—what current generations owe future ones? — poses. Intergenerational justice implies
that
Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been
established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a
suitable amount of real capital accumulation. This Saving may take
various forms from net investment in machinery and other means of
production to investment in learning and education. (Ibid., 289)
However, there are two particular difficulties that need to be overcome in order to establish a just
savings principle. Again, the first issue is concerned with the content of a just savings principle,
while the second asks about the motivation of parties behind the original position to come up
with a just savings principle.
First, we must determine what a just savings principle can look like. Since such a
principle is concerned with the distribution of this “real capital” over generation, it would make
sense to apply the difference principles as a way to ensure just distribution. However, Rawls tells
us that the difference principle cannot give conceptual content to the just savings principles. As
Roger Paden briefly summarizes, while “the difference principle requires us to change existing
institutions only for the benefit of existing people”, the just savings principle requires “present
change in order to achieve distant future goals” (Paden, 1997, 30). The difference principle deals
with the distribution of goods in a just society, stating that “social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent
with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1997, 266). However, because “there is no
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way for later generations to help the situation of the least fortunate earlier generation … the
difference principle does not hold for the question of justice between generation and the problem
of saving must be treated in some other manner” (Ibid., 254). Furthermore, a just savings
principle is meant to act as a limiter on the difference principle. It cannot be that the least
advantaged of the current generation are allocated real capital at the expense of the least
advantaged in future generations— or vice versa. In other words, a just savings principle that
ensures the stable conditions of justice remain across generations cannot be derived from the
difference principle without undermining the very project of intergenerational justice. A
principle of just savings will thus need to be formulated in such a way that promotes the
reproduction of the fair terms of cooperation, without undermining the very social order it is
meant to reproduce. While we cannot determine the proper content of intergenerational justice10,
we can limit such an extreme by having “the parties … ask themselves how much they would be
willing to save at each stage of advance on the assumption that all other generations have saved,
or will save, in accordance with the same criterion” (Rawls, 2009, 255).
However, there remains a motivational problem that Rawls needs to address. Rational
individuals behind the veil of ignorance know that they are from the same generation and as such
“can favor their generation by refusing to make any sacrifices at all for their successors” (Ibid.,
121). That is, while “our considered judgement dictates that earlier generations should save for
later ones … self-interested individuals would choose not to save for future generations”
(English, 1977, 92). Since rational individuals are primarily motivated by their own self-interest,
and the veil of ignorance fails to hide the generational uniformity all parties share, nothing in the

10

Mainly because the rate of savings, Rawls tells us, will be contingent on the society’s “real capital” and the
implied needs of future generations.
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original position can explicitly motivate them to save for future generations. Furthermore, a just
savings principle would seem to run counter to the interests of a private rational individual. Not
only would it be more beneficial to favor one’s own generations, but rational self-interested
individuals would also stand to lose more by adopting a just savings principle. Afterall, they
would restrict their own access to “real capital”, not for their own sake, but for the sake of future
non-existing people. To resolve this motivational gap, Rawls claims that we need to “modify our
initial assumptions” about the parties in the original position (Rawls, 2009, 254).
We can adopt a motivation assumption and think of the parties as
representing a continuing line of claims. For example, we can
assume that they are heads of families and therefore have a desire to
further the well-being of at least their more immediate descendants.
Or we can require the parties to agree to principles subject to the
constraint that they wish all preceding generations to have followed
the very same principles. By an appropriate combination of such
stipulations, I believe that the whole chain of generations can be tied
together and principles agreed to that suitably take into account the
interests of each (§§24, 44). If this is right, we will have succeeded
in deriving duties to other generations from reasonable conditions.
(Ibid., 111)
Thus, imagining themselves to be fathers, say, they are to ascertain
how much they should set aside for their sons and grandsons by
noting what they would believe themselves entitled to claim of their
fathers and grandfathers. (Ibid., 256)
So, to achieve a reasonable result, we assume first, that the parties represent family lines who
care at least about their more immediate descendants; and second, that the principles adopted
must be such that they wish all earlier generations to have followed it (Ibid., 259). The family
therefore comes into light as an essential assumption for upholding the prospect of an
intergenerationally stable liberal society. Without the assumption of the just and loving family,
liberal societies, as depicted in A Theory would be impossible to sustain. And without a just
savings principle, the possibility for “realizing and preserving a just society” becomes an
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impractical dream (Ibid., 289). That is, without it, the system of justice established would fail to
ensure the intergenerational reproduction of its own values and virtues.
3. Political Liberalism and Stability for the Right Reasons
Now that we’ve established how the just family is necessitated by the liberal doctrine
developed in A Theory of Justice, we can begin to look at how the just family fits within Political
Liberalism. But before we can see how Political Liberalism affirms the centrality of the family’s
function for the reproduction of justice over time, we need to understand how Rawls comes to
consider his previous attempt at stability a failure. Briefly put, a theory of justice fails to
recognize “the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, where some of those
doctrines are taken to be nonliberal and religious” (Rawls, 1996, xl). In other words, A Theory
assumes that citizens of a liberal democracy “hold the same comprehensive doctrine … to which
the principles of justice might belong” (Ibid., xlii). However, “the point is that not all reasonable
comprehensive doctrines are liberal comprehensive doctrines; so the question is whether they can
still be compatible for the right reasons with a liberal political conception” (Ibid., xxxix).
Political Liberalism therefore comes about as an attempt to remedy this problematic assumption.
Rather than assuming a unilateral acceptance of liberal values and virtues, Rawls now wants to
describe a system of justice that can appeal to individuals whose own self-prescribed rational
interests doesn’t immediately lead one to adopt a reasonable position that is consistent with
liberal politics.
The criticism of A Theory is not a complete rejection, but rather a fix that Rawls finds
necessary for the sake of creating and sustaining a stable liberal social order (Hill, 1994). The
picture he presents in A Theory is incapable of dealing with a plurality of comprehensive
doctrines and therefore cannot be “stable for the right reasons” (Rawls, 1996, xxxix). Stability
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for the right reasons, according to Rawls, means stability through the “the reasoned support of
citizens who affirm reasonable although conflicting comprehensive doctrines” (Ibid., 143). It is,
in other words, “part of public justification” of political liberalism (Ibid., 333). Thus, a stable
society is one that encourages everyone to live in accordance with the fair terms of cooperation
whether or not those terms agree with their comprehensive doctrines. In other words, a stable
liberal society needs to motivate even those individuals who reject the fundamental value of
autonomy, to “acquire a sense of justice and a reasoned allegiance to those institutions” (Ibid.).
An implication of this omission is that A Theory must rely much more on the state’s
sovereign powers to ensure the stability of society. Or to put it differently, because rational and
reasonable citizens will not all agree to the same system of justice, Rawls must rely on state
paternalism to ensure that every parent does their fair share to educate children into the proper
sense of justice. As Brian Barry comments in his review of A Theory of Justice and Political
Liberalism,
Rawls seems to have changed his mind in one respect about the
significance of stability. I have quoted him as saying that we are to
seek stability of a non-Hobbesian kind. But what if non-Hobbesian
stability cannot be attained? In A Theory of Justice, Rawls has no
qualms about falling back on Hobbesian methods. Thus, the
penultimate section, "The Good of the Sense of Justice," concludes
with a robust insistence that “to justify a conception of justice we do
not have to contend that everyone, whatever his capacities and
desires, has a sufficient reason (as defined by the thin theory) to
preserve his sense of justice … It can even happen that there are
many who do not find a sense of justice for their good; but if so, the
forces making for stability are weaker. Under such conditions penal
devices will play a much larger role in the social system. (Barry,
1995, 888)
This implies that given a “fact of reasonable pluralism,” the penal system will play a much more
important role in stabilizing a democratic society by regulating those individuals who are not
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reasonable (in a liberal sense). To go back to the triadic structure presented earlier, while the
parent-child relationship is supposed to do most of the theoretical lifting explaining the
development of a sense of justice—having the state’s sovereign power operate as a mere
formality that assures everyone does their fair share— it turns out that the state-parent
relationship ends up operating as an equally, if not more, crucial and necessary component of
stability. If different families raise children with a sense of justice incompatible with the liberal
social order, the state will have both an interest and a right to intervene into the private domestic
space of the family.
We must note, as Barry does, that because paternalism is consistent with the principles of
justice, the issue is not strictly with using Hobbesian means (Rawls, 2009, 183). Rather, as Rawls
views it, what is problematic with A Theory’s account of stability is its ultimate overreliance on
the state’s sovereign power. He in fact implicitly rejects the idea of a singular comprehensive
doctrine by positing this very point. As he argues, if “we think of political society as a
community united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then oppressive use of
state power is necessary for political community … Call this ‘the fact of oppression’” (Rawls,
1996, 37). While a just social order will necessitate some form of penal system, it cannot rely on
it for its stability. This is because such a social order would not only be less stable according to
Rawls, but also, and perhaps more importantly, it would fail to be stable for the right liberal
reasons. As he argues:
If justice as fairness were not expressly designed to gain the
reasoned support of citizens who affirm reasonable although
conflicting comprehensive doctrines—the existence of such
conflicting doctrines being a feature of the kind of public culture
that liberal conception itself encourages—it would not be liberal.
(Ibid., 143)
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4. The Problem of Stability in Political Liberalism and Just Families
Now that we understand Rawls shift from A Theory to Political Liberalism, we can begin
to see how he readdresses the problem of stability and the family. The problem of stability itself
remains largely unchanged expect for being specifically tailored to the nuances of Political
Liberalism. We are still dealing with the motivation of parties outside the original position—i.e.
the isolation and assurance problems (Ibid., 145). However, the same cannot be said for his
answers:
Each question of stability has a separate answer. The first is
answered by setting out the moral psychology (II:7) in accordance
with which citizens in a well-ordered society acquire a normally
sufficient sense of justice so that they comply with its just
arrangements. The second is answered by the idea of an overlapping
consensus and meeting the various difficulties arising in connection
with it. (Ibid., 141)
In conjunction with what was said earlier, one will note that state paternalism is no longer an
adequate solution to the assurance problem. This of course does not mean that Rawls rejects the
necessity of a penal system, but that state paternalism cannot be a stabilizing institution without
falling prey to the fact of oppression. Thus, starting with the idea that reasonable pluralism is a
permanent fact of any democratic society, Rawls finds the solution for the instability of the
second kind in the notion of an overlapping consensus; “that is, a consensus … which … is
affirmed by … opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over
generations in a more or less just constitutional democracy, where the criterion of justice is that
political conception itself” (Rawls, 1987, 1). Because different groups will uphold different
comprehensive doctrines, the new solution is to find, within each reasonable doctrine, a way to
justify the principles of justice laid out in the original position. As an example, Rawls points to
religious institutions like Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam claiming that each “can
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support a constitutional democratic regime” for their own reasons (Rawls, 1996, 65). There are
specifically three elements to an “overlapping consensus” we need to understand. First and
foremost, an overlapping consensus is a moral concept that applies to the basic structure of
society. Echoing the basis of A Theory, Rawls is again interested in the same system of basic
institutions. “The focus of a political conception of justice” he tells us, “is the framework of
basic institutions and the principles, standards and precepts that apply to them, as well as how
those norms are expressed in the character and attitudes of the members of society who realize its
ideals” (Ibid., 3). An overlapping consensus is therefore a moral conception of justice “worked
out for a specific kind of subject, namely, for political, social, and economic institutions” (Ibid.).
Again, echoing the commitments of A Theory, and second, the primary moral value of
political liberalism is justice. But, while moral in nature, an overlapping consensus is neither
derived from, nor a compromise between reasonable comprehensive doctrines; It is a
freestanding conception of justice. In other words, an overlapping consensus is generated
independently from citizen’s own philosophical, religious, or moral commitments and “offers no
specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by the political
conception itself” (Ibid., 10). This doesn’t mean “that political values are separate from, or
discontinuous with, other values” but rather that they are supported by something other than
individual’s comprehensive doctrines (Ibid.). More specifically, and third, an overlapping
consensus is formulated “in terms of certain fundamental intuitive ideas viewed as latent in the
public political culture” (Ibid., 175). That is, it is defined in terms of “the political institutions of
a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the
judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge” (Ibid., 14). The
forces of stability have therefore changed considerably. As we saw above, a comprehensive
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sense of justice is too unrealistic to be stable for the right reasons. And in light of multiple
reasonable yet incompatible doctrines, stability now requires a new unifying force that can make
an overlapping consensus possible.
To put it simply, Rawls posits that a shared socio-political history combined with certain
psychological capacities is enough to realize an overlapping consensus. To be more specific, his
story explaining the emergence of an overlapping consensus involves two stages— the first
representing the development of a constitutional consensus and the second that of an overlapping
consensus. During the first stage, “endless and destructive civil strife” gives rise to the adoption
of liberal principles as a modus vivendi (Ibid., 159). A Modus Vivendi describes a political
society stabilized through a balance of power. As Rawls puts it
A typical use of the phrase “modus vivendi” is to characterize a
treaty between two states whose national aims and interests put them
at odds. In negotiating a treaty each state would be wise and prudent
to make sure that the agreement proposed represents an equilibrium
point: that is, that the terms and conditions of the treaty are drawn
up in such a way that it is public knowledge that it is not
advantageous for either state to violate it. The treaty will then be
adhered to because so doing is regarded by each as in its national
interest including in its interest in its reputation as a state that honors
treaties. (Ibid., 147)
Rather than addressing the legal relations between two sovereign states, the term is used to
understand a political compromise between different groups in conflicts—such as religious
groups. (Ibid., 159) According to him, groups in conflict will attempt to mitigate this civil strife
by agreeing to a constitution with grounded in certain liberal principle like freedom of religion.11

11

How exactly are groups expected to adopt liberal principles in the first place is not addressed by Rawls. As he
writes: “How might a constitutional consensus come about? Suppose that at a certain time, because of various
historical events and contingencies, certain liberal principles of justice are accepted as a mere modus vivendi, and
are incorporated into existing political institutions.” (158-159) Rawls merely supposes this to be the case.

89

During the first stage, we therefore have the establishment of a constitutional history—i.e. a
history of legal documents, practices, and precedents grounded in a constitution agreement—that
ultimately encourages citizens to, over time, shift their own comprehensive doctrines such “that
they at least accept the principles of a liberal constitution” (Ibid., 163). However, we do not yet
have an overlapping consensus. Rawls needs to explain the forces that lead a constitutional
consensus to change into an overlapping one. During the first stage, we also have the
development of particular virtues which transform the consensus from a constitutional to an
overlapping one. As Rawls states, assuming that the liberal principles implied in the constitution
can be partially accepted by any reasonable comprehensive view, they will, over time,
tend to encourage the cooperative virtues of political life: the virtue
of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, a spirit of compromise and
a readiness to meet others halfway, all of which are connected with
the willingness to cooperate with others on political terms that
everyone can publicly accept. (Ibid.,163)
This is derivable from certain assumptions of about citizens’ psychology. Citizens are assumed
to already possess “a) the two moral powers, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity
for a conception of the good … b) the intellectual powers of judgment, thought, and inference …
c) to have at any given time a determinate conception of the good interpreted in light of a
(reasonable comprehensive view … d) … the requisite capacities and ability to be a normal
cooperating member of society over a complete life” (Ibid., 104). Through these assumed
psychological capacities, individuals within a constitutional social order will eventually develop
the necessary cooperative virtues that will encourage the emergence of an overlapping
consensus. These virtues, combined with the inherently weaker form of stability a constitutional

Although, we may surpass this question by pointing to western political history in which such events have already
taken place— in fact they have taken place in Rawls’ country of origins, the United States.
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consensus offers12, imply that different groups will be forced to come up with principles of
justices that can be subject to an overlapping consensus.
Rawls specifically highlights two ways in which a shared constitutional history and
certain universal moral virtues lead a society to transform the consensus that unifies them into an
overlapping one. First, in so far as a constitutional consensus unifies a pluralism of reasonable
doctrines, political agents (such as lawyers, elected official, court judges etc…) will be forced to
approach political issues from more than just their own comprehensive doctrines. That is, “they
are led to formulate political conceptions of justice” through which “they can explain and justify
their preferred policies to wider public so as to put together a majority” (Ibid., 163). As such,
political agents who have internalized the proper cooperative virtues will be driven to
communicate their policies in terms that can appeal to a plurality of reasonable comprehensive
views, forcing them to construct a freestanding political conception of justice. Secondly, Rawls
argues that the principles of justice established in constitutional consensus are too narrow.
Namely, “the rights and liberties and procedures included in a constitutional consensus cover but
a limited part of the fundamental political questions that will be debated” (Ibid., 165). Such a
consensus, in other words, “lacks the conceptual resources to guide how the constitution should
be amended and interpreted” (Ibid., 164). In order to address the extra elements of political
justice that are not covered by the constitution, “groups will tend to develop broad political
conceptions covering the basic structures as a whole in order to explain their point of view in a
politically consistent and coherent way” (Ibid., 165). But this is of course granted that individual
are already psychologically pre-disposed to respond to the limits of constitutional consensus in

12

Since constitutional consensus or Modus Vivendi is grounded in a balance of power, Rawls argues that it is less
stable than an overlapping consensus. Because a Modus Vivendi is based on group self-interest, as soon a shift in
the balance of power happens, stability becomes weaker and civil conflict arises again. (See, Rawls, 1997, 150-151)
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these ways—namely through certain friendly and trusting attitudes towards others. (Mitchell,
1994, 1931; Brennan and Noggle, 1999, FT. lxxiv). Subsequently, without the unifying forces of
a common socio-political history combined with shared psychological moral traits, Rawls tells
us, “a democratic people … will not enact the legislation necessary to cover the remaining
constitutional essentials and basic matters of justice, and conflict will arise about these” (Rawls,
1996, 164).
Since neither a shared history nor the assumed moral-psychological capacities of rational
and reasonable adults are a-priori given, we should ask: what exactly makes both of these
practical and realistic solutions to secure stability? As is hinted by this section’s title, the
prospect of an overlapping consensus seems to be possible through the social function of just
families. More specifically, just families make possible both the necessary intergenerational
continuity needed for a shared history and the moral development required for deploying a
freestanding conception of justice that recognizes the fact of reasonable pluralism. Before
understanding exactly how we can trace the possibility of an overlapping consensus to the
family, it may be useful to first look at the ways in which it has changed from A Theory. First
and foremost, the most obvious difference between A Theory and Political Liberalism is that we
are no longer talking about the just family. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the
freestanding conception of justice as fairness, families will morally educate their children into
their own reasonable comprehensive doctrines. As Rawls tells us, “no particular form of the
family (monogamous, heterosexual, or otherwise) is required by a political conception of justice
so long as the family is arranged to fulfill” its reproductive role (Rawls, 1997, 788, FT. 60). The
second element that changes in the family qua stabilizing institution is the manner in which it is
regulated. Rather than having the parental pedagogical function be directly regulated by the state,
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the assurance problem is, as we just saw, resolved through an overlapping consensus. Thus,
unlike the relations presented in figure 1, Rawls’ Just Family, qua stabilizing institution, now
looks like figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Just Families as a Stabilizing Institution
This, as pointed out before, does not mean that state paternalism will not be part of the
general plan, but that
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which
all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common
human reason. (Rawls, 1996, 137)
In other words, political coercion is legitimate only in so far as it is the product of an overlapping
consensus. Thus, while the penal system is still used as an element of stability, it does not have
the authority to regulate private citizens without it being first legitimated by the plurality of
reasonable citizens. Finally, and thirdly, the family is no longer the intergenerational link
required for a just savings principle. Rather than assuming parties in the original position to be
“heads of family”, Rawls now describes them “as rationally autonomous representatives of
citizens in society” (Ibid., 267). He further rephrases the just savings principle, stating that “the
parties can be required to agree to a savings principle subject to the further condition that they
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must want all previous generations to have followed it” (Ibid. 274). This does away with the
need to change the motivational assumptions of the parties required in A Theory and,
consequently, makes the family redundant to realizing and upholding a just savings principle
(Ibid., 243, FT. 304).13
Despite all these changes, the family still retains some familiar elements. It is still
considered “a part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the basis of the
orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to another”
(Rawls, 1997, 788). Furthermore, given that the account of moral development detailed in
chapter 8 of A Theory is left unchanged, the family still plays the same fundamental role as the
school of justice. However, both elements now take on a new dimension with the addition of an
overlapping consensus. As both a basic structure of society that reproduces society across
generation and a fundamental institution for the cultivation of a sense of justice, the family now
also conditions the possibility of an overlapping consensus. This may seem contradictory at first
since we just posited that just families are regulated by an overlapping consensus. However, this
is merely talking about the just family in a well-ordered society that is stable for the right
reasons. Before an overlapping consensus can come about, and as we saw, a constitutional
consensus must first be reached to unify different comprehensive doctrines together under a
single political system. It is clear that the family, in a society regulated by a constitutional
consensus, cannot already include an overlapping consensus. Rather, within such a society, the
just family will be a fundamental unifying force for the realization of an overlapping consensus.

13

It is important to note that the lack of a “head of families” assumption does not undermine the status of the
parent as both a private and public person in the just family. As Rawls puts it, “The adult members of families and
other associations are equal citizens first: that is their basic position. No institution or association in which they are
involved can violate their rights as citizens” (Rawls, 1996, 388)
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Only once an overlapping consensus has been established, will the family be subject to its
claims.
So how exactly is the just family supposed to be a fundamental institution for realizing
the stability made possible by an overlapping consensus? Or to put it more specifically, how can
the family condition both the development of correct moral virtues and shared political history
that make an overlapping more than a mere utopian dream? The first one is relatively easy to
answer since Rawls merely reasserts the theory of moral development deployed in A Theory—in
which, as we saw, the family is of fundamental importance in both the first and second stage.
The mutual feelings of trust that motivate individuals to come up with a freestanding conception
of justice, thus, arise in the same manner as they did earlier on. First, the love of the parent is
necessary to engender love and consequently obedience in the child. Then, as they enter
associations, they begin to develop the friendly feelings and mutual trusts that can finally
develop into a sense of justice.
The second importance of the family is a bit trickier to demonstrate. This is mainly due to
the fact that stability over generations is no longer specifically tied to the Just Family (through
the just savings principle) like it was in A Theory. Rather, with the change to the heads of family
assumption, intergenerational stability is now the product of all the basic structures of a society
working together to maintain and strengthen a unified political history that future generations can
build upon (Rawls, 1996, 30). Now clearly, the family is a part of this basic structure since it is
responsible for “securing the orderly production and reproduction of society and of its culture
from one generation to the next” (Ibid., 1997, 793). Hence, as a part of the basic structure of a
well-ordered society, the family will play a crucial role in unifying multiple generation into a
common project. However, there is something special about the family that makes it a
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fundamental institution for the possibility of an intergenerational justice and the emergence of an
overlapping consensus; namely love. That is, the family is able to sustain an intergenerational
political project through the implied natural sentiments that exist between parent and child—i.e.
between one generation and the next.
This ability of the family to unify different generations into a common political project, is
most explicitly visible if we ask the following question: what motivates future generations to
take up the political project of previous ones? This is a question which is particularly important
for someone like Rawls, since he rejects both an innate disposition towards liberalism and the
Hobbesian solution to the problem of stability. That is, since the state cannot force individuals to
cultivate the necessary moral disposition, nor can it expect people to naturally fall into liberal
values, we are pressed to find what exactly links different generations together over time into a
cohesive and unified political community. The answer to our question is given to us in A
Theory’s description of the third stage of moral development. As Rawls writes: “It would seem
that while the individual understands the principles of justice [during the second stage], his
motive for complying with them, for some time at least, springs largely from his ties of
friendship and fellow feeling for others, and his concern for the approbation of the wider society”
(Ibid., 2009, 414). As discussed earlier, it is because the child loves the parent and has friendly
feelings towards other members of their associations, that they recognize the benefit of a liberal
politics. They understand that the well-being of the people they care for is tightly tied to the
political conception of justice as fairness. As such, future citizens are first motivated to adopt the
principles of justice because of the natural sentiments they have developed during the first two
stages of moral development. And these feelings, as we saw in section 2, primarily arise from the
child’s family life.
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To put it more concisely, we can summarize the last few points by stating that the just
family is a necessary condition of stability by virtue of its capacity to engender the necessary
affective feelings upon which an overlapping consensus can be built. That is, if an overlapping
consensus is the product of multiple generations of rational and reasonable agents working
together, the family is the glue that hold generations together into a common political project,
and its bonding agent are the natural sentiments it engenders. For this reason, it is also a very
dangerous institution. With enough unjust families that educate their children into unreasonable
doctrines, the forces of stability will weaken to the point that there will no longer be able to
support themselves without a regression into a constitutional consensus. Once an overlapping
consensus loses its majority support, the forces of stability that hold society together, in the
words of Shaun Young, become “unacceptably threatened” (Young, 2000). As such if the
majority of families no longer support the overlapping consensus and principles of liberal justice,
they will be in a position to educate the next generation into anti-liberal dispositions. And once
the majority support of an overlapping consensus is lacking, the assurance problem will reemerge without some form of direct political coercion or compromise—neither of which
represents stability for the right reasons since they constitute illiberal means.
5. Conclusion: The Family and the Production of Liberal Subjects
Liberal subjects are not born, they are produced, and as such liberalism cannot exist, at
least in the terms presented by Rawls, absent the correct production of its citizens. As Locke
once famously posited, children are born as “tabula rasa,” empty of the necessary ideas and
moral principles for following through with the requirements of Natural Law (Locke, 1996). As
we have seen, Rawls reaffirm this view by depicting children as innately a-moral self-loving
creatures who are motivated by their own immediate inclinations. Justice therefore does not
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apply to children as such, since the child is not in a position to act justly. They not only lack the
autonomy defended by the first principle of justice, but also the equality required by the second.
This disposition is less of a hard-wired nature, than the raw untilled soiled of potential moral
growth. Granted the proper forces of moral development are presented, the child will develop
into a rational and reasonable individual with the powers to live and operate within a democratic
social order as a free and equal citizen.
But before this can be the case, children have to be produced into liberal citizens. The just
family is central to this production because, as many throughout the history of philosophy have
pointed out, the family is often depicted primary. It is primary in the sense that it is the first
association (and basic institution) children typically enter into. Familial relationships are also
primary because they represent the ground upon which the rest of children’s moral development
will take shape. And finally, as discussed in section 2, because the parent is the first external
authority figure under which the child can be subjugated. The primacy of the family is hence
further complemented by a certain a-political almost natural authority through which the child
can be shaped. As Rawls puts it in A Theory of Justice, during the first stage of moral
development “we are to do what is expected without questioning, for not so to act expresses
doubt and distrust, and a certain arrogance and tendency to suspicion” (Rawls, 2009, 408-409).
However, this raises an issue for a political philosophy that takes as its premise the
freedom and equality of all human beings and which, consequently, primarily legitimizes
coercion through some form of consent. Namely: if the family functions as an essential
reproductive institution of liberal democratic values, what sort of standard can legitimize and
support the paternalistic authority parents have over their children such that it is consistent with
the bounds of liberal philosophy? Or, to put it differently, how can liberal philosophy justify the
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family’s hierarchy as just and necessary for justice, if the very essence of the familial
relationships (specifically the parent-child relationship) cannot be adequately laid out in terms of
justice as fairness?
What is at stake here are the tenets of individual freedom and equality, as well as
liberalism’s capacity to secure the correct form of stability (Kearns, 1983; Mallon, 1999). On the
one hand, if the political conception of justice is applied within the family, the separation
between public and domestic sphere may lose all of its conceptual meaning. Since an
overlapping consensus is partially, but necessarily, conditioned by the family, and the former
regulates the latter, the family (and the lineages it makes possible) may threaten the principles of
justice by engendering a majority overlapping consensus that abides to certain non-public values.
As Eamon Callan puts it:
The fact that we must interpret our comprehensive or partially
comprehensive doctrines in a manner that acknowledges
[reasonable disagreement] reveals some serious erosion of Rawls's
distinction between the public and nonpublic spheres because how
we interpret these doctrines is central to the lives we lead outside
politics. (Callan, 1996, 15)
For example, it is not unthinkable for the tenet “children must obey their parents” to be adopted
as part of a society’s overlapping consensus. Such a tenet would be part of the extra political
elements that pertain to the basic structures of society but are not addressed directly by the
constitution. However, if parental paternal power is generally accepted by the majority of
reasonable citizens across different comprehensive doctrines, what restrains this power within
the nonpublic sphere of liberalism? As Okin posits:
Suppose that all of these "nonpolitical" settings inculcate and
reinforce in them the belief that there is a natural, God-given
hierarchy of the sexes, each with its own proper sphere-the female's
being narrow, circumscribed, and without authority, and the male's
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the opposite. How is such a socialization consistent with both
children's becoming, in any sense, "free and equal citizens"-who, as
Rawls says, must "regard themselves as self-authenticating sources
of valid claims" (p. 32)? (Okin, 1994, 29)
The primacy of the family, both in terms of children’s moral development and the emergence of
an overlapping consensus, means that parents could “contend that children's educational
standards … be defined relative to what they will need to become fully active members of their
familial society,” rather than developing the necessary political virtues for living and
reproducing a liberal democratic society (Gutmann, 1980, 342). As such, thinkers like S.A.
Lloyd ask, “why should the institution of the family have this special status – why permit the
family, but only the family, to reciprocally constrain the principles of justice”? (Lloyd, 1994,
360).
On the other hand, the state could begin to act as the family once a constitutional
consensus is agreed upon. Because the family is private and morally educates children into their
comprehensive doctrines, it can also act as a severe constraint against ensuring the equality of
opportunity principles, As Véronique Munoz-Dardé posits:
as long as there are families, and hence deep inequalities between
people's initial circumstances as regard class, social condition,
cultivated attitudes to effort, to self- sacrifice, to autonomy, and so
on, the ideal of equal realization of people's natural capacities and
moral powers, including their capability to form, revise and pursue
their own conception of the good, shall not be delivered. (MunozDardé, 1999, 40)
Hence, a possible solution could be to revisit the role of the state in its future citizen’s moral
education. This would not only ensure that familial relationships would be subsumed under the
political authority of the state and justice as fairness, but would also emphasize the state’s role in
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the moral development of its future citizens.14 However, neither the emphasis on the family, nor
on the state, would be adequate by liberal standards since the first would revert back to the moral
point of view that Rawls wants to reject, while the second would be stable for the wrong reasons
and therefore illiberal. That is, it would seem that Rawlsian political liberalism is so
fundamentally grounded on the assumption of the just family that it runs the risk of overlooking
a fundamental weakness in its system that could lead to instability. The answer to avoiding both
of these issues and regulating parental power, as the next chapter will argue, is the fact that the
family is a specialized institution with a very specific object—The deficient child. As such, the
parental paternal power required to morally educate children is legitimized through the
ontological status of the child as deficient. It is because of its deficiency that paternalism is
justified towards children, but not towards free and equal mature citizens of a liberal social order.

14

A phenomenon exemplified by the Gesetz über die Hitlerjugend of 1936 mandating all “Aryan” children to enter
the Hitler Youth organization. As Section 2 reads “The German Youth besides being reared within the family and
school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the
people and community, through the Hitler Youth” (GHDI, “Law on the Hitler Youth (December 1, 1936)”)
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CHAPTER 3: THE DEFICIENCY MODEL OF CHILDHOOD AND THE LIBERAL
JUSTIFICATION OF PARENTAL POWER
While the family is a necessary basic structure of society for mitigating the liberal
problems of stability, it is also a site of much contention. Its problematic nature primarily stems
from the fact that “political liberalism does not insist upon complete congruence between the
principles of political justice and the ‘internal life’ of associations” (Fleming and McClain, 2013,
109). As a result, Rawls holds that while the principles of justice “do impose essential constraints
on the family as an institution,” they “do not apply directly to its internal life” (Rawls, 1997,
789). Such a lack of congruence is to be expected within liberal societies, due to the plurality of
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines that make up the belief systems of a
diverse population. But families also serve a public function. They are the primary institution
through which future citizens develop the required cognitive and moral capacities for living in a
just liberal society. Its internal life, in other words, is expected, under the right conditions, to
produce just citizens with a strong sense of justice and by extent, reproduce the very values and
virtues of a society. We are to wonder, however, from where this strong sense of justice is
supposed to emerge, when families’ internal lives are not subject to the principles of justice?
In this chapter, I argue that the family institution can function as the basic structure of
society that ensures the orderly reproduction of virtues and values over time, thanks to the
particular conceptualization of childhood liberal philosophy deploys—namely, the deficit model
of childhood. The not yet conception of childhood allows liberal philosophy to bridge the gap
between private and public that engenders the two forms of instability. That is, it gives us a
theoretical ground for resolving the Rawlsian problem of stability. I further argue and conclude,
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that this is because the parental power necessary to cultivate children’s sense of justice is made
compatible with liberal commitments in so far as we accept the deficit model.
To support my conclusion, I have divided this chapter into nine sections. The first section
begins by elaborating the problem of the family through Susan Okin’s feminist critiques of the
family in A Theory of Justice, as well as, Rawls’ own answer to this criticism in Political
Liberalism. For Okin, Rawls overestimates the family’s ability to be just without ensuring that its
internal life is regulated by the principles of justice. This in turn, she argues, will result in the
reproduction of sexist norms and attitudes that stand in opposition to the ideal of a well-ordered
society. What is needed, according to her, is a way to incorporate the knowledge that sexism
exists and has historically harmed women, into the original position such that the parties will
take appropriate measures to stop it. This however, as we shall see, presents a view that is
incompatible with Rawlsian political philosophy, but that Rawls, none-the-less, has a reply to;
namely that women’s free and equal status takes priority over their status in the family.
In the second section I will then turn to the question of children’s status, and the ways in
which it mirrors some of the concerns presented by feminists— a question that was unfortunately
not answered by Rawls. I specifically turn to Deborah Kearn’s criticism of A Theory of Justice’s
view of the family as naturally unjust and offer three challenges that the necessary paternal
relationship between children and adults presents to the liberal view: dubbed respectively, the
liberal challenge, the egalitarian challenge, and the developmental challenge. In the third, fourth,
fifth, and sixth sections, I then turn to the three most common justifications of parental paternal
power (retrospective consent, hypothetical consent, and well-being) and evaluate their ability to
overcome the three challenges—ultimately arguing that the well-being justification is best fitted
for a liberal justification of parental paternalism. As it will be discussed in more detail, the well103

being justification is the only justification that can synthesize both the private freedom of the
family and its public duties into one congruent moral/political project.
In the seventh and eighth sections, I turn to the relationship between the well-being
justification and the deficit model of childhood. The seventh section will begin by asking
whether or not the well-being justification commits us to a utilitarian, and therefore anti-liberal,
view of justice; and concludes that the only reason it does not is because it deploys a deficit
model of childhood. More specifically, because this view of childhood, I will argue, reduces the
child’s nature to a lack of potential for adulthood, it will also be able to avoid the utilitarian
claim by arguing that in promoting the child’s well-being, they are expressing its own hidden
nature. To promote the well-being of the child therefore becomes equivalent to actualizing the
child’s own nature as a potential rational adult. To further drive the point, the eighth section will
then propose three different views of childhood that reject the deficit model in some form. First,
I discuss the liberationist view through the work of John Holt. Second, I discuss proprietarianism
or the view that children are naturally unequal to adults. And third, a view of childhood that is
independently defined from the parameters of adulthood. As we shall see, all of these views will
be inadequate to promote the stability of liberal society. Finally, in the ninth section, I will
summarize the last three chapters and derive our ultimate conclusion—i.e. that the deficit model
of childhood is necessary to theorize the possible stability of a liberal political system.
1. Is the Family Just? A Feminist critique of the Liberal Family
This discrepancy between the private internal life of the family and its role as the basic
structure of society ensuring the reproduction of justice over time, has prompted liberal feminist
thinkers to question whether Rawls’ theory is entirely consistent with itself when it comes to
women’s issues. For example, Susan Okin, argues that
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Unless the household in which children are first nurtured, and see
their first examples of human interaction, are based on equality and
reciprocity rather than dependence and domination—and the latter
too is often the case—how can whatever love they receive from their
parent make up for the injustice they see before them in the
relationship between these same parents? (Okin, 1989, 99-100)
Okin here is hinting at the once-overlooked gendered and oppressive nature of the family.
According to her, because Rawls merely “assumes the family is just” he fails to consider the
ways in which oppressive gender norms become reified (Ibid., 97). She agrees with him that the
just family is necessary for the ordered reproduction of liberal values over time, but she disagrees
with the assumption that such families can be prevalent without first and foremost addressing its
constitutive and oppressive gender norms (Ibid., 128-129). While Okin’s figures are outdated,
the trends of injustice in the family have not shown to be declining so much so that this is no
longer a relevant issue. As examples, we can look at a couple of recent studies. One, conducted
by the US department of justice, reported in 2011 that “1 in 9 (11 percent) children were exposed
to some form of family violence … including 1 in 15 (6.6 percent)” were exposed to intimate
partner violence between 2010 and 2011 (Hamby, Finkelhor, Turner, and Ormrod, 2011, 1). This
is accompanied by a gendered dynamic which showed that “males perpetrate most family
violence, but females also can be aggressors” (Ibid., 3). Another, conducted by the Chapin Hall
in 2017, reported that LGBTQ youth were 120% more likely to end up homeless than their cisgendered peers (Morton, Dworksy, and Samuels, 2017). These overlooked gendered norms in the
family, according to Okin, are barren grounds upon which to cultivate the required sense of
justice. This is because first, if the principles of justice have no inherent moral weight for
individuals in the family, then ideologies and practices that undermine women’s liberties and
equality of opportunity are also bound to continue. But furthermore, and second, young girls who
are raised in such unjust environments will also consequently internalize particular moral
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doctrines which undermine their self-esteem and autonomy as persons. Consequently, because
the principles of justice are seemingly inapplicable to the internal structure of familial life, the
hierarchies and oppressive gender norms that are assumed to be morally good become
reproduced over multiple generations.
What is needed, according to her, is a way for the parties in the original position to
recognize the peculiar social situation of women in society. She argues that rather than assuming
the family to be just, Rawls must ensure that the parties in the original position have “the
knowledge that women have been and continue to be the less advantaged sex in a great number
of respects” (Okin, 1989, 102-103). That is to say that without addressing the injustices in the
family from within the original position, his theory cannot ensure that families will be just. And
if Rawls cannot ensure that families will be just, then the problem of isolation and assurance
emerge once again by virtue of the fact that citizens will be deprived of the proper moral
development. That being said, it isn’t clear how exactly Rawls is supposed to make such
accommodations without violating the very principles of justice he aimed to defend. As Sharon
Lloyd posits, “Rawls’s view will not side with the feminist in directly imposing his or her
comprehensive doctrine by legally requiring, for example, that divisions of labor within the
family be equitable” (Lloyd, 1994, 357). Part of the reason against such a prescription of feminist
comprehensive doctrine is that, according to Lloyd and as we saw last chapter, political
liberalism cannot promote any single comprehensive doctrine. Any comprehensive doctrine will
be acceptable as long as they are reasonable –i.e. as long as it leads to internalizing a sense of
justice and does not threaten the moral weight of the principles of justice.
This also means that Okin’s worries about the status of women is already addressed by
the principles of justice. Not only will the feminist comprehensive doctrine be rejected as the
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comprehensive doctrine that establishes justice within the family, but sexist doctrines that
undermine women’s freedom and equality will not be considered reasonable, and therefore
would be rejectable by liberal standards. In fact, Rawls answers Okin’s worries in this very
manner. As he points out:
A long and historic injustice to women is that they have borne, and
continue to bear, an unjust share of the task of raising, nurturing, and
caring for their children. When they are even further disadvantaged
by the laws regulating divorce, this burden makes them highly
vulnerable. These injustices bear harshly not only on women but
also on their children; and they tend to undermine children's capacity
to acquire the political virtues required of future citizens in a viable
democratic society. Mill held that the family in his day was a school
for male despotism: it inculcated habits of thought and ways of
feeling and conduct incompatible with democracy. If so, the
principles of justice enjoining a reasonable constitutional
democratic society can plainly be invoked to reform the family.
(Rawls, 1997, 790-791)
But how can Rawls justify the intervention of the public sphere into the private sphere of the
family without falling prey to a kind of formative republicanism? We’ve already seen in chapter
two that such an intervention will have to be in line with the overlapping consensus established
in said liberal society. That is to say that any form of intervention by the state will first have to
be justified by the overlapping consensus established through a people’s common political
history and values. Hence, in so far as the two principles of justice are adopted, every citizen of a
liberal democratic society will have particular inalienable rights that no institution can override.
Even if the basic structure alone is the primary subject of justice, the
principles of justice still put essential restrictions on the family and
all other associations. The adult members of families and other
associations are equal citizens first: that is their basic position. No
institution or association in which they are involved can violate their
rights as citizens. (Ibid., 791)
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Thus, if the freedom and equality of a citizen is threatened, the public elements of a liberal
democratic society will have a right to intervene and, at the very least, constrain the influence of
any unreasonable doctrine that may have instigated such a violation. The grounds for the
intervention of justice into the family is therefore the protection of liberal principles themselves.
Unlike republican political philosophy which would justify formative intervention on the basis of
civic interest, Rawls’ liberal intervention into the private sphere is grounded on the individual’s
own rational interest as free and equal persons. As such, Okin’s worry about the lack of justice
within the family is at least theoretically put to rest in so far as women are taken to be free and
equal individuals with their own rational interests. An attack on said freedom and equality
whether through domestic abuse or indoctrination into unreasonable doctrines, would be within
the scope of justice’s influence in so far as the freedom and equality of all citizens constitutes a
fundamental tenet of liberal philosophy.
2. “Because I said so!”: The Need for Reconciling Parental Power with the Principles
of Justice
Unlike Okin, who criticizes Rawls for not truly concerning himself with the application of
justice in the family, Deborah Kearns (1983) criticizes his view of the family for being
fundamentally unjust in nature. According to her, the family is unjust because its internal life is
regulated by natural sentiments rather than rational and reasonable principles. “Having assumed
ties of natural sentiments between family members,” she argues that, “Rawls has established that
the family is in itself 'natural'”; making it “very difficult to make this 'natural' institution subject
to the principles of justice” (Kearns, 1983, 37). In other words, by rendering the family a natural
institution grounded in natural sentiments such as love and friendly feelings, Rawls is making
this crucial institution “opaque to the principles of justice” (Ibid.). This in turn, she argues,
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quoting Jane English, can result in the adoption of sexist principles like “the child-bearer must
also be the child rearer,” which “from the perspective of the family as a unit” would be
completely rational but, from a social perspective, would violate the equal opportunity principle
(Ibid.). As she further elaborates, the
family cannot logically be made subject to the principle of fair
opportunity because of its biological existence. Whoever heard of
the position of father being opened to all family members under
conditions of equal opportunity? Such a statement would make
sense only if the nuclear family were abolished and replaced with
something I, for one, cannot imagine. The family remains an
institution which is not subject to the primacy of justice. (Ibid., 38)
As a result, she concludes that Rawls is faced with a crucial dilemma. If the family is meant to
reproduce the sense of justice necessary for stability, it can only do so outside the means of
justice itself. Or as Kearns herself puts it, “we must constantly recognise, not only has Rawls not
brought the family under the principles of justice but the lack of impartial and equal opportunity
makes the family inherently unjust” (Ibid., 40). The family’s internal life (its “ordering
hierarchy” and its “duties and obligations”) cannot be determined according to impartial and
rational deliberation we find in the original position. The problem is not then, as Okin posits, that
Rawls merely assumes the family to be just without addressing the way in which it can be so.
The difficulty that he is pressed to resolve is the fact that while the family is an inherently unjust
institution, it is expected to (re-)produce justice.
Paralleling Okin, Kearns takes issue with the application of justice within family life
because of its implications for ensuring the freedom and equality of women. Rawls, as we saw
earlier, directly addresses those issues when he argues that women are first and foremost free and
equal citizens. No matter the biological or natural essence that make up the family unit, nothing
can strip adult women of their status as autonomous persons. Furthermore, if the family’s
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internal life promotes comprehensive doctrines that threaten the stability of the liberal society,
the public sphere will have both a right and an interest to intervene. So, it should be clear that the
family can and must be just for Rawls, in so far as its adult members are first and foremost
subject to the principles of justice before being subject to any other association. While family
members have the freedom to structure its internal life and divide their labor according to unjust
comprehensive doctrines, these internal arrangements can only be legitimate in so far as they do
not threaten the moral authority and stability of the principles of justice. In other words, justice
remains the primary fundamental value.
It is a different story, however, when we begin to consider children’s status and agency
within familial life. In fact, it becomes less clear how the principles of justice can be applied to
the parent-child relationship. Since children are not equal or free citizens, and most importantly,
require this kind of inequality for proper development, the principles of justice cannot be
invoked on the grounds that the child’s freedom and equality is being violated. And this is
especially crucial when we remember, from the last chapter, that the family is not defined by the
parent-parent relationship but the parent-child relationship. Hence, if the parent-child relation is
the defining quality of the family, and this defining quality is, by its very nature, unequal and
unjust, then liberalism has a congruency problem. The lack of congruence between the parentchild relationship and the principles of justice, combined with the public necessity of just
families, means that liberalism is now pressed to provide a justification of parental power that
can reconcile the private nature of the family with its public function, without undermining either
the freedom of individuals in the private sphere, or compromising the moral requirements of
justice. The question is therefore as follows: what resources does a liberal philosophy provide for
justifying the fundamentally unjust but necessary existence of the family? More specifically, this
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question entails three challenges that liberal philosophy must resolve if it is to maintain its own
internal consistency as a political doctrine.
The first, which I will dub the developmental challenge, is an expansion of Okin’s
criticism through Kearns’ argument about the fundamental unjust nature of the family.15 It
specifically questions the tension between the authority of parents over their children, and the
goal of parenting to produce just citizens. If, as Kearns posits, the family is grounded on a
fundamentally illiberal platform—i.e. on natural sentiments and attachments rather than rational
and reasonable self-interest—we are pressed to reconcile this unjust basic structure of society
with the ideal liberal requirements of a well-ordered society. In other words, the developmental
challenge asks about the theoretical compatibility of parental power within a well-ordered liberal
society. On the one hand parental power is meant to reproduce the virtues and values of liberal
justice, on the other hand, the child-parent relationship is defined by inequality, a lack of
freedom, and blind subjugation. Even if it will be the case that parental power is conducive to the
reproduction of liberal values, it does not follow that it is a legitimate form of power. It must be
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The idea for this developmental challenge is also inspired by Thomas McCarthy’s Race, Empire, and the Idea of
Human Development (2009). In it, McCarthy discusses what he calls liberalism’s “dilemma of development”
(McCarthy, 2009, 166). To put it briefly, the dilemma of development asks about the means for engendering a
perfectly just liberal world. While it is clear, at least for liberal philosophers, that liberal democracy is the most
conducive form of politics for human flourishing, not every country or people has met the social conditions for
internalizing the liberal principles of justice. While there is a moral urgency to promote the spread of human
autonomy and self-determination, its implementation is harder to reconcile with those normative commitments. If
individuals and sovereign nations have rights to self-determination, then this would mean that anti-liberal
sentiments ought to be respected—which in turn, would affirm liberal philosophy by undermining it. To overstep
this normative disaster traditional liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, have claimed
that non-liberal societies lacked the necessary moral capacities for self-determination—i.e. that they were
underdeveloped. As such, due to their lack of moral development, individuals in non-liberal societies were not privy
to the same rights and equality as their European counterpart. Which further meant that liberalism could justifiably
coerce non-liberal societies into adopting the right values. Hence, the dilemma of development; while there is a
normative urgency to actualize liberal principles of justice globally, this imperative has also prompted and legitimized
the use of illiberal means (like colonialism) for its realization. What I call the developmental challenge follows this
same tension. However, rather than addressing global politics, I am applying it to the child-parent relationship. How
can parental power, which is fundamentally illiberal in nature, be reconciled with the principles of justice that ground
liberal philosophy?
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showed, on the contrary, that parental power is theoretically compatible with the principles of
liberal justice.
This issue becomes apparent when we highlight the role of imitation in the child’s
development. As discussed in chapter 1, imitation is the central force that pushes the child to
internalize the different forms of morality. Children learn the proper values and virtues at a
particular stage of moral development by imitating older more virtuous individuals who have
already achieved the moral conditions for political participation. But as pointed out by Okin
earlier, if children do not experience family dynamics as based in the principles of justice, “how
can whatever love they receive from their parent make up for the injustice they see before them
in the relationship between these same parents?” (Okin, 1989, 100). While she is concerned with
expressions of intra-parental “dependence and domination,” she never posits this same problem
as it is expressed in the parent-child relationship. After all, the morality of authority requires that
children recognize both their dependence on and subjugation to their parents. But then, why is
the dependence and domination directly experienced at the hands of the parents perfectly
legitimate by liberal standards, while the indirect experience of dependence and domination
between parents threaten the very sense of justice required to create and sustain a stable liberal
society?
The next two challenges have been put forward by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift in
their book Family Values: The Ethics of the Parent-Child Relationship (2014)—the first being
dubbed the “liberal challenge” and the second the “egalitarian challenge” (Brighouse and Swift,
2014). The liberal challenge is concerned with “the distribution of freedom and authority
between parents, children, and the state” (Ibid., 2). Like Kearns, Brighouse and Swift recognize
that applying “liberal categories to relations within the family is incoherent … or inappropriate
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… or both,” especially when it comes to the parent-child relationship (Ibid., 28). While it is clear
that children are special individuals that require unique attention and care, it is less clear who
gets to enforce this authority over them.
Given that children are separate people from their parents, … the
core question is why parents should have any special authority with
respect to the processes that will shape their children’s values. (Ibid.,
115)
Since the principles of justice “do not inform us how to raise our children,” something else must
ground the scope and limits of parental power (Rawls, 1997, 790). We could obviously claim
that parents have a natural right over their biological children. But this would also mean that
adoptive parents and other legal guardians would lack the required authority to morally educate
their child. Furthermore, if biological parents are the only ones with the authority to care for their
children, this would also mean that no other agent would have the legitimate authority to
influence their moral development. Both of which seem unintuitive and against individual’s
rights to form families. As a result, we are left with the question: why parents?
Finally, and as other thinkers have also pointed out, it would even seem that the lack of
congruence between the internal life of the family and the principles of justice implies the
inadequacy of the former for reproducing liberal values and virtues over multiple generations
(Fishkin, 1983; Munoz-Dardez, 1999). This results from Rawls insistence that the equal
opportunity principle doesn’t just imply that social positions be “open in a formal sense, but also
that all should have a fair chance to attain them” (Rawls, 2009, 63). If this is the case, then all
families, in order to properly reproduce the principles of justice, must cultivate individuals with
equal chances for opportunity. However, it is clear that the family cannot offer this—especially
in a pluralistic society. Different families will have different resources and values, which in turn,
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will translate into differences in children’s cognitive/moral development as well as future
opportunities. While it is not impossible for us to imagine an ideal society in which a pluralism
of families coincidentally produces equally just citizens, the very nature of the family as a private
institution grounded in love who performs a public function more readily points to the opposite.
However, as Rawls further posits, unless the principle of equal opportunity “is satisfied,
distributive justice could not be left to take care of itself, even within a restricted range” (Ibid.,
76).
We therefore have three challenges to liberalism which all call into question the validity
of parental power. The developmental challenge contests the idea that parental power is
compatible with the requirement of liberal moral development; the liberal challenge pushes
against parent’s rights over their children; and finally, the egalitarian challenge contests the
family’s ability to enact the equal opportunity principle. It would perhaps be better at this point
to argue for abolishment of the family and for replacing this institution with one that is less
problematic. One obvious solution to these challenges would be to have the state become
responsible for the moral development of their future citizen. While this would resolve the
presented challenges, it would hardly be recognizable as a liberal form of politics since the
principles of justice are unable to offer recommendations on how to raise children. On the
contrary, such a state run “orphanage” would be more akin to Plato’s Republic than the classical
Lockean or more contemporary Rawlsian versions of liberal philosophy. We could reinvent the
wheel, and come up with an entirely different institution that would keep all of the benefits the
family institution present, without any of its short comings. And while Rawls admits that such a
possibility is within the bounds of political liberalism, I agree with Kearns that it is hard, if not
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impossible, to imagine what this institution would look like. Which is probably why Rawls
himself ended up settling with the institution of the just family.
But if we are to keep the family alive within liberal philosophy, a justification of parental
power that can reconcile the tension between the private nature of the parent-child relationship
with the principles of liberal philosophy must be presented. The justification of parental power
must be able to show that the prima-facie incompatibility between parental power and liberal
justifications of power is actually compatible. In other words, it must demonstrate that the
illiberal grounds of the family are necessary to promote justice. There are specifically three
possible justifications liberalism can turn to resolve this tension: Subsequent consent,
hypothetical consent, and the child’s well-being. We shall see that only the last one is able to
adequately resolve the tension without undermining the principles and stability of liberal
democracies. However, for now, let us look at the first possible justification of parental power,
subsequent consent.
3. Subsequent Consent
One way to justify parental paternalism within the parameters allotted by liberal philosophy
is through the traditional notion of consent. As a basic tenet of social contract theory, people
must consent to the hierarchies they enter into for institutions and other individuals to have
legitimate claims of authority over them. The emphasis on consent as a justification of parental
power would therefore mean that the freedom of the subject is respected, all the while making
sure that it remains within the rational and reasonable constraints of justice. That is, because the
child consents to the parental paternalism they are subjected to, and consent stands on both
rational and reasonable grounds, both the principles of justice and the freedom of individuals
remain uncorrupted. Thus, if the child does not rationally and reasonably consent to the parents’
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power, it will be deemed an illegitimate application of parental paternalism and the public sphere
would have a legitimate right to intervene—namely, to protect the (future) freedom and equality
of the child. As we saw in chapter 1, Hobbes makes use of this justification to legitimize parent’s
sovereign power over their children. Consent for parental power allows him to disavow
Aristotelean political naturalism by denaturalizing the parent-child relationship. Even this
intimate relationship of power is grounded in the act of the contract. And as such, not even
children can be said to be naturally inferior to adults. This move by Hobbes— to base the parentchild relationship on consent—is necessary for his contract theory to be properly consistent. If
the child is the natural inferior of its parent, and the parent has natural authority presiding over
their children, then the moment of the contract is no longer a possibility by virtue of the preestablished natural order. The fact that such an order exists would mean that the chaotic and free
for all state of nature that motivates individuals to sign a covenant is nothing more than an
unrealistic thought experiment that contradicts nature. Children would be under the natural
authority of their parents, and as such, individuals would have a natural loyalty to their elders—
which would furthermore undermine the sovereign authority of any monarch—making the social
contract an impractical ideal.
But unlike Hobbes’ view of the child as capable of giving immediate consent, many, if not all
of liberal philosophers dealing with the justification of parental power will agree that it does not
require the “child’s past, present, or immediately forthcoming consent” (Fives, 2017, 11).
Afterall, the child lacks the rational and reasonable capacities for consenting, and as such we
cannot expect parent’s authority to be grounded in an impossible possibility. Rather, the consent
justification for parental power is typically elaborated either in terms of “future-oriented
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consent” or “hypothetical consent”. The first form of consent is championed by liberal political
philosopher Gerald Dworkin, who explains that
There is . . . an important moral limitation on the exercise of parental
power which is provided by the notion of the child eventually
coming to see the correctness of his parents’ interventions. Parental
paternalism may be thought of as a wager by the parent on the
child’s subsequent recognition of the wisdom of his restrictions.
There is an emphasis on what could be called future-oriented
consent––on what the child will come to welcome rather than on
what he does welcome. (Dworkin, 1972, 119)
While the child currently lacks the proper moral capacities for consenting to parental power, the
goal of parenting should be such that the child 1) gains the moral and cognitive capacities for
consenting and 2) that they actually consent to the way in which they were brought up once they
have gained this capacity. This second end is important since it is a major distinction between the
subsequent and hypothetical consent justifications of parental power. According to the futureoriented consent view, the child gives a concrete and visible affirmation of their parent’s
paternalism. The subsequent consent justification can ideally resolve our dilemma by specifically
limiting parental power through the child’s actual future consent. If the child does not or cannot
consent to the parent’s paternal power when they are adults, then the relationship of power will
have violated the principles of justice by going beyond what would be considered rational and
reasonable for the child.
That being said, while it offers an easy solution to our dilemma, subsequent consent is
loaded with problematic assumptions and implications. More specifically there are four major
criticisms of future-oriented consent in the literature: “(1) its alleged incoherence, (2) its
vulnerability to bilking, (3) its alleged licensing of mind control, and (4) its alleged licensing of
rape” (Chwang, 2009, 118). The first issue is brought to light by Donald Van De Veer who
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rejects future oriented consent based on the inconsistent idea that one could agree to giving up
certain rights after the fact. As he argues, “It is reasonable to believe that one who has an
alienable right has it until he alienates it” (Van de Veer, 1979, 638). According to him, if an
agent A interferes with the actions of another agent B at time Tn, and A receives subsequent
consent from B at Tn+1, A still infringed on B’s rights at time Tn. Because B is not born with the
right to interfere with A’s action, B must receive some form of consent from A before they can
interfere. Hence, A “violated that right by doing X at Tn””— X representing any form of
paternalistic interference (Ibid.). As such, before an individual agrees to have a certain right
alienated, such a right cannot be violated by another person without committing some form of
political/moral transgression. We can imply from Van de Veer’s argument that individuals must
not only consent to be alienated from certain rights, but that they must also have the capacity to
consent. Consequently, from a purely subsequent consent perspective parental paternalism would
not be morally or politically permissible until the child gains the capacity to consent. However,
this leaves us with a moral paradox. We must receive the child’s future-consent to legitimize
parental paternalism, but parental paternalism is required for the child to give their consent.
Second, legitimizing parental power on the actual future consent of the child would fail to
justify parental authority in cases where children or parents die before the child reaches maturity
(VanDeVeer, 1986). This criticism, as some have argued, however, misses the “wagering”
component of subsequent consent. As we can see from Dworkin’s quote above, “the liberal
argument is that paternalists make the wager that they will receive consent from their child when
that child has reached adulthood, and such retrospective consent justifies paternalistic actions”
(Fives 2017, 22). This is not specific to children, but also applies to other acts of paternalism. For
example, if individual A is dying, and individual B is applying CPR without A’s immediate
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consent, B’s actions would still be legitimate in so far as we can reasonably expect A’s
retrospective consent. In the same way, parents can wage that their child’s will in fact consent,
and as a result, will not be morally culpable for applying paternalism to their child if the child
lives a shorter life than expected. This, it is important to note, only applies to those cases of
bilking and does not justify parental paternalism. In so far as the child reaches full maturity, their
actual consent is still required.
Third, and perhaps most relevant for our purposes, comes the issue Eric Chwang calls the
“mind control” or “brainwashing” objection (Chwang, 2009). Let us go back to the Wisconsin v.
Yoder Supreme court case as an illustration of this criticism. Assuming we agree with Amy
Gutmann’s evaluation of the case as wrongly emphasizing adult’s right to freely practice their
religion over children’s right to civic education (Gutmann, 1980; 1995), such paternalistic
actions would still be entirely legitimate from a subsequent consent perspective. In such a case,
as long as the child gives their consent after the fact, Amish parents’ decision forcefully to take
their children out of the public-school system at the age of 14, despite being against the interest
of the state and their own autonomy, would be politically and morally justified. However,
because parents also have authority over their children’s moral development, we are now
confronted with the possibility of a manufactured consent. As Haley Richmond puts it,
We should not expect that as his capacity in reasoning develops, he
will be in a position to question his parent’s beliefs, because the very
development of those powers of reason will depend on his
upbringing. The way in which he reasons will be affected by the
religious views of his parents. It does not seem possible for these
parents, or any parents, to bring up their children in such a way as
to entirely avoid the charge of having manufactured consent to that
upbringing. (Richmond, 1998, 245)
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As such, because we can reasonably expect that the Amish child who is raised in isolation from
the rest of society will grow up to adopt and affirm such values, we can reasonably assume that
their consent will be largely manufactured rather than autonomous—and therefore illegitimate by
liberal standards since it would fail the first condition for employing parental power (i.e. gaining
the capacity to give one’s autonomous consent). As such, subsequent consent cannot be a
legitimate justification of parental power since it fails to adequately give us a criterion for
judging the individual’s autonomy. Paying attention only to an individual’s concrete affirmations
fails to adequately explain whether the child’s judgement is truly autonomous and consensual, or
manufactured and merely an imitation of true consent.
What follows from this, and fourth, is the possibility of correcting moral wrongs through
(the manufactured) consent of those recipients of paternalism. For example, in accordance with
retrospective consent, a sexual partner who at first refuses to have intercourse, but then consents
to the forceful intercourse after the fact, would morally legitimize the coercive actions taken.
However, as Tziporah Kasachkoff argues,
Consent is morally relevant to the justification of paternalistic action
only if it shows that the insult to autonomy which a paternalistic
action is held to constitute did not take place. But consent given
subsequent to the paternalistic action cannot do this. Consent
changes the normative relations we have with others and so the
transactions that transpire between us by making us partners to
transactions that, absent our consent, would be transgressions
against us. Without consent, borrowing would be stealing, sexual
intercourse would be rape, a physician's operating on us would be a
physical assault, and so on. (Kasachkoff, 1994, 15)
Hence, similarly to Van de Veer, Kasachkoff is arguing that subsequent consent cannot
transform the normative relationship between individuals after the fact. In giving consent to an
act that would otherwise transgress a person’s integrity as a free and equal individual, they are
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transforming what is morally and politically acceptable for others to do to them. Lacking this
normative transformation means lacking the normative ground upon which paternalism is
acceptable and justifiable. If we accept retrospective consent as a moral justification of
paternalistic action, then consent itself loses any moral or political force since it could always be
wagered that a person will change their mind after the fact. This would, in turn, undermine the
very idea of individual autonomy that supports liberal philosophy. It is therefore clear that
subsequent consent cannot, at least by itself, properly justify parental paternalism within a liberal
society. First, because it results in a moral paradox, secondly because it is at high risk of being
manufactured, and finally because it ultimately undermines the very moral significance of
consent itself. As a result, we cannot justify parental power on children’s future consent. It may
be, as Fives claims, a good “thought experiment” for parents “to ask themselves whether their
children will one day retrospectively consent to what they are now doing,” but it cannot be a
“significant feature of the liberal position” (Fives, 2017, 22).
4. Hypothetical Consent
That being said we could either complement or all together replace retrospective consent
with another form of consensual agreement; namely hypothetical consent. This form of consent
aims “to justify principles by positing an idealized choice situation, occupied by idealized agents
who must decide upon (or "consent to") rules that should govern their interactions with one
another when they are in actual, nonidealized society” (Stark, 2000, 314). It should be noted that
hypothetical consent is not typically used as a justificatory norm of parental power— and we will
see why in just a second. However, Rawls does exactly this in A Theory of Justice, arguing that
“once the ideal conception is chosen, [parties in the original position] will want to insure
themselves against the possibility that their powers are undeveloped and they cannot rationally
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advance their interests, as in the case of children; or that through some misfortune or accident
they are unable to make decisions for their good, as in the case of those seriously injured or
mentally disturbed” (Rawls, 2009, 218-219). Unlike subsequent consent which requires some
form of actual confirmation, hypothetical consent merely requires that an ideal agent could
reasonably be conceived to desire said paternalism. As such, from the hypothetical perspective,
we justify parent’s power over their children by asking “what children would consent to” were
they autonomous enough to decide for themselves (Fives, 2017, 164).
This subsequently lets us do away with all of the problems of future oriented consent, all the
while keeping the benefits we reaped from it earlier. On the one hand, like subsequent consent,
hypothetical consent lets us ground paternalistic action on the just ideals of individual freedom
and equality. It respects the autonomy of the parent, and that of the child, by justifying
paternalism on the hypothetical rational and reasonable qualities that defines human nature. On
the other, the fact that hypothetical consent does not require any actual affirmation means that we
no longer fall prey to subsequent consent’s short comings. The moral paradox goes away by
virtue of the fact that parenting can now be evaluated before the child gives any actual consent.
The worry about manufactured consent is also mitigated in so far as the ideal autonomous agent
functions as a standard of autonomous decision making. Again, because we do not need the
child’s actual consent, we do not need to worry about whether or not such affirmation was
manufactured. And finally, since the ideal rational agent makes decisions they will never regret
(as per the definition of rational agency we saw in chapter 1), the idea that a rational person
could change their minds is moot. Hence, we can therefore both respect the individual autonomy
of the private sphere all the while making sure that justice can interfere when such autonomy is
transgressed relative to this ideal agent.
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That being said, there are two reasons to disavow hypothetical consent as a tool for justifying
parental power. The first and perhaps most obvious reason is that justifying parental power
through hypothetical consent essentially conflates the grounds of political and parental power,
ultimately blurring the line between private rational self-interest and public good. And this is
exactly what the liberal dilemma is concerned with, in so far as the hypothetical consent
justification would radically weaken parent’s rights over their children and immensely enhance
the state’s power to intervene into the family. Let us first see why political and parental power
cannot be legitimized on the same grounds. On the one hand, Rawls tells us that
our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials
of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the
light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and
rational. (Rawls, 1997, 201)
On the other, he argues that while the principles of justice may tell us how we ought to treat
other people politically speaking, they “do not inform us how to raise our children, and we are
not required to treat our children in accordance with political principles” (Ibid., 390). And this is
mainly because while political power is concerned with authority over free and equal individuals,
parental power deals with authority over unequal individuals. Children and parents, unlike the
parties within the original position, are not in fact equals. The child’s deficient nature prohibits
us from reasonably expecting that the principles of justice are biding to all of the parties in the
parent-child relationship. It is, on the contrary, reasonable to expect that the parties in the parentchild relationship are unequal and that some form of unreasonable coercion is necessary for their
moral development. To say that hypothetical consent grounds both political and parental is thus
the same as confusing two very different sorts of authority—i.e. authority over free and equal
individuals versus authority over unequal individuals.
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Following from this, and second, conflating political and paternal power would also
inevitably result in what Rawls called the fact of oppression. Since parent’s authority will be
grounded on the two principles of justice, the family’s internal life will also be regulated by the
terms of cooperation established in the original position. This will surely take care of the issues
posited by the developmental and egalitarian challenge, but will however inadequately resolve
the liberal challenge. The issue is that, while retrospective consent tilts the dilemma in the favor
of the family’s own private right to self-determination, a justification of hypothetical consent will
be inclined to favor the state’s authority over the private authority of citizens within their own
life. And this is contested by the liberal challenge in so far as it does not allow parents to raise
their children in accordance to their own discretion. In other words, to say that parental power is
supported by the same grounds as political power, is to invite the principles of justice, and as
such the political power of the state, into the family. Or, as Rawls puts it, it will, turn the
government into another force of stability and as such ensure stability through “oppressive use of
state power” – i.e. it will become stable for the wrong reason (Rawls 1993, 57).
5. Children’s Well-Being and the Liberal and Egalitarian challenges
Since consent doesn’t have enough explanatory power to justify parental authority in such a
way as to be consistent with liberal principles of justice, other thinkers have turned to the notion
of well-being in order to define the scope and legitimacy of this authority. As Michael Merry
points out since “children do not typically consent to the conditions that allow for adult
prerogative in making decisions on their behalf, it is necessary to speak of their best interests”
(Merry, 2010, 113). This justification is perhaps the most widely used across the liberal
literature, since, as we shall see, it is an efficient mean for resolving the tension between the
family and the requirements of justice. Its efficacy results from a child centered approach which
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argues that both the development of a sense of justice and the necessary parenting it requires, are
ultimately congruent because they both constitute the child’s well-being. Children are therefore
interpreted to have both an interest and a right in being parented the right way—i.e. in the way
that promotes their well-being (and even perhaps that of the parents.) When these rights and
interests are violated, the state will therefore be obliged to intervene in order to protect children’s
interests in the family. Here we can see the similarity between this argument and Rawls’
response to Okin’s criticisms. The family, while private, is always first and foremost composed
by individuals whose rights cannot be violated. Just like women are considered free and equal
citizens who cannot legitimately be oppressed in the family, children’s interests and well-being
will determine whether or not the family is being just with regards to the parent-child
relationship.
Briefly speaking, the argument goes as follow. It begins with the idea that individuals have
both the rational capacity and motivation to promote their own well-being. This is the common
assumption of liberal philosophy that individuals are assumed to be self-interested and as such,
are best positioned to promote their own well-being. What specifically constitutes the well-being
of an individual, as we can remember from chapter 1, are the fundamental primary goods that
any rational self-interested person would need to fulfill their own rational plan of life (Rawls,
2009, 54). The state’s authority is partly conditioned by its capacity to defend and ensure access
to primary goods. Like adults, children also have interests; however, unlike adults, they lack the
cognitive resources and capacities for pursuing said interests. Since children cannot themselves
lay claim to such rights and interests, we, as adults, have a moral duty to respect and promote
children’s interests and well-being. However, the defenders of the well-being justification hold
that not just any adult will be adequate for cultivating a child’s well-being. Rather, as we will see

125

next, they argue that parents are best positioned to actualize this end. As such parents’ right to
parent is derived from the idea that they are best positioned to fulfill those conditions that
encourage children’s own well-being. Just as individuals have a right to self-determination
because they are best positioned to promote their own rational self-interests, parents have
authority claims over their children because they are best positioned to cultivate the latter’s wellbeing.
From this brief overview we can already see how the well-being justification resolves the
liberal challenge presented above. According to it, parents ought to be the primary care givers of
children because of the special intimacy that defines their relationship. For example, Brighouse
and Swift offer four different paradigms of child-rearing to illustrate the benefits of the family;
1) a “state regulated quasi-orphanage”, 2) “Arrangement … in which child raising is shared
between ‘parents’ and designated child-raising specialists”, 3) “Communes in which a large
group of adults collectively and jointly raises a group of children”, and finally 4) “Families, in
which a small number (no more than four) [of] adults— ‘parents’—raise children” (Brighouse
and Swift, 2014, 71). According to them, the first three paradigms fail to meet the requirements
necessary for ensuring children’s well-being. Citing the contemporary psychological and
neurological literature on children’s development and parenting, the authors posit that children
require consistent, intimate, and authoritative care. In other words, for “a child’s interests
reliably to be met, she needs to be cared for by at least one adult who loves her, the loving
relationship needs to be sustained over a long period, and the adult who loves her must be able to
exercise a good deal of discretionary authority” (Ibid., 72). These are all requirements, according
to them, that are best fulfilled by a small number of adults living together continuously for a long
period of time— i.e. a family.
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A state-run orphanage could hardly ensure that any of these requirements are met to the
proper standard. As they put it, employees are not parents; they are free to leave their post
whenever they desire. Hence, the requirements that define good parenting are essentially
incompatible with the contractual basis of a state-run orphanage. Either children would lack the
consistent and intimate relationship due to employees rolling in and out, or severe “restriction on
freedom of contract” will be required to make sure that an individual stays on the job.16 (Ibid.)
But more importantly, while they do not deny the possibility of an effective state-run orphanage,
they also question “whether children could develop the requisite level of trust in someone who
they knew to be acting according to a contract” rather than love (Ibid.). And it isn’t clear that it
could. As Merry points out, “the benefits of intimacy and nurture that accrue to children cannot
possibly be rivaled by the non-intimate structures of the state” (Merry, 2007, 46). Second, we
have a social arrangement between professional child-rearer and parents. According to Brighouse
and Swift, in so far as parents are still engaged in promoting their children’s well-being, such an
arrangement doesn’t stray too far from the family model as parents still participate in their
children’s growth (Brighouse and Swift, 2014, 75).
Finally, the community model of child-rearing is inadequate, they argue, because “children
either will receive insufficient attention, or will not receive it consistently from one person as
seems to be required” (Ibid.). If too many people are involved in children’s development, the
love and attention they receive will be too diluted to be meaningful in a developmental sense.
Such a community arrangement would therefore be unable to provide the necessary intimacy and
16

Brighouse and Swift specifically remark that such a state-run orphanage would limits individual’s contractual
rights in two ways: First, employees would no longer have the right to absolve themselves of their contract and as
such would be required to keep working at this facility. This mean that they wouldn’t be able to move or switch
jobs if they wanted to. Furthermore, and second, employers would be unable to fire workers expects for the worst
of offenses. Since, again, the child’s well-being requires continuous care, the child’s caretaker cannot be fired
unless it undermines the child’s well-being.
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care required to promote every child’s well-being. As a result, the family, specifically the parentchild relationship, is best equipped to provide all of the necessary elements for promoting
children’s well-being. And this is because “parents are more disposed to be deeply concerned for
the welfare of their children, and most seek to provide the conditions necessary for their normal
development” (Merry, 2007, 111). Or as Rawls puts it, parents are assumed to love their children
and consequently, to possess the proper motivation for fulfilling the immediate and future
interests of their off-springs.
But while the family may be best suited to meet the needs of children, we still need to
understand how the well-being justification can overcome the egalitarian and developmental
challenges. As a quick reminder, the egalitarian challenge questions whether parents “have the
rights to benefit [their children] in ways that confer competitive advantages on them” (Bighouse
and Swift, 128) This challenge presents liberalism with both a moral and political issue. On the
one hand, children who do not receive such competitive advantages will be worse off than those
who do. On the other hand, this inequality in children’s opportunities also entails an inadequate
capacity for reproducing the principles of justice over generations. We therefore come back to
Okin’s criticism that whatever love children experience from their parents will not, by itself,
mitigate the production and reproduction of injustice in society. There are, two ways in which
the egalitarian challenge is met—both of which, in the end, diminish the ideal requirements of
the equal opportunity principle by acknowledging an unsurmountable tension between the family
and equality. The best that can be done, according to them, is to mitigate the problems that arise
from this conflict. The first doubles down on the previous justification of the family, arguing that
it is better equipped to reproduce the principles of justice than its alternatives. Veronique MunozDarde, for example, argues that families are more likely to treat children as ends in themselves,
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thus productively helping them in developing “a lively sense of their own moral worth as a
person and to advance their aims and ends with self-confidence” (Rawls, 1986, 308-309 as cited
in Munoz-Darde, 1999, 47). Care takers in state run orphanage would most likely relate to the
children as means to an end—such as making income— which in turn would be less conducive
the nurturing the child’s well-being and interests. As such, she concludes that the complete
abolition of the family “would probably pose such extreme threats to individual liberty and
capacity for self-determination, that it would defeat the very purpose that made us envisage its
substitution by a well-run orphanage” (Munoz-Darde, 1999, 49).
The second argument, presented by Brighouse and Swift, finds a loophole in the equality
principles through what they call “familial relationships goods”— i.e. the consistent, intimate,
and authoritative elements of the parent-child relationship described above. They summarize
their views as follow:
If I love my child and not yours, then I care more about my child’s
well- being than I care about yours. We accept that children benefit,
in terms of familial relationship goods, from having parents who are
able to express their love by favoring them over others. But that
doesn’t give parents a blank check, morally speaking. Our task here
is to work out what ways of conferring advantage on their children
parents do and do not have a right to engage in. (Brighouse and
Swift, 2014, 123)
Familial relationship goods provide the authors with a basis upon which to save the family from
the requirement of the equality of opportunity principle. They allow parents to be partial to their
own child by virtue of its necessity for creating the loving parent-child relationship we discussed
above. In other words, the special and loving nature of the parent-child relationship is partly
produced by parents’ partial treatment of their own child. And consequently, this partiality is
required for cultivating the child’s well-being. However, this also means that parents will lack
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this right to be partial towards their own child if the competitive advantage does not contribute to
the goods that a family makes possible. As a result, parental acts like reading “bedtime stories,
and having one’s children accompany one to church (or to cricket),” despite the fact that they
may offer more advantages to those children, are well within parent’s rights in so far as they
enhance their intimate relationship (Ibid., 132). However, acts like “[s]pending one’s money on
elite private education, or bequeathing it to one’s children” are not protected under parental
rights in so far as they do not enhance the intimacy between parent and child (Ibid., 133). While
such parental acts can confer some good onto their children, they argue that their benefits do not
outweigh the equality of opportunity principles since they do not contribute to the familial
relationship goods (Ibid., 135). Allowing such preferential treatment without grounding it in the
child’s well-being would, they argue, inevitably hurt other children’s interests by giving
privileged children a competitive advantage--which would, in turn, be a definite violation of the
equal opportunity principle. As a result, the well-being justification is able to overcome the
egalitarian challenge by 1) claiming the family is, pragmatically speaking, the best way to ensure
equal opportunity, and 2) limiting parental right to partiality through the standard of familial
relationship goods.
6. The Child’s Well-Being and the Developmental Challenge
Finally, we come to the developmental challenge. As a brief reminder, the developmental
challenge questions the tension between the ideals of liberal justice and the illiberal means of
their realization (i.e. the family). We can see how this tension, if left unresolved, poses great
difficulties for liberal politics and its stability by looking back at the Wisconsin v. Jonas Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) Supreme Court Case. On the one hand, the state of Wisconsin argued that
mandatory schooling until the age of 16 was required for preparing children and adolescents to
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be “self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society” (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
1972).They further argued that depriving minors from access to formal schooling infringed on
their right to a public education which the state has a duty to protect by virtue of its status as
parens patriae. On the other hand, Yoder’s side claimed that mandatory schooling not only
infringed on their first amendment rights to practice their own religion, but that it would also do
psychological harm to the children by mandating activities that directly conflicted with their
religious beliefs (such as playing competitive sports). While the court cites the Amish’s freedom
to practice their religion, therefore giving parents the rights to take their children out of public
school, it also very much limited the role and authority of the state in defending their interests
and those of the children involved. As Amy Gutmann remarks,
Perhaps the stakes in the Yoder case were too small to impress the
dilemma it posed upon us; only one or two years of compulsory
schooling were in dispute. But imagine if another well-established
religious group in the United States otherwise identical to the Amish
were to forbid all formal education for their children for the same
reasons that the Amish prohibit schooling beyond the eighth grade.
(Gutmann, 1980, 348)
While it may look like it at first, Gutmann is not giving us a slippery slope argument here. On the
contrary, she is pointing to the prima facie incompatibility between the private nature of the
family and the overall broader public requirements it has to produce adults with a sense of
justice. This is a case, in other words, that shows the inherent conflict of interest that Rawls’
political liberalism must face. If individual’s right to religious freedom has the ability to trump a
child’s proper moral development, the system will once again be faced with a stability issue.
Liberal thinkers will either have to accept the self-destructive potential (and as such the
instability) of their political philosophy, or they must legitimize parental power in relation to
when it is compatible and conducive to the production and reproduction of liberal justice, and
131

when it is not. The first possibility is, off course, unacceptable, since it would affirm liberalism
by upholding its refusal. It would thus reduce liberal principles of justice to a mere guide with no
moral force behind them. And parents would have the right to “contend that children's
educational standards must be defined relative to what they will need to become fully active
members of their familial society” not to the broader liberal democratic society (Ibid., 342). So,
our question here, as it concerns the developmental challenge, is: “did the court’s ruling promote
stability and enforce the correct means for creating/sustaining a just society?”
Answering this question is not necessarily easy. Nothing in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice or
Political Liberalism can give us a way to readily evaluate the court’s decision. We could look at
the manner in which his theory resolves conflicting rights and liberties. A Theory takes care of
this by pointing to the lexical priority of the principles of justice. When rights and liberties
conflict, the greatest equal liberty principle will have priority over the Difference Principle,
which, in turn, will have priority over the Equal Opportunity Principle. In other words, the
Amish’s right to practice their religion (defended by the first principle) took priority over the
state’s responsibility to civically educate children (defended by the second and third principle).
Hence, if we follow this route, we would have to contend with the court that the Amish parent’s
right to freely practice their religion was infringed upon, and that the state lacked the authority to
force children to attend public school when it conflicted with their religious views. However,
while this seems to give us an answer, it in no way appeases the developmental dilemma. On the
contrary, since parent’s liberty of religion allows them to reject the civic requirements of justice,
such a conclusion would enhance the developmental challenge by limiting the role of justice in
children’s lives.
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The other way is to follow the well-being justification which, briefly put, resolves the
developmental challenge by likening the child’s well-being to the development of liberal values.
In connecting the child’s well-being with liberal values, liberal thinkers are able to explain how
and when the unequal authority that parents have over their children can be the source of
political justice. That is to say that, parental power, under the well-being interpretation, isn’t just
a condition for promoting children’s interests. In so far as the child has an interest and a right to
internalize liberal values and become a rational and reasonable adult, parental power will also
have to be a force for developing the proper sense of justice. We therefore have to see how the
child’s well-being coincides with the principles of justice. First, we have to see what exactly
constitutes children’s well-being according to liberal thinkers. Afterwards, we can demonstrate
the compatibility between parental and political power by discussing the connection between
what Rawls calls natural attitudes and moral feelings.
According to the well-being justification, it is important to take children’s interests into
consideration when dealing with cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder. (Gutmann, 1997, 567)
We’ve already seen that the family, specifically a few parents, constitutes a basic good for
children. Parents not only provide the necessary intimacy needed for healthy development, but
the long-term care and authority required to promote the child’s well-being as well. But the
family does not exhaust the well-being of children. There is a lot more than familial goods at
play when ensuring children’s goods. Thankfully, Brighouse and Swift, provide us with a
comprehensive list of what constitutes their interests.
1. Children need the health care, nutrition, shelter, and clothing
adequate to their healthy physical development within the society in
which they are raised.
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2. Children need education and upbringing that attends to their
cognitive development sufficiently well that they become capable of
the critical reflection necessary for autonomy, and able to operate
effectively in the economy of the society in which they are raised.
3. Children need the education and upbringing that enables them to
understand their own emotional needs and dispositions, regulate
their emotional life, and connect emotionally with other people.
4. Children need the education and upbringing that ensures their
development into moral persons, who understand the basic demands
of morality, are capable of regulating their behavior according to
those demands, and are disposed to do so.
5. Children need the freedom, support, and environmental
conditions to enjoy their childhood. (Brighouse and Swift, 2014, 64)
While this list is one among many and, as they put it, “is sensitive to context,” it is a fairly
typical representation of what is generally accepted to constitute children’s interests. Whatever
the differences in what individual thinkers believe make up the child’s well-being, they at the
very least all agree that the child’s interests are connected with liberalism’s own normative
commitments. That is to say that each of these “interests” are considered such in so far as they
constitute fundamental conditions for developing the child’s future autonomy (e.g. Gutmann
1980, 1997; Schapiro, 2003; Merry, 2007; Mullin, 2014; Raghavan & Alexandrova, 2014). As
the authors clarified before providing the list of interests, “a young child’s agency interest is in
becoming an autonomous adult … she also has an interest in developing a capacity for a sense of
justice” (Brighouse and Swift, 2014, 63). In other words, the list is grounded in the child’s more
fundamental “interest in developing the capacities for agency that they will come to exercise as
adults” (Ibid). This is because, as Gutmann proposes,
most (if not all) of the same skills and virtues that are necessary and
sufficient for educating children for citizenship in a liberal
democracy are those that are also necessary and sufficient for
educating children to deliberate about their way of life, more
generally (and less politically) speaking. (Gutmann, 1997, 575)
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This move right here is the glue that holds liberalism’s hope for stability together. While adult’s
well-being does not require, and in fact rejects, an a-priori congruence between what is morally
good and what is just, the child’s special nature already implies it. What is morally good for the
child is also what is politically just, and what is politically just is what is morally good. We will
come back to the deeper philosophical and political implications of this assumed congruence
below. For the moment, we must detail exactly how this equivalence between morality and
justice in the child is made sense of.
We can find the expression for this connection in Rawls’ proposed theory of moral
development. As we can remember from the second chapter, children come to develop the
necessary moral feelings (like authority or association guilt), through the emergence of certain
natural attitudes (like love and trust). What distinguishes moral feelings from natural attitudes,
Rawls tells us, is “the necessary feature of moral feelings … that the person’s explanation of his
experience invokes a moral concept and its associated principles” (Rawls, 2009, 421). In other
words, the individual’s “account of his feeling makes reference to an acknowledged right and
wrong” (ibid.). Natural attitudes, like love and trust, on the other hand cannot be accounted for
by the individual who experiences them. For example, Rawls tells us that the “child’s love of his
parents has an explanation –namely, that they first loved him –but not a rational explanation by
reference to his original self-love” (Ibid., 1963, 406). However, in loving the parents back, the
child obtains a moral ideal which they strive to actualize in themselves. The parents, in other
words, become ideal representative of “the morality in which they enjoin, and make explicit its
underlying principles as time goes on” (Ibid., 408). As a result, the child “accepts their
judgement of him and he will be inclined to judge himself as they do when he violates their
injunction” (Ibid., 2009, 40). Hence, the moral feeling of authority guilt experienced by the child
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when they transgress the parent’s moral norms can be accounted for by invoking the moral ideal
embodied by the parent figure. When the child commits acts of transgression against the parent’s
authority, they “will be inclined to confess … and seek reconciliation” because they love and
recognize them as a moral authority figure. As such, while the natural attitude of love towards
the parent has no explanation for the person feeling it, the moral feeling of guilt that prompts the
child to resolve the moral transgression does. Now off course, the child’s morality of authority is
“primitive” in so far as “it consists of a collection of precepts” but the point here remains, that
the child can provide an explanation for their moral feelings—namely, that they love their
parents (Ibid., 408-409).
Aside from this difference, natural attitudes and moral feelings are very much connected
with one another. According to Rawls, specific natural attitudes are necessary conditions of
moral feeling such that the “absence of these moral feelings would evidence a lack of these
natural ties” (Ibid., 425). If a person lacks a sense of justice, Rawls proposes that they must have
lacked the natural attitudes that makes it possible. We cannot say for sure that the natural
attitudes of love and trust are sufficient for actualizing the desired moral feelings, since “there
may be other explanations” and the society in which children morally develop will affect their
values (Ibid., 426). None the less, the fact that the absence of certain moral feeling entails a lack
of certain natural attitudes, shows us that the former is at least necessary for the latter to develop.
As Rawls clarifies
The thought here is that, by definition, a natural attitude and moral
feeling are both orderings of certain characteristic dispositions, and
that the dispositions connected with the natural attitudes and those
connected with the moral feelings are related, in such a way that the
absence of certain moral feelings implies the absence of certain
natural attitudes; or, alternatively, that the presence of certain
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natural attitudes implies a liability to certain moral feelings. (Ibid.,
1963, 297)
“Love” is therefore psychologically necessary for authority guilt to develop, “friendly feelings”
for association guilt, and finally, “love of humankind” for a sense of justice (Ibid.). Because
moral feelings have this connection with natural attitudes, he further argues, that they must be a
“normal feature of human life” (Rawls, 2009, 426). That is to say that within a well-ordered
society, these natural attitudes will give rise to the required sense of justice and that, this sense of
justice is “the result of a certain natural development” (Rawls, 1963, 281).
To understand how this ties over to the well-being justification, we must first explain,
how, in a just society, the development of a sense of justice is not merely a descriptive fact, but
also a good. For this, we briefly have to turn to Rawls’ “Kantian interpretation of Justice as
Fairness.” In this section of A Theory, Rawls attempts to lay out the Kantian grounds of Justice
as Fairness. More specifically, he wants to model the nature of the parties in the original position
after the Kantian autonomous subject. For Kant, Rawls claims, “a person is acting autonomously
when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of
his nature as a free and equal rational being” (Rawls, 2009, 222). The original position and the
veil of ignorance are meant to invoke this kind of autonomous impartiality. By reducing the
knowledge of the parties to the bare minimum, Rawls can ensure that they act in accordance with
their nature as rational and reasonable individuals.
By acting from these principles persons express their nature as free
and equal rational beings subject to the general conditions of human
life. For to express one’s nature as a being of a particular kind is to
act on the principles that would be chosen if this nature were the
decisive determining element. (Ibid.)

137

In doing so, Rawls can ensure that the parties in the original position would act according to their
impartial rational nature. This capacity to express their nature qua rational being, according to
both Kant and Rawls, is constitutive of a rational individual’s good (Ibid., 223). This is because
rational agency allows individuals in the original position to determine their primary goods. As a
result, expressing our nature by acting rationally is a good in itself for the parties in the original
position, in so far as it is the condition for ensuring the safeguarding of their primary goods. That
being said, and as we saw in the previous chapter, individuals outside of the original position are
not reducible to their bare rational and reasonable elements. On the contrary, the ideal conditions
of the original position are the reason why Rawls needs to deal with the two problems of
stability. We already saw that to remedy the problems of stability, Rawls turns to the “sense of
justice.” While the Kantian interpretation ensures individuals in the original position act
according to their nature, the sense of justice ensures that they will do so outside of it. In other
words, the sense of justice lets us express our nature as rational and reasonable individuals. And
“since doing this belongs to their good, the sense of justice aims at their well-being even more
directly” (Ibid., 417).
From a rational perspective, individuals want to actualize their own nature as free and equal
persons. If the sense of justice aims at our well-being because it expresses our nature as rational
individuals, developing it will certainly have the same effect. And because the sense of justice is
a natural product of moral development in a well-ordered society, it further follows that the
goods of development (the child’s well-being) will necessarily include the development of a
sense of justice. The developmental challenge can therefore be put to rest by claiming that the
parent-child relationship promotes the child’s well-being by ensuring the development of a sense
of justice through particular, but necessary natural attitudes. The parent-child relationship, in
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other words, is the source of justice in the child in so far as it is the best equipped institution to
realize and protect children’s well-being, which is in turn congruent with the production of
autonomous citizens.
7. Well-Being and the Deficient Child
The well-being justification seems to be the best for justifying parental power within a liberal
society. As we saw, according to the defenders of this justification, the parent-child relationship
is not only the most appropriate association to promote children’s well-being, but also their sense
of justice. The child’s well-being is essentially tied to the autonomy it both will and ought to
eventually develop. The well-being thesis, in other words, makes the child’s own private
interests congruent with its potential for liberal citizenship. And since the parent-child
relationship is the best equipped institution to promote the child’s well-being, it follows that it
will also cultivate the necessary liberal autonomy that comes with this good.
By this point, however, we are confronted with the possible tension between the well-being
thesis and the anti-utilitarian basis of justice as fairness. On the one hand, the well-being thesis
could be read as a utilitarian claim, justifying parental power on the grounds that it maximizes
the child’s, parent’s and society’s overall well-being and interests. On the other hand, Rawls’
version of liberalism explicitly rejects this idea on the basis that utilitarianism “does not take
seriously the distinction between persons” (Ibid., 24). According to him, a utilitarian form of
justice would distribute rights and liberties in such a way as to yield “the maximum fulfillment”
(Ibid., 23). However, for “the utilitarian view of justice … it does not matter, except indirectly,
how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individual any more than it matters, except
indirectly, how one man distributes his satisfaction over time” (Ibid.). This is because in order to
maximize the utility of a society, the principles of utilitarian justice will have to emphasize the
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“right for a society to maximize the net balance of satisfaction taken over all of its members”
(Ibid.). It must therefore turn to an impartial spectator “who is conceived as carrying out the
required organization of the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desires” (Ibid.,
24). Consequently, principles of justice grounded in utilitarian ethics would overlook and
override individuals’ private rational self-interest on the view that, “the greater gains of some”
would be compensation enough for “the lesser losses of others” (Ibid., 23). These are clear
violations of the assumed self-interested nature of free and equal individuals in the original
position and of the principles of justice’s lexical priority. As a result, it is obvious that, by
Rawlsian standards, we cannot support the well-being justification if it is grounded in a
comprehensive moral doctrine like utilitarianism. This is why, we must posit, I argue in these
concluding pages, that what grounds the well-being justification is not a moral duty to maximize
utility, but the very nature of the child as a deficient adult and our subsequent moral duty to
actualize their hidden potential nature as adults. In fact, the well-being justification, we shall see,
can only work in so far as we accept the premise that children are deficient adults.
At this point, it may be useful to remind ourselves what exactly constitutes the deficiency
model of childhood. As we saw in the first chapter, this dissertation has defined the deficiency
model as a conceptualization of childhood that reduces its ontology to a “not yet.” This “not yet,”
I posited, has two elements attached to it. First, it means that childhood is defined as the negation
of adulthood. In the deficiency model, adulthood operates as the metaphysical, epistemological,
and normative standard that childhood lacks. To say that childhood is not yet adulthood, thus
primarily implies the former’s conceptual emptiness and its dependence on the latter for
conceptual content. Childhood has no reality, no truth, or value of its own. Without a conception
of adulthood to define it and give it content, childhood is in other words meaningless. It could be
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argued that the well-being thesis exemplifies the opposite, since it emphasizes a child-centered
approach. Brighouse and Swift, for example, accept both the deficiency model and that
“[c]hildren come first when it comes to justifying child-rearing arrangements” (Brighouse and
Swift, 2014, 59). But they also clarify that this “child-centered approach” emphasizes
“developmental interests”— i.e. “interests in how that child rearing will influence their
development into adults” (Ibid.). As such, even the well-being approach is first and foremost
conditioned by what it means to be a healthy normal rational adult. In line with the deficient
nature of childhood as an empty concept describing a lack, the child-centered approach must first
be predicated on a notion of adulthood; so that it can then show how the child fails to meet up
with this standard. And this is exactly how Brighouse and Swift structure their discussion of
children’s interests. They first begin by explaining the congruency between individuals’ agency
and their well-being, stating that “people are usually better placed than others to judge what will
their own well-being require” (Ibid., 61). Starting from this premise about the nature of rational
adulthood, the authors can now distinguish child and adult by eliminating certain elements.
According to them, children are “profoundly dependent on others for their well-being”,
“profoundly vulnerable to other’s people decisions”, “can yet develop capabilities that enable
them to realize their own interests”, and “lack a well-developed and stable distinctive conception
of what is valuable in their life” (Ibid., 62). All of which are qualities that directly contrast the
notion of adulthood, but that are definitionally lacking in the child.
This brings us to the second quality of the deficiency model, childhood as a potential for
adulthood. It is obvious that the child is not the only thing which lacks adulthood. For example, it
may be said that not all adults reach adulthood—but this does not mean that they are children.
Not all things that lack adulthood should be categorized under the category of childhood. What

141

distinguishes childhood from other lacks of adulthood is the fact that childhood has the potential
for adulthood. Again, the well-being justification is right at home here since it claims that the
child’s well-being is closely related with its potential for moral and cognitive maturity. As
Brighouse and Swift put it, part of what defines the child is its capacity to develop into a mature
adult (Ibid.). The “not yet” or deficiency model of childhood can thus be summarized as the view
of childhood that narrowly focuses on both its lack of, and potential for, adulthood.
The well-being thesis relies on the deficiency model precisely for the particular way in which
it relates childhood and adulthood. By defining adulthood according to liberal standards and
claiming that childhood is that which is yet to become the adult, we can claim that the child’s
own nature essentially implies (at least within the confines of a well-ordered liberal society) the
liberal citizen. 17 In other words, the deficiency model allows liberal thinkers to find their own
ideal subject within the imperfect child; not as an end but as a constitutive part of its nature as a
developing human being. Or to be more precise, childhood already comes with its own moral
end by virtue of the kind of thing it is; namely a not yet adult. As a result, to express the child’s
nature will be equivalent to developing their potential for actualizing the values and virtues that
define adulthood in liberal societies. And in so far as we agree with Rawls that the sense of
justice aims at individual’s well-being because it promotes the expression of their own nature, it
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While I am willing to grant liberalism’s notion of adulthood for the sake of argument, Mary Beth Mader’s Sleights
of Reason gives us ample reasons to question this alleged congruence between liberal norms and adulthood. While
Rawls wants to argue that the psychological fact determines the normative grounds of justice and its stability,
Mader argues that the concept of development is often used (she provides examples from Harriet Taylor Mill and
Sigmund Freud) as a conceptual ruse to self-referentially legitimize certain normative standards of progress.
However, given my focus on childhood and not development, this connection will have to be expanded upon in
later works.
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follows that the development of a sense of justice in those whose nature already aims towards it,
will also aim at their well-being despite their deficiency.
The “not yet” conception of childhood also emphasizes a second crucial element of the wellbeing justification aside from making the implication of adult virtues into the notion of
childhood. It also entails children’s lack of agency and need for parental paternalism by claiming
that children are privy to some nature which is fundamentally hidden from them. Because of
their deficiency, children lack the capacity to express their own nature and as a result, lack the
capacity to actively promote their own well-being. But because childhood is just an
underdeveloped version of adulthood, and the adult does understand the child’s predicament
(since they were a child themselves), the adult will have to be the necessary conduit through
which the child’s nature can be properly expressed, and their well-being optimally promoted. As
such, the well-being justification of parental power first and foremost relies on the deficiency
model of childhood. It is because the child’s nature qua deficient adult already implies a certain
form of adulthood and the necessary paternalism for achieving it, that it can overcome the
utilitarian claim. In promoting the child’s well-being, we are not maximizing the society’s utility
but expressing the child’s more fundamental, but hidden, nature.
The deficient child is therefore the fundamental support pillar holding up and stabilizing
liberal theory. Because of its deficient status, the child becomes a figure through which the
rational and reasonable adult becomes possible. While Rawls’ liberalism is barred from
assuming a congruence between morality and justice in mature individuals, which is why we end
up with the problems of stability in the first place, the child, on the other hand, whose nature is
not its own, must, by virtue of its deficiency, be given this congruence.
8. Liberal Stability without Deficiency
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To see the point further, we can try to think about how liberal thinkers could justify parental
power without a deficit conception of childhood. There are specifically three possibilities we can
evaluate. First, we could bite the bullet and posit that children and adults are political equals.
Second, we could argue that children are, by nature, subject to the will of their parents and akin
to property. Or lastly, we could propose a view of childhood that is conceptually independent
from the concept of adulthood. Each of these represents a philosophical view of childhood
different from the deficiency model. And as we shall see, none of them will provide an adequate
view of childhood for the purposes of liberal philosophy; mainly because their normative
implications will ultimately conflict with the requirement of liberal justice and the well-being
thesis.
Our first option, would be to argue that there is no morally and politically relevant distinction
between children and adults. While this may seem like an unreasonable view, it has found some
support in the children’s liberation movement of the 1970s and the publication of Richard
Farson’s Birthrights (1974) and John Holt’s Escape From Childhood (1974). This liberationist
view emerges as an outright rejection of the deficiency and proprietarian views of childhood. As
Holt writes in the opening page of his book: “I propose … that the rights, privileges, duties and
responsibilities of adult citizens be made available to any young person, of whatever age, who
wants to make use of them” (Holt, 1974, 1). Holt’s basic argument is that the “institution of
childhood”— i.e. “all those attitudes, feelings, and also customs and laws” that define our
relations with children— is the true cause of the child-adult distinction (Ibid., 4). While he
doesn’t disagree that there exists “a fact of childhood”, it merely depicts a moment in the
continuous change and growth that is human life (Ibid.). In this “curve of life” people are born,
gradually increase their capacity, peak, and degrade into old age and eventually death (Ibid). But
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what is essential, according to Holt, is that “there are no breaks or gaps in it” that separate human
beings into universal categories. As he argues, this “curve of life is different for all human
beings” sometimes even “cut abruptly short by death” (Ibid.) It is rather the institution of
childhood which “has divided that curve of life, that wholeness, into two parts—one called
Childhood, the other called Adulthood” (Ibid.). This “Great Divide” is therefore not a natural
fact of life, but the product of socially imposed norms.
Furthermore, Holt argues that the distinction between children and adults is not only a social
construct, but an oppressive one. The basic idea is that the institution of childhood represses
children’s own capacities to live equal lives with adults by isolating them from the larger society,
denying them a right “to play any kind of active responsible part in it”, “lock[ing] the young into
eighteen years or more of subservience, and dependency” and ultimately depicting them as “a
mixture of nuisance, fragile treasure, slave and super-pet” (Ibid., 2). To clarify his argument
evokes an analogy, an apparently common one, of childhood as “a kind of walled garden in
which children, being small and weak, are protected from the harshness of the world outside
until they become strong and clever enough to cope with it” (Ibid., 5). While he agrees with this
walled garden analogy, he none-the-less rejects the idea that it must be completely isolated from
the external world of adults. As he writes, “I do not want to destroy their garden or kick them out
of it” but “most young people, and at earlier and earlier ages, begin to experience their childhood
not as a garden but as a prison” (Ibid.). Thus, the point of the liberation thesis is that the
adult/child distinction prevents free and equal individuals from expressing their nature as such.
Children have the capacity and willingness to exit this garden, but adults force them to remain,
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thus violating their rights and stifling their autonomy.18 We can hence summarize the
liberationist view, as David Archard does, by its ideas that: “the modern separation of the child’s
and adult worlds is an unwarranted and oppressive discrimination; that this segregation is
accompanied and reinforced by a false ideology of ‘childishness’; and that children are entitled
to all the rights and privileges possessed by adults” (Archard, 2004, 71).
At this point it should be clear how the liberationist thesis rejects the deficiency model of
childhood; after all it rejects the very moral category of childhood altogether. Childhood, if
anything, merely describes the early years of a human’s life, but in itself, has no moral relevance.
So, is the liberationist thesis compatible with liberal philosophy? On the one hand, we could see
how extending rights and liberties to children may be an extension of liberalism’s commitment to
individual freedom and equality. On the other, extending such rights and privileges to children
would threaten the stability of any liberal democracy. This is namely because liberal thinkers
emphasize rationality and reasonability; two qualities that children lack, not because of any
institution, but because it is a biological and psychological fact of their youth. Treating children
as political equals would therefore remove the reasonable foundations of justice. By allowing
children to participate in the broader public political sphere of liberal democracies, the conditions
for participation and the parties in the original position will have to be radically modified. We
can no longer ground the scheme of social cooperation on the rational and reasonable selfinterest of mature individuals, since this would invoke partiality towards the socially constructed
notion of adulthood. As a result, involving children in the political process will radically change
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The idea here is this garden, as Holt puts it, should have “gates” that allow for entry and exit into the garden.
One of the interesting implications he proposes is that adults themselves, should be able to enter this garden when
needed. This blurs the distinction even more, since children are no longer the only habitants, and both adults and
children could be treated like children if they so chose.
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the public landscape in such a way that it would become unrecognizable to liberalism itself. To
treat children as political and moral equals would shake the very foundations of freedom and
equality on which liberal philosophy is built and sustained.
For example, let us take children’s right to vote. Now we accept, as does the liberationist,
that children are not cognitive equals, but moral equals. The liberationist thesis is not trying to
reject the biology and psychology of children, merely how we morally and politically isolate
them because of it. They still do not possess the particular cognitive capacities and moral
dispositions required for democratic participation a la liberal. This would mean that, as Rawls
put it, their motivations would be grounded in the moral feeling they have currently developed
rather than in the sense of justice. Hence, if we take a child in the morality of authority, their vote
will be motivated by the love they have for their parent and, during the morality of association,
their vote will be motivated by the friendly feeling they hold for their community. While these
are compatible with justice, they are not enough to ground a just social system. The fear would
thus be that children’s votes could be manipulated by either their parent or community. Under
the morality of authority, a child who lives in a family promoting an anti-liberal agenda, would
be compelled to vote as their parent would since they themselves have no standard of moral
evaluation. Combine that with the fact that a liberal state cannot promote the well-being of free
and equal citizens, and the rational and reasonable standard that is supposed to hold democratic
societies together will no longer have much weight in political decision making. Now it is
important that I am not claiming this to be a bad or good thing. However, it is clear that such a
view would ground the pragmatic stability of any liberal society on shaky foundations. With no
moral standard to regulate the behavior of all free and equal individuals according to a
reasonable social scheme of cooperation—i.e. with no sense of justice— the principles of justice
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would once again fall prey to the two problems of stability—and perhaps create even more
problems.19
Secondly, we could adopt the idea that children are naturally inferior and akin to property—
i.e. proprietarianism. Unlike the liberationist, the proprietarian argues that because parents beget
their child, they are akin to their property. This follows from the Lockean view of private
property; parents have imbued their labor in creating their children, making the latter the
property of the former. Locke himself, never argued for such a conclusion rather opting for the
deficiency model. However, we can find an example of proprietarianism in Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, when he argues that “the originator is more attached to his off spring than
the off spring to their begetter; for the product belongs to the producer …” (Aristotle, 1984,
1161b20-21). Unlike the liberationist thesis (which posits the moral equality between children
and adults) and the deficiency model (which posits the immediate moral inequality and the future
equality of children and adults), the proprietarian position argues that children, by nature, are
subject to the authority of their biological parents. More specifically, it argues that “first, those
who create children have a right over these children” and second, that “those who are a
proprietor of children have the rights of proprietors” (Archard, 2010, 44).20
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We could perhaps find such a moral standard that both children and adult can act on. But it is clear that whatever
this standard would be, it would not look like the two principles of justice detailed in Rawls’ A Theory.
20
I would like to address what seems like a contradictory claim; namely that in the first chapter I claimed that
Aristotle uses a view of childhood that is akin to what I have been calling the deficit model. However, here I have
just claimed that Aristotle proposes a proprietarian model of childhood which is distinguished from the “not yet”
view of childhood. The reason for this is twofold. First, because the deficit model of childhood and the proprietarian
view are not inherently incompatible. It could be that children are born as property and then develop into mature
individuals. This basically constitutes Aristotle’s position on the matter. However, and second, because I am
addressing the proprietarian view within the theoretical scope of liberal philosophy, we do not have to claim that
Aristotle held two contradictory views. Only that this position (i.e. of a combination between proprietarianism and
the deficiency model) is contradictory within the metaphysical commitments of liberal political philosophy. As we
will see in the next paragraph, liberals cannot hold that children are both property and future free individuals without
having to explain how ownership does not become lifelong. Aristotle avoids this objection by virtue of the fact that
the parent-child relations is natural and nature takes care of transforming the child from property to independent
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Despite that they both assert the inequality of the child relative to the parent, it is important to
note the difference between the proprietarian view and the deficiency model in more detail. Their
difference stems from the fact that proprietarian view overlooks children’s potential to become
rational adults. As Archard puts it when defending the liberal view (and applying the deficiency
model) “a child is just not the sort of thing that can be owned, and it is not such a thing precisely
because it is a human being” (Ibid., 45). Despite the child’s unequal status, they are still a human
being with the potential to become equal. And thus, we are not dealing with the deficiency model
of childhood in so far as the proprietarian reduces children to a private property and not to the
potential adult nature it embodies. In other words, the proprietarian emphasizes the “not” and
overlooks the “yet” of childhood. So, is the proprietarian view compatible with the commitments
of liberal philosophy and the well-being thesis? The answer is again no. For while, unlike the
liberationist, they concede some form of moral inequality between adults and children, the
proprietarian view also gives absolute power to the parents. As Aristotle puts it, “there is no
unconditional injustice in relations to what is one’s own; one’s own possession, or one’s child”
(Aristotle, 1984, 1134b9-11). So the principles of justice would be unable to intervene in childparent relationships, and we would thus come back to the original dilemma of stability with
which we opened, about the conflict between the family’s reproductive role and its private
internal life. Or as Archard puts it, “If begetting did generate ownership, then it is hard to see
why ownership should not be lifelong, how we would apportion property rights between mother
and father, and how we might acknowledge the productive contributions of medical staff”

individual. But this view is fundamentally opposed to the social contract tradition which posits that authority is an
artificial agreement – i.e. nature cannot give nor take away rights and liberties. This is why Locke, whose theory of
labor would seem to prescribe such a view, rejects Aristotelean proprietarianism— and so do other liberal thinkers
like Kant. For a more detailed explanation of the incongruence between private property and public interest, see
Monahan, 2005.
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(Archard, 1990, 186). Furthermore, it is clear that the child’s well-being will not play a
significant role in determining the form of parenting parents adopt, since this would put radical
limits on their natural claim to authority.
Finally, we could come up with a radical and nuanced notion of childhood that is
independently defined from the concept of adulthood, that is, a concept of childhood that does
not rely on adulthood for its meaningfulness. Such a concept would be different from any of the
ones presented above, including the deficit model, in so far as they each rely on the concept of
adulthood in some form. The deficiency model claims that children are not yet adults; the
liberationists claims that children are adults; and the proprietarian view claims that children are
not adults. While it is not the goal of this project to ultimately give such a definition of
childhood, we can non-the-less foresee some of its implications with regards to the well-being
justification.
First, however we define childhood, if it is independently defined from the concept of
adulthood, it is clear that the well-being thesis cannot be used to justify parental power within the
normative parameters of liberal philosophy. This is because, as we saw, the well-being thesis
reduces the child’s nature to that of a not yet adult, and as such, can claim that the child has an
interest in developing the capacities of adulthood. Furthermore, because the child is incapable of
making decisions that would contribute to their well-being, since they are unaware of their own
nature, the adult can and must take on the role that reason would otherwise take in a mature
individual. If we thus define childhood independently from adulthood, it isn’t clear that either of
those propositions would be defendable. At the very least, we could still hold that children are
unaware of their nature, but in this case so would adults. Adopting the deficit model of childhood
lets us give adults authority over children by virtue of the fact that the adult represents the child’s
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own hidden nature and is thus best equipped to realize it. However, using a view of childhood
that isn’t defined by the parameters of adulthood also does away with the natural relationship
between parent and child. As Gilles Deleuze puts it in his book Anti-Oedipus:
What does it mean to be alive? What does it mean to breathe? What
am I? … The child is a metaphysical being. As in the case of the
Cartesian cogito, parents have nothing to do with these questions.
And we are guilty of an error when we confuse the fact that this
question is "related" to the parents, in the sense of being recounted
or communicated to them, with the notion that it is "related" to them
in the sense of a fundamental connection with them. (Deleuze, 2009,
54)
Deleuze here is claiming that the child is a metaphysical being, that is, an individual entity who
separate from its parents. Again, we will talk about Deleuze’s rejection of the deficit model in
the next chapter, but for now it is only important to note that asserting the child as a
metaphysical being is to affirm their difference from the parents. It is, in other words, to affirm
its existence as a real entity in its own right and to avoid confusing the child’s ontology with that
of the adult or parent. So, when we ask, “what constitutes the child’s well-being?”, a defender of
this view will not answer with “the development of rational self-determination accompanied by a
sense of justice”. Or, at least, they wouldn’t be able to support this claim by pointing to the
child’s nature.
Perhaps, it is the case that developing into a rational and reasonable adult does promote the
child’s well-being. None-the-less, liberal philosophy will still be pressed to find a new
justification for parental power. As we can remember, the well-being justification avoids falling
into utilitarianism by arguing that parental power is necessary for the child to actualize its own
potential nature as a mature individual and, by extension, to have their well-being promoted.
However, with a new independent conception of childhood, we would either have to fall back
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into a utilitarian claim, or recognize that expressing the child’s nature will not be equivalent to
cultivating the autonomous individual depicted by liberal adulthood. That is, the notion of wellbeing would no longer coagulate the requirements of justice with the child’s own nature.
Consequently, while it may be best for the child to develop into a rational adult who is morally
predisposed to operate in a liberal democratic society, it will not be enough to justify parental
power in a way that promotes the stability of liberal democracy.
9. Conclusion: Liberalism and the Deficiency Model of Childhood
In the first chapter I proposed that the deficit model of childhood had a particular political
and theoretical function to play in liberal philosophy; namely, to mitigate the problem of
stability. We derived this claim from the fact that while Hobbes made use of the deficit model,
he did not necessarily isolate children from political participation nor did he deny children’s
political agency. Rather, it was because of liberalism’s own theoretical commitments to
individual rational self-interest and the public/private distinction, that the child had to be
estranged from the political space. Not because of some primacy of the rational in politics which
naturally makes children incapable of being political, but because of liberalism’s own
philosophical commitments ultimately result in what Rawls called the problem of stability. The
deficit model of childhood, we concluded, ought to be read as a strategic concept with a crucial
theoretical purpose—to preserve the rational nature of liberal politics by mitigating the problem
of stability.
In the second chapter, we then turned to the family institution to establish the connection
between childhood and the problem of stability. As we saw, the family is both a private and
public institution. It is a private institution in so far as the parent-child relationship is outside the
scope of the principles of justice. It is public in so far as it is the institution responsible for
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ensuring the stability of a liberal society over time. This dual nature means that it is the only
institution that can ensure the production and reproduction of liberal values and virtues. This
follows from the fact that public institutions, like the state, are barred from promoting a single
comprehensive doctrine, and as such would lack the authority to morally develop its citizens.
And other private institutions do not have the same status as a basic structure of society and as
such cannot be similarly regulated as the family. This makes the family uniquely suited to ensure
the development of a sense of justice which establishes the foundation of stability in liberal
democratic societies.
In this chapter, we then contested the compatibility of the family’s parental power with its
institutional role as a pillar of liberal stability. We specifically challenged liberalism’s use of
paternal power for public purposes on three grounds: The first challenge pushed against the
legitimacy of parents’ power over their children, asking why parents specifically have a right to
affect their children’s values? The second challenge disputed the family’s ability to ensure the
fulfilment of the equal opportunity principle. And finally, the developmental challenge pushed
against the seemingly unjust means used to reproduce an ideal system of justice. We further saw,
that out of all the possible justifications of parental power—hypothetical consent, retrospective
consent, and well-being— the well-being justification was the only position that was able to
meet all three challenges head on, and ensure the theoretical compatibility of the private and
public elements of the family. Finally, in the last two sections of this chapter, I have argued that
the deficit model is necessary for the well-being justification to be consistent with the Rawlsian
emphasis on the primacy of justice. By depicting childhood as a “not yet” version of adulthood,
proponents of the well-being justification are able to intertwine the private goods of the parentchild relationship with its public role as the reproducer of values and virtues in a liberal society.
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In other words, the well-being of the deficient child entails both the private nature of the family
and its public function. As a result, while liberal philosophy is unable to normatively prescribe
mature citizens its own liberal values and as a result falls into the two problems of stability once
out of the original position, the child’s special nature lets us overcome this barrier by evoking the
congruence between the two.
Taken all together, we can now conclude that the deficit model of childhood is indeed crucial
to liberal philosophy in so far as it is needed to ensure stability for the right reasons. The deficit
model of childhood, in other words, allows for the liberal conception of justice “to generate its
own support” by grounding a process through which the development of a sense of justice is
assured. What this ultimately means, for our purposes, is that a liberal philosophy which does not
employ the deficit model of childhood will be irrational from the perspective of a party in the
original position. This is because individual within the original position who do not posit the
immediate inequality but potential future equality of children cannot legitimately defend the
parental power necessary for developing a sense of justice. For then, the justification of parental
power will inherently conflict with the principles of justice, rendering the whole system unstable.
And as Rawls tells us, “this fact must not be overlooked … for then a different conception of
justice might be preferred” (Rawls, 2009, 125-126).

154

CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND CHILDHOOD: THE NEED FOR A
NEW WAY FORWARD.
In the introduction, I referred to the deficit model of childhood as a strategic concept,
specifically deployed to achieve a certain theoretical end. Throughout this dissertation, I have so
far discussed liberal theory’s purpose in deploying a deficit or “not yet” view of childhood—to
mitigate the problem of stability in ways that remain consistent with liberal principles of
justice— and its conceptual function for achieving this goal—allowing liberal thinkers to posit a
congruence between private interests and justice through the notion of childhood well-being.
What I have attempted to do, in other words, was to show the conceptual function of childhood
within the parameters of Rawls’ philosophy specifically, and philosophical liberalism more
broadly speaking.
In this chapter, I want to do two things: First, I want to contextualize the last three
chapters of this dissertation within the broader history of the concept of childhood in western
philosophy. To this end, the first two sections will respectively provide a brief history of what I
call the two faces of childhood in western philosophy, and then proceed to show how this
theoretical trend is the resulting product of a transcendental and idealistic understanding of
childhood. More specifically, the first section will describe how childhood has been consistently,
and to this day, seen as either a concept referring to what is opposed to philosophy—i.e. the
misosophic view of childhood— or, as with Rawls, a conceptual means to a theoretical end— i.e.
the instrumental view of childhood. Then, in the second section, I analyze Tamar Schapiro’s
essay, “What is a Child?” as a means to illustrate the ideal and transcendental nature of western
philosophy’s conceptualization of childhood. As we shall see, Schapiro considers childhood’s
normative status to be entirely ideal, lacking any empirical elements, mainly due to its nature as a
deficient adult.
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After contextualizing Rawls’ view of childhood within the broader tradition of western
philosophy, I then want to go beyond the scope of philosophy and offer empirical grounds on
which we can both reject the deficit model of childhood, and rethink our commitments to the
political philosophies that stand on top of it. As a result, the third section will dive into three
different lines of research outside of philosophy, which have collectively been dubbed “the new
childhood studies” (Spyrou, 2018). The first discusses the policy focused research which studies
and promotes children’s participation in local and national government activities. Rather than
emphasizing the work of children as politicians, the second line of research focuses more closely
at children’s everyday navigation and reconstruction of their social and political environments.
It, in other words, looks at children’s mundane agency and influence on the broader sociopolitical context they inhabit. Thus, rather than looking at how children directly participate in
politics, this research focuses more on children’s everyday lives as workers, caretakers, activists,
and community organizers, and highlights the way in which their agency contributes to the larger
macro-level economics and politics of the region. Finally, the section ends with another line of
research which attempts to politicize childhood on its own terms. Rather than looking at
children’s agency in the context of an adult world (i.e. as politicians, workers, caretakers etc…)
these thinkers argued for a politics that is specifically rooted in the concrete practices and
utterances of childhood.
I then conclude this chapter and dissertation, by discussing the implications of the insights
learned from the previously outlined research. First, I argue that this research gives us more than
enough reason to update the now outdated deficit model of childhood. While the deficit or not
yet model reduces childhood to a transcendental and universal process of becoming, this research
shows us that quite on the contrary, it also represents an empirical, particular, and dynamic
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being. Second, I then look at the implications of this research for Rawls’ political liberalism and
political philosophy more generally speaking.
1. Western Philosophy and the Two Faces of Childhood
Western philosophy has held two kinds of relationship with the concept of childhood—
which I will dub the misosophic and instrumental views of childhood. The first, and oldest,
relates childhood and philosophy as kind opposites. Childhood, according to the misosophic
view, is a counter-example, something which perverts and distorts the love of wisdom in
whatever shape or form it takes. In this sense, childhood represents “a sort of negative or shadow
picture” of philosopher’s philosophy (Kohan, 2005, 13). For example, in Plato, childhood is
never directly addressed or defined but is given conceptual content through figures like a
drunkard or the “insane” (Plato, 1997, 645e and 864d). That is to say that, for him, childhood
represents a “mental state” opposed to all those things which are good and just. It represents the
counter-image to Plato’s perfect city. Similarly, more than a millennia later St Thomas Aquinas’
natural law theory reaffirms this view by defining the child as “an irrational animal” (Aquinas,
2018, 57). As natural laws determine the acts of rational animals in such a way that is
specifically human, the child’s mental disposition as irrational depicts them as a perversion and
disfiguration of humanity itself; that is, more like an animal than a human.
Despite its age, and the radical transformations in Western views of childhood, it is not as if
the old view was dethroned from its position within the philosophical cannon. For example, one
of the most prominent ethical and political thinkers of the 20th century Hannah Arendt is guilty
of the same move. Arendt’s political philosophy promotes collective civic engagement and a
certain notion of political action that is grounded on an existential reading of the human
condition, views children as fundamentally a-political. In her Reflection on Little Rock (1954),
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for example, she clearly disconnects childhood from political activity, asking “Have we now
come to the point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world?"
and “do we intend to have our political battles fought in the school yards?” (Arendt, 1954, 50).
This is off course, nothing more than a rhetorical question trying to show the absurdity of
involving childhood into political struggles. “The child” after all, “instinctively seeks authorities
to guide it into the world in which he is still a stranger, in which he cannot orient himself by his
own judgement” (Ibid., 55). To be political in the school, a space she considers to be outside of
the political space of action, is, according to her, to invite the “rise of mob and gang rule”
because children “have neither the ability nor the right to establish a public opinion of their own”
(Arendt, 1967, 55-56). Childhood hence represents everything the philosopher and their
philosophy rejects; it is the lack of knowledge, the lack of agency, the lack of morality, the lack
of self-sufficiency, the lack of order, the lack of consciousness, the lack of humanity etc…. That
is to say that childhood by itself, in other words, represents the lack of philosophy altogether.
During the enlightenment period, we see the emergence of a new relationship between
philosophy and childhood— as an instrumental concept. From this perspective, childhood is not
so much contrasted with philosophical ideas and practice, but is now treated as a conceptual
means to a theoretical end. In other words, childhood now becomes a useful conceptual tool for
testing and demonstrating the theoretical strength of one’s conclusion. As a result, we also see an
important change in the way that philosophers depict childhood. It is no longer seen as an
imperfect, misosophic state of mind that needs to be overcome, but rather as a particular stage of
human development that requires nurture and attention. Childhood is now philosophically valued
because it represents the origins and fertile ground upon which the enlightened human subject is
made possible (like, for example, the rational, autonomous, self-conscious, critical, lawful
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subject that Kant describes in his What is Enlightenment?). As a result, its new status as the
natural origins of the philosophers meant that it could now be linked with philosophical truths
and values.
The most visible expression of this instrumental relationship can be found in the work of
classical social contract theorists who used the concept of childhood to show the epistemic
legitimacy of concepts like the state of nature. For Locke and Rousseau, childhood was an
empirical expression of the state of nature, and children’s development represented the empirical
recapitulation of the theoretical movement out of the state of nature and into a state of
civil/political society. In Locke, the child has not yet consented to the authority of the
government, and is therefore, by definition, in the state of nature. Once they reach maturity, they
become free by virtue of their ability to tacitly consent to the government’s authority. They thus
recapitulate the political transformation of the original contract in their own lives. Similarly,
Rousseau equates the child with the noble savage who stumbles into society and must contract to
ensure their freedom. This is why the goal, in educating children, is to ensure that the corruptions
made possible by social life do not bring us back to pre-contractual society— to make sure that
this transition from nature to society doesn’t corrupt the individual like it did with our ancestors.
In both of these thinkers, childhood’s philosophical worth comes from its ability to premise
certain philosophical truths and values. This particular relationship between philosophy and
childhood further develops through G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy— although Hegel himself said
very little on these matters. The Phenomenology of Spirit, for example, aims to connect the
development of individual consciousness with that of World History. Knowledge and reason are
therefore no longer transcendental structures that escape the contingency of history, but are
contextualized within the reason of that period. But the historical nature of knowledge, for
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Hegel, did not mean that history was a free flowing and open-ended force. World history, on the
contrary, traces the development of “spirit” coming to consciousness with itself; this process is
what Hegel calls philosophy. As such, similarly to how a child develops into an autonomous
self-conscious individual, Spirit must go through stages of complexity before it can actualize its
end—i.e. self-consciousness. What this essentially means is that philosophy, knowledge, reason,
politics all have different stages of rational complexity ranging from infancy to maturity. As a
result, Hegel connected both philosophy and childhood through the rational development of
Spirit. Childhood is now seen as the origins of philosophy. But while childhood is
developmentally connected to philosophical thought, Hegel himself never cared to focus on the
philosophical potential of children. This is because childhood represents the origins of
philosophy and is, in this sense, pre-philosophical and does not merit philosophical inclusivity—
which is the reason he ultimately provides for excluding African thought from his World History
(Hegel, 2012, 91).
However, Hegel’s developmental philosophy opened up the gates of childhood, and at the
turn of the 20th century, thinkers like Freud, and Piaget begin to include the voice of actual
children like “Little Hans”, and Jaqueline, Lucienne, and Laurent Piaget in their research. We no
longer just heard about childhood and children, but children’s words were now quoted and cited
in academic texts— acting as the main source of evidence for their theories. This was not
because children’s comments were filled with philosophical insights and nuance, but because it
served a conceptual purpose. Because childhood represented the origins of human existence, it
became a crucial empirical site of research for supporting one’s own theoretical commitments.
The child is merely a means to an end that has already been predetermined by the expert thinker.
We see this in Freud’s interactions with children; interactions that happen “behind the
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consulting-room walls” so as to suffocate children’s own voices and reduce “everything to the
Oedipal scene” (Deleuze, 2006,89; 2009, 55). Similarly, we find the same move, although
differently expressed, in Piaget’s psychological study of his own children. Particularly
influenced by the German Idealist thought of Kant and Hegel, his project can be seen as an
attempt to formulate a theory of knowledge and intelligence grounded in empirical data rather
than philosophical idealism. As he explains in Psychology and Epistemology (1971):
The first aim of genetic epistemology is … to take psychology
seriously and to furnish verifications to any question which each
epistemology necessarily raises, yet replacing the generally
satisfying speculative or implicit psychology with controllable
analysis (on the scientific mode, therefore, of what is known as a
control). (Piaget, 1972, 7)
Piaget’s turn toward the concrete sayings of childhood is therefore methodologically motivated.
His genetic epistemology is not an attempt at giving a voice to children, but rather, an attempt at
grounding an epistemology in empirical facts about human psychology. Piaget’s interest in
childhood and children was secondary to his philosophical commitments. Something which
likely contributed to his underestimation of children’s capacities (cf. Weiten, 1992). But more
importantly, Piaget’s approach to interacting with children, as Gareth Matthews puts it, “focused
solely on those competencies that we can be assumed to have and our children can be assumed to
lack” (Matthews, 2009, 15). That is, it begins its interrogation with an assumed “deficient
conception of childhood” (Ibid.). Philosophy for the Piagetean thinker, is an ability acquired
during the fourth and final stage of human cognitive development. Childhood represents the
universal pre-philosophical origins of philosophical thinking. It is, in other words, a premise to
his epistemology.
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Towards the 1970’s, professional philosophers themselves began to take up the practice
of engaging with children thanks to the work of Matthew Lipmann and the creation of the
philosophy for children movement (P4C)— an international network of organizations dedicated
to introducing philosophy to pre-college students. Lipman found the philosophical roots of P4C
in the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey. Dewey rejected the traditional philosophical
emphasis on objective ideal concepts. Rather, knowledge was the product of an on-going
dynamic relationship between knowers and their environment. For Lipmann, this meant that
philosophy was “a special nonscientific form of cognition that is concerned with the judgement
of value as a unique form of inquiry— a judgement of judgement a ‘criticism of criticism’
(p.398)” (Lipmann, 2003, 38). In other words, philosophy was not about deriving a-priori
metaphysical or epistemological principles, but rather about critically engaging with our beliefs
and dogmas in the face of concrete problems, and finding appropriate solutions to them. The goal
of Philosophy for Children was thus, “not to turn children into philosophers or decision makers,
but to help them become more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate, and more
reasonable individuals. Children who have been helped to become more judicious not only have
a better sense of when to act but also of when not to act” (Lipman et al., 1980, 15). I emphasize
the “for” part of P4C, because this first generation of researchers and practitioners presented
themselves as benevolent outsiders bringing the gift of critical thinking to a struggling public
education system. Furthermore, philosophy for children is not concerned with the child, as much
as it is concerned with the effects of philosophical education on the broader whole of society
itself. In this sense, philosophy for children is not merely a gift to children but to society as well
since, in interacting philosophically with children, we are creating the ripe conditions for
democracy (Lipman, 2003). Here again, the philosopher acknowledges childhood, not because it
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presents anything philosophically interesting in itself, but because it represents the origins and
first condition for democratic citizenship and/or justice.
However, over the last two decades philosophers have progressively interacted more and
more with children. A number of thinkers have since sought to reshape P4C into philosophy with
children—thinkers like Jana Mohr Lone, Michael Burroughs, Roberta Israeloff, Walter Kohan,
Karel Van Der Leeuw, Joanna Haynes, Gareth Matthews, Barbara Webers and many more.
According to this “second generation” of P4C researchers and practitioners, children are
naturally pre-disposed to philosophical inquiry and questioning. Even without the philosopher,
children have philosophical questions and actively seek answers to these questions.
Those of us working with young philosophers in precollege
classrooms understand the practice of philosophy as deriving from
fundamental dispositions that most children possess. That is,
children, from a young age, often raise philosophical questions, are
interested in considering these questions with others, and, given a
suitable educational environment, are capable of taking part in
philosophical dialogue with adults and peers. We believe that
philosophy has an important place in schools because philosophical
practice, at its most fundamental level, is common to and practiced
by children. (Lone and Burroughs, 2016, 8)
Philosophy here does not provide answers or critical skills, but creates a space in which children
(as a community) are invited to “determine what the important questions for our time are” and
seek “their own answers through the practice of thinking for themselves with others in communal
deliberation” (Vansieleghem and Kennedy, 2011, 178). The philosopher serves and follows the
children on their journey, offering what experience they have and attempting to capture and
cultivate their innate sense of wonder and questioning. Philosophy with children, is therefore
primarily about children. It attempts to give them a “safe space” in which they can engage in
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communal discussions about the urgency of their time and their own identity. It, in other words,
gives children a voice, but a voice that matches their own existential conditions.
That being said, the way in which these practitioners bring philosophy and childhood
together remains dubious because of the insistence to practice philosophy with children in
schools. There are some P4C programs that have extended beyond the classroom, like the one
spearheaded by Dr. Claire Katz at Texas A&M who works with the Boys and Girls Club of
Brazos Valley; or the Philosophical Horizons program at the University of Memphis who is
currently working with children at Memphis Rox – a community rock climbing gym. But
typically, when P4C programs and curriculums are created for the purposes of going beyond the
school, they are brought to life by non-academics – like parents or academically trained nonprofessional philosophers. For example, Japan, whose educational systems emphasizes tradition
and an authoritarian form of moral and political pedagogy, has made it difficult for P4C to enter
the school system (Lam, 2019). As a result of this difficulty, some Japanese parents have taken it
upon themselves to establish after-school programs that practice of P4C with pre-college
students (Fatić and Amir, 2015, XI). But these kinds of programs are not the norms and are
sparse. We should ask why that is since, as Michel Foucault famously showed, the school is not a
space of self-determination, growth or free expression, but a space specifically designed for the
control and management of bodies (Foucault, 2012).
Perhaps this is because most professional philosophers are also teachers in one way or
another. Or, because other countries across Europe and Latin America have already included
philosophy into their primary and secondary school curriculum, and thinkers in countries like the
US are trying to catch up. Almost certainly, because schools are one of the only (and easiest)
spaces for professional philosophers to enter into for the sake of engaging philosophically with
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children. However, while these are valid reasons for bringing philosophy into the school, it does
not explain practitioners reluctancy to leave this academic and pedagogical space. While my
point here is not to give an answer to this question, we can reasonably expect this from a practice
that has historically connected philosophical education with schooling through concepts like
disciplines (e.g. Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) and Kant’s On Education
(1803)). Many canonical western philosophers— from Plato to Hegel and on— have argued that
philosophical education required discipline, which itself required a particular hierarchal order.
Hence, the school presents itself as the perfect space in which to cultivate children’s
philosophical minds since it already comes with its own disciplinary authority – the teacher—
and the topology necessary to legitimize this authority. But it is clear is that philosophers do not
have to restrict themselves to the schools, and yet they do. If the goal of this second generation of
P4C practitioners is to give children a voice through philosophical conversation, it would seem
quite clear that the school should not be our first choice.
Thus, I have presented here a brief history of western philosophy’s relationship to childhood.
From the earliest times, childhood was seen as the negation or shadow of a philosopher’s ideas—
it was the complete lack of philosophy itself. Childhood hence acted as the antipode confirming
the epistemic status of a philosophy. Then, with the emergence of Enlightenment thought,
childhood began to represent not just the lack of philosophy altogether, but its pre-philosophical
origins as well. In mentioning childhood, we are no longer just demonstrating a negative
exemplar, but a condition of philosophical thought— and by extent everything else. For this
reason, the turn of the 20th century saw the emergence of disciplines like psychoanalysis and
developmental psychology as a way to complete our picture of philosophy, knowledge,
metaphysics, justice, and morality. By the 1970’s, professional philosophers themselves began to
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interact with children thanks to the work of Lipmann and other P4C practitioners. But the child is
engaged once again, not by virtue of its own philosophical relevance, but as the origin point of
democratic justice. Finally, during the turn of the 21st century, philosophers began to recognize
the philosophical sensitivities and tendencies of children. For what seems like the first time in the
history of western philosophy, philosophers are taking children seriously. But this effort,
however, seems to be contradicted by their continual efforts to practice within a space built for
control and management. The point of this short and superficial historical reconstruction of
western philosophy’s relationship with childhood is twofold. First, to demonstrate how, for the
majority of western history, philosophers have loaded their own assumptions and philosophical
commitments within their conception of childhood. This dissertation has dedicated its last three
chapters demonstrating how John Rawls is guilty of naturalizing liberal values through his use of
the deficit model. Childhood has been treated as a conceptual means to a particular theoretical
end rather than as a philosophical end in itself. For this reason, and second, we should be wary of
the philosopher’s portrayal of childhood since few of them ground their ideas of childhood on
concrete empirical grounds.
2. Philosophy and Transcendental Childhood
Most philosophers will tell us that the child, by nature, lacks a voice and as such, is not
entitled to the same epistemological, moral, and political status as their adult counter-parts
(Schapiro, 1999, 2003; Brighouse, 2003). However, their argument will often reach this
conclusion without any reference back to the actual concrete existence and activities of children.
And even when they do, as is the case with Freud and Piaget, their definition of childhood will
typically frame their interpretation of the child’s voice and activity (Deleuze, 2007; Matthews,
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2009). This is to say that philosophers have, for the most part, only ever interacted with
childhood as an ideal concept, all the while overlooking its concrete empirical expression.
This practice is perhaps most clearly and visibly exemplified in Tamar Schapiro’s seminal
essay “What is a Child?” (1999). We should first note, in line with the previous section, that the
title is misleading. The core of her argument does not attempt to define childhood for its own
sake, but for some deeper philosophical end; that is, to seek “what features of a person’s
condition can in principle justify us in treating a person” paternalistically (Schapiro, 1999, 715).
So again, childhood is not presented as a philosophical end in itself, but as a theoretical means to
a conceptual end. What is this theoretical end? The first line of the essay makes it clear:
“Treating someone like a child is prima facie wrong, unless, of course, the person in question
really is a child” (Ibid. my emphasis). It is, in other words, common knowledge that treating
someone “like a child” (meaning paternalistically) is wrong, except when it is right. This in turn,
according to Schapiro, presses us to delineate the boundaries of “treating someone like a child,”
so as to avoid committing a moral faux-pas.
Questions about when to treat children as adults, and when to treat
adults as children, bring out the fact that there can be a gap between
our conventional applications of these terms and their proper
application for moral purposes. (Ibid.)
As such, the “philosophical task is to [explain] more clearly the sense in which children are
undeveloped and the reason why their lack of development is significant from a moral point of
view” (Ibid., 717). In other words, an ontology of childhood is necessary for us to mark the
boundaries of a morally justified paternalistic power. So, despite the title asking “what is a
child?”, Schapiro falls within the tradition of thinkers who have use childhood as a conceptual
means to a theoretical end.
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But more in line with this section, she tells us that to properly mark these boundaries of
moral power, we should not construe the question “what is a child?” as being empirical in nature.
Rather, the question “is construed in the first instance as a question about the content of a status
concept … The question is: what, exactly, are we attributing to a person when we accord her the
status of ‘child’?” (Ibid.). We cannot turn to the empirical nature of childhood for two reasons.
The first, is because Schapiro reduces the empirical nature of childhood to the biological. “As an
empirical concept,” she tells us, “‘child’ picks out biological beings who will naturally develop
into biological adults” (Ibid., 725). Since the question “what is a child?” already implies a
normative element, biological facts will be inadequate for finding an answer. Second, defining
childhood in an empirical manner, according to her, means that we ought to regard the
undeveloped nature of children’s agency as an obstacle to morality, a condition which in
principles ought to be eliminated” (Ibid., 735). In other words, to address the question “what is a
child?” empirically would mean to understand children “as a distinct and permanent underclass”
of sub-humanity (Ibid.). Empirically speaking, there is no hint of normative necessity in the
child’s actions that could in turn point to some form of rule or authority. By approaching
childhood as an ideal concept, rather than an empirical reality, we therefore give ourselves the
tools for recognizing what is not immediately present in the child’s empirical behavior, that is to
say their humanity and, by extent, moral status.
Because the empirical nature of childhood is itself philosophically barren, Schapiro has to
draw her concept from another source. Her
… strategy is to use concepts from the Doctrine of Right as guides
in developing a Kantian account of the concept of a child. There is
… a rather deep and illuminating analogy between the liminal status
of a child and that of a prepolitical society. Perhaps surprisingly,
parallels between the condition of childhood and the state of nature
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help to account for our more settled intuitions about what childhood
is and how we ought to treat those in the condition of childhood.
(Ibid., 719)
She further elaborates later in the essay that, “like the prepolitical society, the immature agent
has to adjudicate her conflicting motivational claims on the basis of something like a principle;
she is reflective, being a wanton is not an option … [but] she cannot adjudicate those conflicts in
a truly authoritative way” (Ibid., 728). As a result, she analogizes that just as individuals in the
state of nature lack an authoritative system of laws, and as such cannot make claims of right and
wrong, children “cannot act as [judges]” by virtue of the fact that they “lack a set of laws to
refers to” when directing their actions (Ibid., 729). Hence through this analogy, she is able to
derive the argument presented in the first chapter. Namely, that paternalism is only wrong when
it obstructs someone’s will, but that, since children have no will or voice of their own,
paternalism towards them does not present us a moral wrong.
In this way, the transcendental nature of childhood as a deficient adult (i.e. as a resident
of the state of nature) allows us to justify our paternalism towards children an a-priori manner.
The child is, by definition, the individual who cannot act for themselves. As a result, its actions
can only be sourced from an external authority, which can either be, in Kantian terms, natural
inclinations or human moral authority (i.e. the parent, the teacher, or the philosopher). However,
we should be curious as to the legitimacy of this analogy and call into question its usefulness for
determining moral questions concerning childhood for two reasons. The first is that previous
philosophers (e.g. Pateman, 1988; Mills, 2014) have already revealed the state of nature as a
strategic conceptual device that work to reaffirm and even generate forms of structural
oppression. For example, Charles Mills The Racial Contract (2014), describes the state of nature
as a concept demarcating “the permanently prepolitical state or, perhaps better, nonpolitical state
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(insofar as pre- suggests eventual internal movement toward) of nonwhite men” (Mills, 2014,
13). Similarly, for Pateman, the state of nature is a conceptual tool used to affirm the “natural
sexual difference” at the heart of contracting (Pateman, 1988, 5). In other words, both authors
highlight the state of nature as a methodological device used to identify of who can and cannot
enter society, and by extent, who is and is not privy to legitimate claims of justice. However,
while the legitimacy of the state of nature has been called into question as a patriarchal and racist
tool of oppression, its legitimacy for marking the boundaries between child/adult, and by extent
the private/public, has yet to be fully called into question.
Of course, the difference is, that it is much easier to view this natural distinction between
childhood and adulthood as a normative moral and political distinction as well. As Schapiro
claims, we all have this intuition that “the words and deeds of children have a different status and
significance than the words and deeds of adults” (Schapiro, 1999, 716). Which brings us to the
second reason for our suspicion, that this view of childhood is, except for the uncontroversial
intuitions we have about children’s natural inequality, devoid of empirical support. As we shall
see in the next section, empirical studies on childhood agency show us that children, quite on the
contrary, are very much present and active members of any political society, even despite their
lack of rational and reasonable moral capacities. But to see this, we have to go beyond
philosopher’s university office desk and library, and dive into the imminent world of children.
3. The Imminent Realities of Childhood
While philosophers have kept operating under this transcendental notion of childhood, other
disciplines, specifically sociology and geography, have emphasized children’s concrete voices
and actions as a theoretical basis of childhood. This fairly recent tradition in childhood studies
has specifically aimed to oppose the western transcendental view of the child as a deficient adult
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by demonstrating children’s political and ethical capacities as concrete agents in their own
imminent practices as children. In other words, these studies show us that the philosophical view
of a transcendental childhood does not reflect, even to a minimum, its actual imminent reality.
There have specifically been three lines of research that have attempted to demonstrate the
inadequacy of a transcendental view of childhood as a deficient version of adulthood. The first
focuses on children’s agency and epistemic credibility in policy-making, especially when it
concerns policy that affect them specifically (Lee, 1999; Wyness et al., 2004; Such and Walker,
2005; Stasiulis, 2010; Skelton 2010; Balagopalan, 2019). For these thinkers, policies can only
adequately address children’s social and political concerns by including them into the political
process in one way or another. As a result, their goal has largely been to demonstrate children’s
competence as speakers and agents. Nick Lee, for example, promotes “an empirical focus on the
distribution and effects of childhood ambiguity” for its “ability to inform policy and practice”
(Lee, 1999, 471). In other words, to properly formulate policies that regard children, policy
makers and scholars alike need to interact “face to face” with children in order to come up with
concrete policies that have the desired impact on children’s lives (Ibid.). Elizabeth Such and
Robert Walker argue that the “manifestation of rights and responsibilities reflects adult
conceptions of childhood that are, at best, partial with limited connection to the lives and
experiences of children” (Such and Walker, 2005, 54). As a result, they aim to correct this
inadequate view of childhood by interviewing children and showing their capacity to engage “in
moral constructions of themselves, and of childhood in their account of responsibility”— again
prompting policy makers to make space for children’s own voices (Ibid., 51). For these thinkers,
when researchers interact with children, they should be able to find competent – but not
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necessarily equal— agents who can only be served properly if they are included within the
political process of policy making.
Such a recognition of children’s political agency, can be found in European and Latin
American countries whom have established children’s parliaments (Matthews et, al, 1999, 139;
Sapiro, 2004; Cabaness, 2006). These children or youth parliaments are typically composed of
representatives whom are voted in by their fellow peers to represent them at the national and
international level. Prompted by Article 12 of the ratified “UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child,” they aim to empower children by promoting “shared responsibility and active
engagement in decisions which affects [their] quality of life” (Matthews et al., 1999, 135). We
can see these commitments come to life in the UK where, for example, the British Youth Council
Organization (BYC) formed the United Kingdom Youth Parliament (UKYP); a parliamentary
body consisting of 369 representative seats held by children between 16-18 years of age, and
democratically elected by children between the ages of 11 and 18 across the UK. Once elected,
Members of Youth Parliament (MYPs) hold office representing their district’s youth population
for one year. During this year, which begins on February 2nd, each MYP will campaign for
particular issues which, since 2008, have been democratically decided on by the youth
population of the UK. MYPs will also attend meetings, hold debates, and campaign for their
constituents on particular local and national issues. In 2010, Member of the United Kingdom’s
Parliament voted to allow the UKYP to hold one annual debate in the House of Commons
Chambers – the lower house of the United Kingdom’s Parliament— on major issues decided by
the youth public. In the 20 or so years the UKYP has operated, its members and constituents
have debated and campaigned for various social and political issues such as, sex education,
public transportation, university fees, the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan, school
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curriculums, living wages, voting rights, climate change, mental health, the National Health
Service, and much more (“UKYP Campaigns”, http://www.ukyouthparliament.org.uk/).
While these efforts have been seen across the globe, one in particular stands out; the Bara
Mansa Children’s Participatory Budget Council (CPBC) which was directly created and funded
by the city’s local government. In 1998, in an attempt to increase civic responsibility amongst
the youth, the city council of Bara Mansa in Brazil established the CPBC, which was allotted
$125,000 a year to be used at the discretion of its elected members. Voting rights and eligibility
for the election are limited to children between ages of 9 and 15, and the elected child counselors
work as CPBC representative for a one-year term. During the first four years since its inception,
the CPBC has taken on projects such as “repairs to schools and school equipment … better
security and improved playgrounds in low-income areas, repairs of sewers and drains, and tree
planting” as well as “the renovations of the health clinic in the neighborhood of Mangueira, to
include a modern dentist’s surgery” (Guerra, 2002, 78). Aside from funding infrastructural
projects, the CBPC also aimed to improve the lives of children by addressing issues specific to
them. One such example was the CPBC’s request to the mayor of the city to extend the stopping
time of school buses by one minute in the morning. This change was ultimately instituted and
“resulted in fewer upset children in the morning and a better start to the school day” (Cabanness,
2006, 204).
Some thinkers have however criticized this approach for narrowly focusing on adultist
conceptions of children’s political and epistemic agency (Punch, 2003, 2007; Gallacher, 2005;
Gallacher and Gallagher 2008; Benwell 2009; Kallio and Hakli, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). For
example, Lesley-Ann Gallacher and Michael Gallagher take issue with “participatory methods”
in sociology that try to include children’s voices into research studies. They propose that
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“emphasizing ‘participation’ may actually serve to reduce the possibilities within a research
encounter” and “constrain the possibilities for them to act” since it already frames what can be
recognized as agency (Gallacher and Gallagher, 2008, 507). They exemplify this narrowness by
pointing to studies which used “child-directed photography” methods (e.g. Moss, 2001; Burnett
& Myers, 2002; Yamada-Rice, 2017).
Children may do a range of things with cameras: take pictures of
things they find interesting; take pictures of what they think the
researcher wants to see; take pictures of their friends; explain to the
researcher why they are taking each picture; take lots of pictures but
say nothing about them, even when asked; ask the researcher to take
pictures for them; give the camera to someone else; take no pictures;
they may even break the camera deliberately. All of these would be
doing something, but not all of them could be described as
‘participation’. (Ibid)
Thus, by reducing our recognition of children’s agency to the parameters of “participation”, they
argue that we, as researchers, are essentially constraining our recognition of childhood agency to
what the adult researcher has already deemed to constitute participation in their study.
Similarly, Kirso Pauliina Kallio and Jouni Hakli (2011a) have argued that such policyoriented research “entails that children’s politics is considered more or less on a par with adult’s
politics” (Kallio and Hakli, 2011a, 100). Using the Finnish Children’s Parliament (FCP) as an
example, they propose that children “have views, attitudes, experiences and feelings that are not
articulated in the political vocabulary and are not mobilized through the official political system”
(Kallio and Hakli, 2011a, 103). They specifically point to the topics of discussion relevant for
building “a good school” addressed by the FPC in 2009 as an example of the narrow scope of
policy-centered childhood studies. They specifically highlight how certain topics relevant to
Finish children’s experience of a “good school” could not be addressed because they conflicted
with the Finish national policy. Topics such as children’s “wishes to spend their after-school
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hours on their own and not in organized afternoon care” would “conflict with the prevailing child
policy discourse that stresses the importance of institutionally arranged before- and after-school
activities (see endnote 3; Basic Education Act 628/1998)” (Ibid.). Or “the importance of animal
rights and environmental values might have surfaced with demands that schools should favor
vegetarian diet and ethical choices in their food supply,” but this was, however, “not in line with
national health policies (National Nutritional Council, 2008)” (bid.) Both of which, they further
comment, had “recently been brought up by Finnish children as important matters to them (e.g.
Autio & Wilska, 2005; Forsberg & Strandell, 2007)” (Ibid.). As a result, by merely focusing on
those political practices that are like adults, they propose that researchers interested in children’s
political agency have overlooked “the political potential of children’s everyday activities” (Ibid.,
104).
For these reasons, a second line of research has shifted the focus of childhood studies
from adult political spaces to children’s everyday geo-political and social agency (Punch, 2001,
2003; Katz, 2004; Abebe, 2007; Nakata, 2007; Benwell, 2009; Elwood and Mitchell, 2012).
These studies have specifically sought to make visible the ways in which children address geopolitical and economic issues facing their community within the scopes made possible by their
everyday lives. As a result, they typically focus their interrogation on the micro-level social and
political influences of children’s every-day agency as well as the strategies they use and generate
to navigate both the local and global political environments. Samantha Punch’s fieldwork in
Tarija, Bolivia (2000, 2001, 2002 2003), for example, had attempted to dismantle the myth that
children in economically poor areas “have ‘abnormal childhoods”, by demonstrating their
capacity to navigate local spaces all the while finding ways and strategies to experience
meaningful and enjoyable childhoods. According to Punch, much of the literature on childhood
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has focused on minority world children (Western European and North American children)
because it has operated on the assumption that the dichotomy between child and adult parallels
that of play and work (e.g. James et al., 1998). To be a child means having the opportunity to
play, and work is typically assumed to be non-congruent with such an activity. But as Punch
highlights in her field work, the children of Tarija
frequently played while they were working or on the way to and
from their tasks. For example, Cira’s diary extract mentioned earlier
in this article indicates how children combine their household work
with opportunistic moments of play: ‘I went to fetch water and my
sister saw a little pigeon. We wanted to catch it but we couldn’t catch
the small pigeon, we fetched water and went to play football.’ She
combined her work with play as she tried to catch the pigeon while
she was out fetching water, then after completing the task she played
football before engaging in another work activity. (Punch 2003,
288)
As a result, these Bolivian children showed that despite carrying “significant workload for their
households” and being severely “constrained by financial resources and the isolation of their
rural environment” they were none-the-less able to “combine their work and school with play,
create their own childhood culture and move back and forth between adult and child-centered
worlds” (Ibid., 289). In other words, children were able to participate within the broader sociopolitical and economic life of their community without necessarily losing their childhood.
Children are therefore not only political agents within properly political spaces, but also
participate in the broader socio-political reproduction of their community at both the local and
national level qua children. We find similar ideas in the work of thinkers like Matthew Benwell
(2009), which discusses children’s ability to construct and negotiate their own mobility in postapartheid South Africa (Benwell, 2009), or Tatek Abebe (2007) which highlights Ethiopian
children’s social role in helping their community cope, both financially and emotionally, with the
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rise of neo-liberal capitalist economic structures and the impacts of HIV/AIDS in the region
(Abebe, 2007).
We can also find concrete examples in the United States where, despite having
normalized a privileged and romanticized view of childhood, many children find themselves in
the midst of political struggles without entering into properly “political spaces”. For example,
Sana Nakata (2008) demonstrates how Elizabeth Eckford’s actions at Little Rock Central High
School— one of the Little Rock nine who integrated LRCHS in 1957— as an example of
children’s everyday political agency. For Nakata, while Eckford herself “simply wanted the
opportunity to go to school”, her actions were already imbued with political meaning, thus
concluding that we cannot separate children and political agency so easily, even when it is
outside of what is considered a properly political space (Nakata, 2008, 24). Similar example can
be found today with children’s everyday lives being affected by larger local, national, and global
events such as school shootings (Grossberg, 2015), climate change (O’Brien et al., 2018), and
mass immigration/deportation—although not many studies have taken the time to elaborate how
children productively navigate their current socio-political and economic environments in the
United States.
However, this kind of research focuses specifically on how children engage a political
world that is first and foremost defined by adults. As Kallio and Hakli argue, children’s “political
agencies are currently recognized mainly through their involvement in processes and practices
led and deﬁned by adults—be these related to policy-making, administration, warfare, activism,
work or something else” (Kallio and Hakli, 2011a, 24). Rather, both authors have spearheaded
the need for a nuanced approach to political theory that can, not only help us recognize
childhood politics on its own terms, but in doing so, also productively expand our own
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understanding of what exactly constitutes the “political” (Kallio, 2007, 2014 2016; Kallio and
Hakli, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2014, 2018; Kallio et al. 2015; Bartos, 2012. 2013; Sletto and Diaz
2015). It is important to note the nuance and difficulty that Kallio and Hakli presents themselves
with this project. Unlike any of the projects outline above, their goal is to capture something
which is first and foremost outside of their own world horizon. They do not want to understand
children’s political agency in adult’s world, but grasp children’s political agency qua child. They
essentially take on the task of asking: what expression, if any, does the political take in
childhood? The point, however, is not to discover something which is already political in the
child, but hidden to the larger bulk of researchers. Rather they want to inquire as to whether or
not anything in childhood can be politicized. They see the borders of the political not as settled
but rather as dynamic and constituted in practice— i.e. the practices and struggles of particular
children with other children or adults (researchers, caretakers, teachers etc….) in certain spaces
through specific means. The question is therefore quite vast in its scope. It doesn’t merely ask
whether adults can recognize the political in childhood without falling into an adultist
perspective, but also whether children can politicize themselves and others in their own
practices.
They begin from “the fact that, as minors, [children] can rarely refuse to adopt the subject
positions offered to them” (Ibid., 27). But this does not mean that the child “feels himself
irresponsible” and is “allowed only to respect and obey” (Beauvoir, 1949, 35) As the previous
literature shows us, children “are not passive players who merely behave and follow certain
paths of development, but social actors in their own right, actively taking part in matters that
affect and interest them” (Kallio and Hakli, 2011 28). This tension, between children’s lack of
self-determination combined with the active role they take up in negotiating and adopting certain
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subjectivities is defining of childhood. This is not to say, at least from my own understanding,
that this tension is specific to childhood—although such a strong case could be argued—but that
it plays a significant role in specifically defining the political, and even ontological, scope of
childhood. Childhood politics, in other words, is a politics of subjectification and socialization.
This provides the authors with a “vantage point” from which they can begin to translate and
theorize childhood politics into a consistent publishable paper (Ibid.). Kalio (2007) gives us a
concrete example of such a politics in her analysis of Finnish children of war who were relocated
to Sweden during the 1940’s. As she summarizes,
The children, who had travelled a long way, arrived in Sweden in
foreign and strange circumstances. Some did not know why they had
been sent away, others had a poor understanding of where they had
landed and what was to happen next. The people guiding them did
not speak Finnish, which made the situation even more confusing.
The children were gathered into a refugee shelter, where they were
to be washed, examined, treated and sent on to foster homes … In
these circumstances, they had to find a way to fulfil the role assigned
to them: to become Finnish children of war in Sweden. This
involved tactical responses to strategic actions. (Kallio, 2007, 289)
She specifically identifies two tactical responses these children employed; a “politics of either
conformity or resistance” (Ibid., 286). On the one hand, some children resorted to a politics of
resistance as a means to gain greater control and freedom in their current situation. One
interviewee from a cited documentary describes “how she and two sisters clung tightly to each
other when they faced the threat of being located to different foster homes” (Ibid., 292).
Similarly, “another former war child recalls how he refused his placement to an unpleasant
family by persistently grabbing hold of the pillars of the car door” (Ibid.). Both of which were
successful. On the other, some children had resorted to a politics of conformity, through which
they “filled perfectly the role of a wartime child evacuee” (Ibid., 293). But, as Kallio cautions us,
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we should not read conformity in line with passivity since “tactics of conformity are no more
natural or neutral than those of resistance” (Ibid.). In adopting tactics of conformity, some Finish
war children were able to change and renegotiate their own subjectivity from a “docile body into
a daring one” (Ibid.). She exemplifies both of these tactics through the case of two sisters who
responded quite differently to their new environment. On the one hand, the older sister employed
a politics of resistance, practicing withdrawal to the point that the medical staff “were either to
question their own actions or to override children’s will to alter the policy or to deny children’s
own politics” (Ibid., 292). In order to avoid such situations, the staff had acquired sweets to bribe
the children with. But these were not enough to break the older sister’s resistance to
socialization. On the other hand, the younger sister similarly was not entirely compliant at the
beginning, at least not until the staff presented her with sweets; “The younger sisters went for the
sweets so decisively that, no matter what it took, they could not deny her the prize”— an act
which was perceived as “courageous” by the older sister (Ibid., 293). Both tactics exemplify
children’s successful capacities to renegotiate and reconstruct the Swedish government’s efforts
to socialize them into their society; to different consequences however. While, “resistance to the
policy allowed some children more freedom of (embodied) speech, conformity with the policy
offered the others a shelter.” (Ibid., 292)
This is just one example of the “multidirectional” process of subjectification, through
which children, “rather than proceeding consistently, mobilize practices and counter-practices in
a myriad of forms” (Kallio and Hakli, 2011a, 28) Another study by Gallacher, also quoted by the
authors, similarly attempts to highlight the ways in which children navigate and renegotiate a
space specifically designed to control and discipline them—"a large private nursery in East
Renfrewshire, Scotland” (Gallacher, 2006, 244) Using Foucault as a basis, she begins by giving
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us a spatial analysis of the nursery as a “functional site” of discipline, specifically pointing to its
particular temporal and spatial arrangements, as well as the “different styles of control” practiced
by its staff (Ibid., 253). Different spaces were codified in such a way that the children could only
do certain things, in certain parts of the room, at specific times. For example, the “music corner”
was open between the hours of 10:00 a.m., to 11:45 a.m., then again between 2:00 p.m. – 2:45
p.m., and again at 4:00 p.m. while the children waited to be called on to start their nap. This way
of demarcating time and space further allowed the staff to impose certain strategies of controls
such as “reminding them that they were under surveillance” or using “peer pressure” and praise
as a way to manipulate them into obedience (Ibid., 255). However, for Gallacher, this only told
half of the story:
The toddler room is undoubtedly a site of control, by both staff and
parents (among others). However, the variety of styles of control
used in the toddler room suggest that children are not passive objects
of (child)care who submissively internalise nursery structures and
rules. The ‘terrible twos’ are about control; children are learning to
control themselves and to take control for themselves. As such, they
are discovering that they can, to some extent, manipulate others and
negotiate the use of space to their own ends. The toddler room staff
were aware of some level of manipulation by the children,
particularly in those children typiﬁed as ‘manipulative’ (King,
1978). However, this does not mean that other children were not
manipulative; more subtle attempts at manipulation may have gone
unnoticed. There was a very deﬁnite ‘underlife’ in the toddler room
composed of various ‘secondary adjustments’, or ways of breaking
and getting around the rules (Goffman, 1968). (Gallacher, 2006,
256)
Children, in other words, also subverted and renegotiated these spaces of control for their own
sake through the formulation of a peer-culture. Instances of this “underlife” or “peer-culture” are
exemplified by routines such as banging on their plates while awaiting food, climbing benches in
the music corner to observe staff on breaks, or transgressing the particular rules of a space by
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“running across the room and jumping on the sleep mats piled up in story book corner” which “
subverted the staff coding of storybook corner” (Ibid., 257).
One example in particular which demonstrates how children were taking “control for
themselves” revolved around a particularly specific space in the nursery— the play house.
Primarily thanks to its small size and the lack of visibility it provided from the outside, the play
house became “the primary site for the creation and extension of underlife routines in the toddler
room” (Ibid.). For example, Gallagher recounts an event between three toddlers (Thomas,
Louise, and Kelsey) and one of the staff (ASHLEY).
The children were called over to the music corner for singing and
stories. Some children went into the play house instead. ASHLEY
told them to come out and join the other children in the music
corner. Thomas and Louise came out reluctantly when told but
Louise slammed the door as she came out. Kelsey still refused to
come out, hiding in the far corner instead. ASHLEY walked away
from the house so Kelsey came over to the window but when she saw
ASHLEY coming back she ran away again. ASHLEY reached into
the house and tried to get Kelsey to come out but she fought against
her. Once Kelsey was ﬁnally out of the house ASHLEY told her
ﬁrmly, ‘It’s not nice to hit the ladies’, and sent her over to sit with
the other children. (Ibid., 258)
This example not only highlights the chaos and creative potential happening within the
playhouse, this particular event also demonstrates how the children of the nursery often made use
of the “system against each other” by calling in staff to resolve disputes (Ibid.). Hence, just as the
Finish war children, these nursery toddlers were able to reconstruct and negotiate the space of
their subjectification, although not through a politics of resistance and conformity, but through
“asserting some control over and negotiating their own uses of childcare space” (Ibid., 261).
Taken together, these three lines of research give us a much more complex, dynamic, and
multilayered view of childhood than we find in the western philosophical canon. They, at the
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very least show us that the majority of western (political) philosophy’s ideas about childhood
are, at best, a superficial and cartoonish characterization, and at worst, a gross misappropriation
for their own theoretical and political ends. And it is hard to defend the majority of philosophical
works which reduce childhood to an ontology of a not yet adult, when the last 20-30 years of
childhood studies have shown quite plainly that children have plenty to say.
4. The Deficiency Model of Childhood and Political Philosophy
What do these empirical studies on childhood agency tell us about the deficit model, Rawls’
Political Liberalism and other political philosophies which use this concept? First and foremost,
it tells us, quite clearly, that the deficit model of childhood tendency to reduce childhood to a
process makes it a vastly inadequate political or philosophical concept. Indeed, one of the key
points highlighted by each of the author’s discussed in the previous section is that childhood
does not only represent a process of becoming (i.e. a not yet), but also and at the same time, a
being (Arneil, 2002; Kalio and Hakli, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). The deficit model narrows our
focus on childhood to a means or process towards an end. Whether we are talking about children
becoming adults, or childhood as a conceptual means to an adultist theoretical end, the deficit
model leaves us blind to the actual and concrete political and moral capacities of children.
However, this research demonstrates quite clearly that children are community leaders (Guerra,
2002), political lobbyists (Matthews et al., 1999), workers (Punch, 2003), caretakers (Abebe,
2007), soldiers (Hyndman, 2010), activists (Nakata, 2008), and political agents (Kalio, and
Hakli, 2011a). In other words, it shows us that the immanent and empirical nature of childhood
goes way beyond the scope allowed by something like biology.
Furthermore, it shows us that, in adopting a deficit model, we are not so much representing
childhood’s own nature, as much as we are offering an idealized and empirically detached
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version of it. This makes it quite useful as a concept, since it becomes unrestricted from the
bounds of empirical reality, but can also misrepresents, sometimes even repulsively, the nature of
childhood itself. Because the deficit model draws its conceptual content from the nature of
adulthood, childhood can represent anything that displays a lack of adulthood. Childhood, in this
sense, can represent anything from the predicament of individuals in the state of nature, as with
Shapiro, to that of a whole entire continent or race of people, as with Hegel (cf. Rollo, 2018). It,
in other words, becomes depicted an empty concept always having to gain its content and
function from the external and more authoritative source of adulthood. But these studies have
shown precisely the opposite, rather displaying a form of childhood that can, whether we are
talking about adult or child politics, generate, rebuild, navigate and compromise in its own ways.
They show us, in other words, how children can be political (and even philosophical) agents
without having to shed their immaturity—i.e. a child’s way of doing politics.
Finally, they tell us that, unlike the deficit model would have us believe, childhood is not a
singular unified transcendental phenomenon. Childhood, on the contrary, is a dynamic,
pluralistic, and intersectional category that can only be appropriately addressed in its empirical
reality— i.e. by interacting with the concrete multitudes of children across the world. It is
dynamic in so far as childhood can be expressed differently across different localities and
histories (Abebe, 2019). For example, we saw that childhood in Scotland, where children can
participate in national politics, is very different than the childhood in Tajira, Bolivia where work
plays a major role in children’s everyday lives, or the expression of childhood in Ethiopia that
has to deal with the consequences of neo-liberal capitalism and HIV/AIDS, or that of CapeTown South Africa which has to navigate a post-apartheid world. It is pluralistic in so far as it is
not possible to understand the full scope of children’s agency and social affects without turning
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to other disciplines. For example, many of the authors mentioned in the previous sections come
from sociology, geography, education, political science and regional studies departments, some
of whom even used philosophers such as Hannah Arendt, Michel De Certeau, Gilles Deleuze,
and Carl Schmitt as tools to develop their own ideas. But childhood is not merely philosophical,
as these studies show, it is also spatial, historical, sociological, psychological, biological, and
even political. Finally, childhood encompasses a multitude of identities. While this point has not
received any attention in this chapter, it should be obvious that children’s lives lie at the
intersection of sexual, racial, class, religious and national identities.
Secondly, they tell us that the stability of Rawls’s political system is grounded in an
incomplete conception of childhood, that fails to highlights the relevance of children’s own
productive agencies in their moral development. Rawls’ comments on childhood are not only
scare, but also widely narrow in their scope. If the view of childhood depicted in A Theory of
Justice were to be actual, then the perfect child would merely be an imitation machine who
passively takes in their moral cues from older more virtuous members of their community—
whether it be the family, their local associations, of humanity in general. But it is clear from the
empirical studies presented above that children are anything but that. None-the-less, Rawls and
the more than 300-year-old tradition of liberal philosophy, continue to operate under such
presumption. This is because, as the first three chapters of this dissertation has aimed to show,
liberalism necessitates this conceptualization of childhood to theorize the possibility of its own
stability. But the fact that children are active agents in the world, and not voiceless adults in the
making, greatly problematizes the justification of parental power discussed in chapter 3. As we
can remember, children’s lack of agency is the main driver for deploying the well-being thesis. It
is because the child is a deficient adult, that liberal thinkers are able to imbue childhood with
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their own values and philosophical commitments. However, since the child’s own nature
expresses more than just a mere deficient version of the adulthood, we can no longer ground the
moral legitimacy of parental paternalism on the child’s well-being qua future adult. Quite on the
contrary, recognizing children’s agency would mean having to rethink the liberal justification of
paternalism in conjunction with children’s own dynamic and multifaceted nature as social and
political agents. In so far as we would have to recognize children’s own agency into our
justification, we would have to go beyond liberalism’s own normative commitments to rational
and reasonable autonomy, to properly justify our paternalistic attitudes. What this essentially
entails, is that this view of childhood cannot be used as a means to ensure the theoretical stability
of his system. It could be, and is most likely is the case, that recognizing children’s agency
would entail accepting paternalistic acts that would not be condoned by liberal theory – like child
work— and rejecting some that would be—like putting young children on leashes for their
safety.
As a result, this research also reaffirms the feminist notion that “the personal is political” by
calling into question the very possibility of a distinction between public and private spheres. As
we saw in chapter 2 and 3, the child qua deficient adult functions as a clear demarcation of the
private sphere as something isolated from the public terms of justice. While adults with a sense
of justice are assumed to be able to travel between both spheres by virtue of their rational and
reasonable nature, the child is barred from participating in public affairs because of its moral
immaturity. In other words, while the adult demonstrates a congruency between private and
public, thus blurring the nature of the distinction itself, the private nature of childhood none-theless functions as a concrete way to keep the two separated. Children are wholly private beings by
virtue of their nature as a becoming, and as a result, represent a predicament within which justice
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is unable to operate—i.e. a state of nature as Schapiro puts it. But the research outlined above
shows us the very socio-political nature of childhood. They, like adults, also enter into what
liberal thinkers would call the public sphere and actively shape it at the local, national, and
global level. As we saw, this is not only in the sense that children are active participants in
government and policy-making, but also, as the second and third line of research shows, in their
mundane everyday lives as children. In fact, it most often seems the case that children are forced
to enter the public sphere of political justice. Like how the Little Rock community forced
Elizabeth Beckford into becoming an icon of the civil rights movement, or how the history of
western colonialism and neo-liberal global economics have forced children in Bolivia, Ethiopia,
and South-Africa (and in fact the entire world) into certain political, social, and economic roles.
Thus, similarly to how feminists have argued that women’s lives in the family is not a-political,
these thinkers show that children are also not distinct or wholly isolated from the public sphere,
but are very much intermingled with it.
While comparable to the feminist critic “the personal is political”, this research on childhood
agency brings with it a particular nuance that must be pointed out. As we saw in the last chapter,
Rawls is able to mitigate the feminist concern about injustice in the family by affirming the
primacy of women’s status as free and equal citizens. As a result, because women are citizens
before being wives, they have both the right to plan their own life according to their own private
rational desires (as long as it doesn’t hinder the political stability of the society), and can use the
political system of justice established as a means to protect this right. But we also saw that Rawls
cannot do the same with regards to children. Because children are “future citizens” who have to
be treated unequally, he cannot legitimately claim the use justice as a means to correct injustices
toward children; after all injustice is required for them to develop a sense of justice. And no one
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denies that the principles of liberal justice are inadequate for raising children. But if the personal
lives of children are often political, then Rawls can no longer defend the distinction between
public and private as he does in responding to Susan Okin. The studies show us that even as
unequal individuals with rights grounded in their status as future citizens, children actively
participate in shaping the political, economic, and social landscape of their community. They do
not necessarily wait for permission or recognition, and are not afraid to take on political positions
as responsible actors—even though they may not realize that this is what they are doing. In other
words, the studies show that childhood agency forcefully breaks through the public/private
distinction. This is not to say that women’s agency or any other oppressed identity does not do
this. Rather the nuanced element of this research comes from the fact that childhood is a
universal fact of human life. Everyone, even those in power today (i.e. white cis-gendered
heterosexual adult men), were at some point children; that is, navigating and reconstructing a
particular kind of social and political space in a way that was deeply connected with their own
private lives. As a result, what these studies do, is put the final nail in the coffin of the
public/private distinction, by universalizing its rejection. Even those who claim the public for
themselves as a way to assert political dominance, had, at some point, acted contrary to this
theoretical and political position and demonstrated its illegitimacy— Rawls included. Overall,
we have to either conclude that liberalism is an inadequate political philosophy for ensuring
children’s well-being, since this well-being requires us to go beyond the parameters allotted by
liberal theory, or we have to accept, what could be very well called the structural oppression of
children, as a legitimate and necessary element of liberal politics (specifically with regards to its
stability).
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But we should not limit ourselves to bounds of liberal theory. For, as the first section of this
chapter illustrated, liberal theory is just one tradition in a long history of western philosophers
misunderstanding childhood. Whether we look at the ancients, the scholastics, the social contract
theorists, the marxists, or the existentialists, we almost always find one of the two faces of
childhood supported by pillars of idealism. There are some obvious exceptions such as the works
Friedrich Nietzsche (1885) or Emmanuel Levinas (1961) who both saw childhood as a
generative force and source value. But even these are typically underscored by the lack of
children’s agency. As a result, we currently inhabit an intellectual culture that, while openly
discussing the nature of childhood and its normative status, never actually interacts with concrete
children, and fails to create spaces of research within which the philosophical agency of
childhood can come to light.
It should be noted that in recent years, more and more philosophers have made an honest
effort to rectify this misconception (cf. Bath, 2011; Carel and Györffy, 2014; Lone, 2015;
Burroughs and Tollefsen, 2016; Grootens-Wiegers et al., 2018). This is specifically the case with
practitioners of philosophy with children who promote engaging with children in philosophical
dialogue and actively listening to them as possible competent agents. For example, Burroughs
and Tollefsen (2016) correctly argue that
In large part, the child develops an identity as a reliable (speaker)
testifier (or fails to do so) in virtue of her treatment by the adult.
When a child is offered recognition as a knower by the adult and
approached through active listening she is, in most cases, capable of
telling the adult a great deal and, further, she can develop forms of
self-regard – self-confidence, self-esteem, self-respect – that are
essential to agency. (Burroughs and Tollefsen, 2016, 375)
The point here being that in order to recognize the philosophical agency of children (or any
agency for that matter), children themselves have to be given a fair chance at being taken
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seriously as knowers, thinkers, problem-solvers, and testifiers. However, the emphasis on
participation, while being remarkable in its own right, not only overlooks the majority of the
world’s children, but also the agency that children demonstrate as everyday agents. It is clear that
children suffer from epistemic injustice, and it is a problem which needs to be addressed. But it
is mistaken to think that children are waiting for adults to give them a fair shot at agency. This is
certainly true for certain things, but as the second and third line of research presented above
demonstrates, it overlooks a major portion of childhood’s epistemic, political, moral, and social
agency.
Alongside a commitment to actively listen, philosophers should practice more broadly what
Gallacher and Gallagher call “methodological immaturity” when engaging with children and
childhood. They propose that “if research is to achieve anything, it should proceed from a
position of ignorance” (Gallacher and Gallagher, 2008, 512). After all, and especially when it
comes to childhood studies, adult researchers often have to enter into somewhat alien spaces that
may or may not be familiar. In adopting this immature attitude, we therefore “begin to think of
research as experimentation”; “not simply reporting a world that exists ‘out-there’, but …
creating and experimenting with an emergent one” (Ibid.). This position of ignorance and
vulnerability, according to them, allows us to see particular things that could not be recognized
before. For example, Gallacher describes an event with her research notepad during her work at
the Scottish nursery.
The toddlers involved in Lesley’s project could not yet read or write
– indeed, many of them had little spoken language – but they were
fascinated by her notebook nevertheless. Many of the children were
keen to look at the notebook, and to use Lesley’s pen to draw in it,
often right on top of Lesley’s attempts at notetaking. Sometimes this
artwork obscured the notes so much as to render them unreadable.
The children would also touch the notebook with paint-covered
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hands, leaving painty fingerprints all over the notebook that stuck
the pages together once the paint had dried, and they would
accidentally – possibly purposefully – rip the pages as they looked
through the notebook. (ibid., 507-508)
While this certainly wouldn’t be considered active participation, Gallacher’s willingness to be
vulnerable allowed her access to an otherwise hidden underlife of the nursery. In allowing the
children to manipulate her, she was “able to appropriate their activities as data for [her] research”
(ibid., 509). As a result, these studies show us that philosophers still have a ways to go before
being able to claim that they understand children and childhood. Rather than narrowing our
interactions with children to adult spaces like schools and courts, they need to take more
initiative in letting the children dictate their own spaces—something which is, unfortunately,
extremely difficult in the United States because of an ideology that seeks to isolate children from
the adult world. None-the-less, if political philosophers want to speak of childhood, what they
need to do is first create spaces of research within which they can not only listen, but also allow
themselves to be vulnerable and manipulated by children. Only in letting children be children
can we generate important and nuanced philosophical insights about childhood.
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